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  ﺴﺘﺨﻠﺺُﻤاﻟـ
  
ﻣﺔ اﻟﺘﻌѧѧﺮف ﻋﻠѧѧﻲ  اﻟﺠﻮاﻧѧѧﺐ اﻟﻔﻨﻴѧѧﺔ واﻹدارﻳѧѧﺔ ﻟﻠﺴѧѧﻼإﻟѧѧﻰ اﻟﺒﺤѧѧﺚ ﻳﻬѧѧﺪف هѧѧﺬا 
وﺗﻘﻮﻳﻤﻬѧѧѧﺎ  واﺳﺘﻘﺼѧѧѧﺎء اﻟﻨѧѧѧﻮاﻗﺺ واﻟﻀѧѧѧﻌﻒ واﺳѧѧѧﺘﺨﺪام اﻷﺳѧѧѧﺎﻟﻴﺐ واﻟﻄѧѧѧﺮق اﻟﺴѧѧѧﻠﻴﻤﺔ 
ﺘﺸѧﻜﻴﻞ ﻧﻤѧﻮذج ﻟﻨﻈѧﺎم إدارة اﻟﺴѧﻼﻣﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﱠѧﺎل واﻟﺤѧﺪﻳﺚ ﻟﻤﻄѧﺎر ﻟ وﻣﻘﺘѧﺮحﻟﺘﺤﺴѧﻴﻦ اﻷداء 
  .اﻟﺨﺮﻃﻮم اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ
ﺗﺒﻨѧѧﻲ اﻟﺒﺤѧѧﺚ اﻟﻤѧѧﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﻮﺻѧѧﻔﻲ ـ اﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻠѧѧﻲ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿѧѧﺎﻓﺔ إﻟѧѧﻰ اﻟﻤѧѧﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﻳﺒѧѧﻲ 
ﺷѧﻤﻠﺖ اﻟﻤﺼѧﺎدر اﻷوﻟﻴѧﺔ  .اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﻳﺔواﻟﻤﺼﺎدر اﻷوﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ  ﺟﻤﻌﺖ اﻟﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎت، (اﻷﺑﻴﺮﻳﻘﻲ)
ﻬﻴﺌѧѧﺔ اﻟﻄﻴѧѧﺮان ﻟ ًﺎﻣﻮﻇﻔѧѧ 051 ﺷѧѧﻤﻠﺖ وزﻋѧѧﺖ ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ ﻋﻴﻨѧѧﺔ ﻋﺸѧѧﻮاﺋﻴﺔ ﺣﻴѧѧﺚ اﻻﺳѧѧﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ 
  .اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻣﻮﻇﻔﻲ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻄﺎر اﻟﺨﺮﻃﻮم اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ
رﻳﺮ اﻟﺴѧﻨﻮﻳﺔ أﻣﺎ اﻟﻤﺼﺎدر اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎت، ﻓﻘﺪ ﺷѧﻤﻠﺖ اﻟﻜﺘѧﺐ واﻟﻤﺮاﺟѧﻊ واﻟﺘﻘѧﺎ 
ﻟﻬﻴﺌѧﺔ اﻟﻄﻴѧﺮان اﻟﻤѧﺪﻧﻲ وﺗﻘѧﺎرﻳﺮ اﻟﺤѧﻮادث واﻟﺪراﺳѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼѧﺔ ﺑﻬѧﺬا اﻟﻤﻮﺿѧﻮع ﻋѧﻦ 
ﻟﻘﻴﺎس اﻷهﻤﻴﺔ وﻣﻌﺎﻣﻞ اﻻرﺗﺒﺎط ﻟﻘﻴѧﺎس ( آﺎي ـ ﺗﺮﺑﻴﻊ )ﺎر ﺒاﺧﺘاﺳُﺘﺨﺪم . ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺴﻼﻣﺔ
ﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴѧѧﻞ وﺗﻘѧѧﻮﻳﻢ ( SSPS)اﺳѧѧﺘﺨﺪﻣﺖ اﻟﺤѧѧﺰم اﻹﺣﺼѧѧﺎﺋﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠѧѧﻮم اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴѧѧﺔ واﻟﻌﻼﻗѧﺔ، 
  .ﺑﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺤﻮادث
 ، وﻋﻠѧﻰ أن اﻟﻈﺮوف اﻹدارﻳﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﺆﺛﺮ ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺑﻴﺌѧﺔ اﻟﻌﻤѧﻞ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ إﻟﻰ  ﺗﻮﺻﻞ
ﻣﻨﺎﺧﻴѧѧﺔ  ًﺎﻇﺮوﻓѧѧأن وآﻤѧѧﺎ  .اﻟﺴѧѧﻼﻣﺔﻳﻬѧѧﺪﱢد ﻋѧѧﺪم آﻔﺎﻳѧѧﺔ ﻣﻌѧѧﺪات اﻻﺗﺼѧѧﺎل واﻟﻀѧѧﺒﻂ، ﻣﻤѧѧﺎ 
إﻟѧﻰ وﻗѧﻮع ﺣѧﻮادث ﻗѧﺪ أدت ﺎﻟﺒﻨﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴѧﺔ ﻟﻤﻄѧﺎر اﻟﺨﺮﻃѧﻮم اﻟѧﺪوﻟﻲ، ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑوأﺧﺮى 
ﻩ ﺷѧﺮآﺎت ﺧѧﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻄﻴѧﺮان، آѧﺎن اﻟﻄﻴﺮان، ﺑﺠﺎﻧﺐ أن دور هﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻄﻴѧﺮان اﻟﻤѧﺪﻧﻲ ﺗﺠѧﺎ 
  .ﻣﺤﺪودًا وﺿﻌﻴﻔًﺎ
أهﺪاف اﻟﺒﺤﺚ، اﻗﺘﺮﺣﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻧﻤﻮذﺟًﺎ ﻟﻨﻈﺎم إدارة اﻟﺴﻼﻣﺔ، واﻟﺬي اﺳﺘﻮﻋﺐ 
اﻟﺠﻮاﻧѧѧѧﺐ اﻟﺴѧѧѧѧﺎﻟﺒﺔ واﻟﻨѧѧѧﻮاﻗﺺ ﻓѧѧѧﻲ اﻟﻮﺿѧѧѧѧﻊ اﻟѧѧѧﺮاهﻦ وﺣѧѧѧﺪدت ﻣﻮاﺻѧѧѧﻔﺎت  وﻏﻄѧѧѧﻰ
اﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴѧѧﺎ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜѧѧﺔ وأﺳѧѧﺎﻟﻴﺐ اﻟﺴѧѧﻼﻣﺔ، ﺣﺴѧѧﺐ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒѧѧﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤѧѧﺔ اﻟﺪوﻟﻴѧѧﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﻴѧѧﺮان 
واﻟﻠﻮاﺋﺢ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴѧﺔ وأﻓﻀѧﻞ اﻟﻤﻤﺎرﺳѧﺎت ﻓѧﻲ ﻣﺠѧﺎل اﻟﻄﻴѧﺮان، وآѧﺬﻟﻚ ( OACI)اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ 
  .أوﺻﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﻤﺮار اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻄﻮﻳﺮ اﻟﺴﻼﻣﺔ
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Abstract  
 The present study aimed at identifying and assessing the 
technical and administrative aspects of safety in Khartoum 
International Airport. It investigates the shortcomings, 
weaknesses and adoption of appropriate means for improving 
the performance. It proposes a model for effective and modern 
Safety Management System for the Airport. 
 The research adopted the descriptive – analytical 
approach; in addition to the empirical approach, for the purpose 
of analysis. The data were collected from primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources included a questionnaire involving 
a random sample of 150 members of the Civil Aviation 
Authority staff and staff of different companies working at 
Khartoum International Airport. 
The secondary sources of data were books, references, 
annual reports of the Civil Aviation Authority, accidents reports 
and relevant studies on topics concerning safety issues. The 
analytic tools used were the (Chi-square) test for measuring the 
significance and the coefficient of correlation for measuring 
relationship. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was 
used for analysis and evaluation of the accidents data. 
 The main findings of the study are that, the current 
administrative conditions affect the working environment. The 
available communication means and control are not conducive 
for enhancing safety and there is a weak administrative body. 
Also, climatic conditions and infrastructure at Khartoum 
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International Airport are among the causes of aviation accidents; 
beside the fact that the role of Civil Aviation Authority towards 
aviation service companies was limited and weak.     
 The study proposed a model for Safety Management 
System, which addressed the objectives of the research, covered 
the negative aspects and shortcomings of the current situation 
and specified modern techniques in the field of safety, according 
to the requirements of the International Civil Aviation 
Origination (ICAO), national regulations and the best practices 
in the aviation field, concerning safety aspects. The study 
recommended further studies for safety development. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1. Background  
In recent years, a considerable effort has been devoted to understand how 
accidents happen in aviation sector. It is generally accepted that most accidents 
result from human errors. It would be easy to conclude that these human errors 
indicate carelessness or incompetence on the job, but that would not be accurate. 
Investigators findings show that the human beings are the last link in a chain that 
leads to an accident. Accidents will not be prevented by changing people; 
nevertheless, they will only be stopped by addressing the underlying causes and 
factors [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2001]. 
In the 1990’s the term “organizational accident” was coined because most 
of the links in an accident chain are under the control of the organization. Since 
the greatest threats to aviation safety originate in organizational issues, then to 
make the system more safe will required action by the organization [Transport 
Canada Civil Aviation, 2001]. 
The responsibility for safety and effective safety management is shared 
among a wide spectrum of organizations and institutions, including: 
international organizations, State authorities on Civil Aviation, owners and 
operators, service providers for air navigation services and aerodromes. These 
responsibilities fall into the following areas [International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), 2006]: 
• Defining policies and standards affecting safety. 
• Allocating resources to sustain risk in management activities. 
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• Identifying and evaluating safety hazards. 
• Taking actions to eliminate hazards or reduce the associated level of risk 
to what has been decided as being an acceptable level of risk. 
• Incorporating technical advances in the design and maintenance of 
equipment. 
• Conducting safety oversight and safety programme evaluation. 
• Investigating accidents and serious incidents. 
• Adopting the most appropriate and best industrial practices. 
• Promoting aviation safety (including the exchange of safety-related 
information).  
• Updating regulations of governing Civil Aviation safety. 
Safety Management System (SMS) is a systematic, explicit and 
comprehensive process for managing safety likewise all management systems 
which were woven into the fabric of an organization. It becomes part of the 
culture, the way people do their jobs.  A safety management system will provide 
an organization with the capacity to anticipate and address safety issues before 
they lead to an incident or accident. A safety management system also provides 
management with the ability to deal effectively with accidents and near misses 
so that valuable lessons are applied to improve safety and efficiency. The safety 
management system approach reduces losses and improves productivity 
[Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2001]. 
1.2. Sudan Civil Aviation Authority  
Sudan Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) was established in 1936 during 
the British colonial era, as a department under the British administrative 
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secretary, where its function was limited to issuing overlying and landing 
permissions. After Independence in 1956, Civil Aviation Department was 
nationalized and joined the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 
the same year. In 1985 the Civil Aviation Department was changed to an 
independent authority bearing the name Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) by 
virtue of a presidential decree. In the year 2005, an independent body named the 
"Civil Aviation Authority" was attached to the Ministry of Presidential Affairs 
[Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 2007]. 
The main function of the Civil Aviation Authority is to provide services 
for air transport industry including; security, aircraft safety, regulating air 
transport and construction and management of airports. Sudan Civil Aviation 
Authority (SCAA) is committed to its functions according to the Civil Aviation 
Act 1999. It is also committed to all international regulations issued by ICAO 
[Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 2007]. 
1.2.1. Sudan Civil Aviation Authority Objectives  
Sudan Civil Aviation Authority Objectives are described as follows [Sudan 
Civil Aviation Authority, 2007]: 
1. Develop all sorts of aviation services in order to provide the most up to date 
quality services to boost strategic and commercial air transport activities 
together with ensuring the safety of Sudanese skies.  
2. Represent Sudan in international and regional for active participation in the 
fields of Civil Aviation and air transport. 
3. Develop civil aviation performance, promote local and international air 
transport and ensure its safety, technical, administrative and economic 
aspects; so as to serve the national interests of the country. 
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4.   Undertake the studies and researchers for the provision of a complete 
package of aviation services. 
5. Provide high quality equipment in airports and aviation activities to cope 
with international standards required by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). 
6. Represent Sudan in meetings held by the international, regional or 
specialized aviation organizations. 
 Sudan Civil Aviation Authority Responsibilities  
Sudan Civil Aviation Authority responsibilities fall into the following [Sudan 
Civil Aviation Authority, 2007]:  
2. Provide air traffic services including air inspecting and telecommunication 
services. 
3. Laying down the basic structures of a reliable aeronautical industry and 
business including issuing licenses, regulation services for passenger, mail 
and cargo transport. 
4. It is responsible for issuance of airworthiness for aircrafts and licenses for 
pilots, engineers, and airlines. 
5. Establishment and management of airports and communication navigation 
networks in consistence with the ICAO's standards.    
1.2.3. Sudan Civil Aviation Authority Departments: 
The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority consists of a Board of Directors and a 
Director General whose office comprises the following (Legal Advisors, 
National Training Institute, Accident Investigation and Prevention Public 
Relations, Executive Office and a Secretariat).  The General Directorates of the 
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Civil Aviation Authority are described as follows [Sudan Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2006]: 
1. General Directorate for Engineering Affairs. 
2. General Directorate for Air Navigation Services. 
3. General Directorate for Corporate Planning and Development. 
4. General Directorate Financial Affairs, Accounting and Supplies. 
5. General Directorate for Aviation Affairs and Safety. 
6. General Directorate for Administration Affairs. 
7. General Directorate for Security, Regional Airports and Airstrip. 
8.  General Directorate for Khartoum International Airport. 
Figure (1-1) Explains the Sudan Civil Aviation Authority Organizational 
Structure.  
1.3. Khartoum International Airport  
Khartoum airport was established in the wake of the Second World War 
in 1947. The expansion began in 1956 by constructing the control tower and the 
aeronautical telecommunication centre. A passenger terminal for international 
flight was established in the sixties of the last century.  A terminal for domestic 
flights was established, as well as VIP and the presidential lounges. However, 
there were no dates available in the airport files for the construction of these 
facilities [Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 2007]. 
       Khartoum airport is located in the heart of the city of Khartoum; 2.5 km 
from the city centre at longitude 32E and latitude 15.35N and height 1260 feet 
above sea level.  There is in the airport a paved runway of 2980m length and  
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Figure 1.1: Sudan Civil Aviation Authority Organizational Structure [Sudan 
Civil Aviation Authority, 2006] 
45m width with runway lighting. It has in addition to five taxiways .The total 
area of the apron is 10400m2 [Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 2007].  
1.4. Research Problem 
 Khartoum Airport is an international airport and it's considered number 
one airport in the Sudan in terms of the volume of air traffic and its location in 
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the capital. However, the current situation lacks the safety implementation for 
operating the airport due to the following problems: 
• Most of the air accidents which occurred in Sudan has caused great 
casualties and material damage, which necessitate the provision of high 
levels of safety and precautionary means.  
• Lack of coordination between the technical capabilities and human 
resources management led to deficiency in the achievement of safety 
objectives.  
• Formulation of an adequate model of safety to address the shortcomings 
in the existing situation. 
1.5. Objectives of the Study 
1. Assessing and evaluating the technical aspect of safety at Khartoum 
Airport.                   
2. Identifying modern technology in the field of safety at the international 
levels and standards and comparing them with the existing situation at 
Khartoum Airport.   
3. Identifying the shortcomings, weaknesses and adopting the appropriate 
means for improving the performance. 
4. Formulating an advance scientific and practical mechanism for avoidance 
of incidents, accidents and safety realization.  
5. Linking support units for safety inside and outside the airport with the 
appropriate technologies. 
6. Devising modern technical control systems in operations maintenance and 
supervision levels. 
7. Formulating effective and modern safety management system. 
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8. Determination and provision of minimum level of necessary technique 
and resource capabilities, as well as identification of alternatives when 
need arises as safety regards. 
9. Formulation of a sustainable strategy and automatic development 
mechanism to introduce and Implement modern technology. 
1.6. Hypothesis of the Study 
1. The working environment at Khartoum Airport is not suitable for good 
performance and the current system lacks an effective administrative body. 
2. The ineffective administrative body was behind the current negative 
situation and the unclear definition of the responsibilities. 
3. The current ineffective administrative condition affects the training 
programmes that affect the worker's proficiency in levels of maintenance 
and operation. 
4. The current system lacks of effective administrative body led to aviation 
accidents in both technical and administrative causes and this in tern, led to 
the shortcomings in the plans and programs of performance and change. 
5. The alternative and choices in dealing with emergencies are ineffective, as 
a result of insufficient apparatuses of communication and control. 
6. Climatic conditions are among the causes which led to aviation accidents, 
as a result of unsuitable working environment at Khartoum Airport. 
7. The infrastructure at Khartoum Airport is insufficient for the best safety 
achievement. 
1.7. Research Methodology 
       Study adopts the descriptive analytical approach as it was deemed the most 
suitable one for the study, besides the requirements and standards of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the concept of Total Quality 
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Management (TQM) and the International Standards Organization (ISO) 
according to the following issues:    
• Uses technical Analysis and evaluation available means and potentialities, 
and studying the modern technologies in safety as well as identifying needs. 
• Review administrative aspects level and efficiency of existing system. 
• Measure the feasibility of existing system in terms of technical and 
technological aspect and means of support of the proposed SMS as a new 
system.  
1.8. Sources and Tools of Data Collection 
The sources and tools of data collection are as follows:  
1.  Primary Sources:  
 Primary sources comprise field works, direct interviews, preparing and 
analyzing questionnaire results for 150 samples of study population and 
analyzing of 20 years accidents data.  
2.  Secondary Sources: 
Books, studies, references, research papers, professional and scientific 
papers in the fields of the study published and unpublished studies and web 
sites. 
1.9.  Study Limitation 
The scope of the study is confined to the recent conditions of Khartoum 
Airport in all study topics and time limitation was a period of 21 years from 
1988-2008, as data during this period is available.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review  
2.1. Safety Management System  
2.1.1. Introduction 
The frequency of incidents and accidents has shown a steady rising and 
developments, likewise, the air traffic density and numbers of aircrafts movements has 
shown an increase. The driving force of all the actors in the aviation community is 
profit related. Safety has had low priority among the service providers, and either the 
importance is not well understood or utterly neglected. The situation is that safety is so 
self-evident that is taken for granted and not integrated at all in some instances. It must 
be understood that increase in capacity and profit will not sell to the traveling public 
unless safety requirements are satisfied [Svensson, 2002]. Figure (2-1), (2-2) & (2-3) 
show hull loss accidents, passengers and freight carried in worldwide in sequence. 
Safety management system is a process for the management of safety risks that 
integrates operations and technical systems with financial and human resource 
management, for all activities related to an air operator or an approved maintenance 
organization’s certificate.  In common with all management systems a safety 
management system provides for goal setting, planning, and measuring performance. It 
concerns itself with organizational safety rather than the conventional health and safety 
at work concerns. A company’s SMS defines how it intends the management of air 
safety to be conducted as an integral part of the company’s business management 
activities [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2002]. 
                        Risk assessment, incursion prevention program, awareness, education and 
training aid are intended to provide a standardized safety program from “Gate to Gate” 
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for the aviation community. Action to distribute the training aid will raise the level of 
awareness among the industry and thus reduce occurrence of accidents. These are the 
main issues for creating a safety management system [Svensson, 2002]. 
The organizational structures and activists that make up a safety management 
system are found throughout an organization, every employee in every department 
contributes to the safety of the organization. In some departments safety management 
activity will be more visible than in others, but the system must be integrated into “the 
way things are done” throughout the establishment. This will be achieved by the 
implementation and continuing support of a safety program based on a coherent policy 
that leads to well designed procedures [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2002]. The 
aim of the SMS is to ensure the highest possible operational safety for air traffic and its 
associated services, under observation of statutory provisions, whereas guaranteed 
maximum runway safety for aircraft is of prime importance [Association of German 
Airports, 2002]. Figure (2-4) explains the objectives of the safety management system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Hull Loss Accidents per Million Movements for Western Built Jets, 
1994-2003 [Australian Brisbane Airport Corporation, 2006] 
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Figure 2.2: Passengers Carried on Scheduled Air Services, 1997-
2006[International Civil Aviation Organization Journal, 2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Freight Tonnes Carried (millions), 1997-2006[International Civil 
Aviation Organization Journal, 2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: the Objectives of the Safety Management System [Association of 
German Airports, 2002] 
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2.1.2. The Airport as a System 
The airport forms an essential part of the air transport system, because it is the 
physical site at which an auxiliary transfer is made from the air mode to land modes. 
Therefore, it is the point of interaction of the three major components of the air 
transport system: the airport, airline, and users. The planning and operation of airports 
must, if they are to be successful, take into account the interaction of these three major 
components, or system actors. 
For the system to operate well, each of the actors must reach some form of 
equilibrium with the other two. Failure to do so will result in suboptimal conditions, 
exemplified by a number of undesirable phenomena that are indicators of inadequate 
operation. Each can, in a state of unrestrained competition, lead to an eventual decline 
in scale of operation at the airport facility, as traffic is attracted elsewhere, and in the 
absence of a competitive option, to depressed demand levels. Such conditions become 
manifest in a variety of ways [Ashtord et al., 1997]: 
•  Deficit operations by the airport. 
•  Deficit operations by the airline at the airport. 
• Unsatisfactory working conditions for airline and airport employees. 
•  Inadequate passenger accommodation. 
•  Insufficient flight supply. 
•  Unsafe operations. 
•  High operational costs to users.  
•  Inadequate support facilities for airlines.  
•  High delay levels for airline and passenger.  
•  Inadequate access facilities.  
• Low passenger demand level. 
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2.1.3. Costs of Accidents and Safety 
Safety   and   profit   are   not   mutually exclusive. Indeed, quality organizations   
realize   that expenditures on the correction of unsafe conditions are an investment 
towards long-term profitability. Losses cost money.  As  money  is  spent on  risk  
reduction  measures,  costly  losses  are  reduced  as  shown  in Figure (2-5). 
However,  by  spending  more  and  more  money  on  risk  reduction,  the  gains  
made  through reduced losses may not be in proportion to the expenditures. Companies 
must balance the costs of losses and expenditures on risk reduction measures. Some 
level of loss may be acceptable from a straight profit and  loss  point  of  view;  
however,  few  organizations  can  survive  the  economic  consequences  of  a  major 
accident. Hence, there is a strong economic case for an effective SMS to manage the 
risks [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 2.5: Costs versus Safety [International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), 2006] 
Serious aviation incidents, which result in minor damage or injuries, can also 
cause many of these indirect or uninsured costs. Typical cost factors arising from such 
incidents can include the following [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
2006]:     
• Flight delays and cancellations. 
Losses 
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• At alternate passenger transportation, accommodation, complaints, etc. 
• Crew change and positioning. 
• Loss of revenue and reputation. 
• Aircraft recovery, repair and test flight.  
• Incident investigation. 
The economic argument is even more salient when one considers the following 
figures produced by the Boeing aircraft corporation. In 1996, Boeing estimated the 
average cost in U.S. dollars of the following: 
$500,000 In-flight shutdown. 
$ 50,000 Flight cancellation. 
$ 10,000 Flight delay per hour. 
   The cost of implementing and maintaining a safety management system becomes less 
significant and well worth the investment when contrasted with the cost of accident [5]. 
2.1.4. Causes of Accidents  
The  strongest evidence  of  a  serious  breach  of  a  system‘s  safety is  an  
accident.  Since safety management aims to reduce the probability and consequences of 
accidents, an understanding of accident and incident causation is essential to 
understanding safety management. Because accidents and incidents are closely related, 
no attempt is made to differentiate accident causation from incident causation 
[International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
 Figure (2-6) portrays an accident causation model that assists in 
understanding the interplay of organizational and management factors in accident 
causation. Various defenses are built into the aviation system to protect against 
inappropriate performance or poor decisions at all levels of the system. This model 
shows that while organizational factors, including management decisions, can create 
latent conditions that could lead to an accident, they also contribute to the system's 
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defenses [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Research into industrial safety in 1969 indicated that for every 600 reported 
occurrences with no injury or damage, there were some: 
• 30 incidents involving property damage. 
• 10 accidents involving serious injuries. 
• 1 major or fatal injury. 
 Figure (2-7) indicates that it is much better to focus investigative efforts on 
incidents, rather than on serious accidents, due to that recurrent incidents are the direct 
cause behind serious accidents; and in turn, this leads to the occurrence of fatal 
accidents[International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Accident Causation Model Reason 
Figure 2.7: 1:600 Rule Supporting 
  Fatal accident 
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Human  error  is  cited  as  being  a  causal  or  contributing  factor  in  the  
majority  of  aviation occurrences. All too often competent personnel commit 
errors, although clearly they did not plan to have an accident. 
Understanding how normal people commit errors is fundamental to safety 
management. Only then can effective measures be implemented to minimize the 
effects of human errors on safety. Figure (2-8) explains contributing factors to 
human error [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The acronym ALARP (As low As Reasonably Practicable) is used to describe 
a risk that had been reduced to a reasonable level.  In determining what is 
reasonably practicable, thus consideration should be given to both the technical 
feasibility of further reducing the risk and the cost; this could include a cost-benefit 
study. 
Showing  that  the  risk  in  a  system  is  ALARP  means  that  any  further  
risk  reduction  is  either impracticable  or  grossly  outweighed  by  the  costs.  It  
should,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  when  an individual  or  society 
accepts“  a  risk,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  risk  is  eliminated.  Some  level  
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Figure 2.8: Contributing Factors to Human Error [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
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of  risk remains; however, the  individual or society has accepted  that  the  
residual risk  is sufficiently low that  it  is outweighed by the benefits. These  
concepts  are  illustrated  diagrammatically  in  the  Tolerability  of  Risk  (TOR)  
triangle  in  Figure (2-9). In this figure, the degree of risk is represented by the 
width of the triangle [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9:Tolerability of Risk (TOR) Triangle [International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), 2006] 
2.2. Features of Safety Management System 
Every organization, and industry, has its own interpretation of safety 
management system. From the Civil Aviation perspective there are main features 
that identify evolving directions and framework which represent the principal. 
These mean features are [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2001]: 
• Adopting a data-driven approach to enhancing aviation safety. This includes 
collecting and making more accessible the type of data that will support a 
proactive approach to safety. 
• Using a risk based approach to resource allocation to support those activities 
which will achieve the greatest safety benefit. 
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•  Fostering and strengthening partnerships to put into effect the concept that 
responsibility for safety is shared by the regulator and the aviation community. 
• Implementing safety management system in all organization activities.  
• Taking account of human and organizational factors in safety management 
practices. 
• Communicating effectively with the aviation local and international community 
on safety. 
When an organization develops a safety management policy and procedures, 
they have to fit into the organization. Safety management has to be comprehensive. 
But should not be more complex than the rest of the company's management 
program. Safety management must be compatible, and preferably, integrated into 
the overall management scheme. The following list will be helpful to know more 
about how to make safety management a reality [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 
2001]:  
• Senior management commitment. 
• Safety policy. 
• Safety information. 
• Establishing safety as a core value. 
• Setting safety goals. 
• Hazard identification and risk management. 
• Establishing a safety reporting system. 
• Safety audit/assessment. 
• Accident and incident reporting and investigation. 
• Safety orientation and recurrent training. 
• Emergency response plan. 
• Documentation. 
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2.2.1. Policy and Principles of SMS 
There is no recognized standard in aviation for defining a typical Safety 
Management System (SMS). So it has been necessary to adapt best practice 
from other industries in order to provide guidelines for those parts of the 
aviation industry that wish to implement a formal SMS. 
The Policy and Principles (P&Ps) define the components of an 
organization's SMS. These have been derived from the lessons learned from a 
wide variety of disastrous accidents where management failures were cited as 
a significant contributory cause, factors which made the accident more likely to 
occur. The P&Ps could be considered as a hazard checklist for identifying any 
potential risks of management failures causing or contributing to an accident; 
the adoption of an effective formal SMS could be considered as a risk 
reduction exercise to minimise such failures as far as is reasonably practicable. 
Safety management systems policy and principles are likely to cover the 
following statements [United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority, 2003]: 
 1. Safety Management Systems Policy Statements 
• A statement of intent about maintaining or improving current safety 
performance. 
• A statement of intent to minimise the risks of an accident occurring - 
probably with the ‘as far as is reasonably practicable’ caveat. 
• A statement of intent to implement an effective formal safety 
management system. 
• A statement about individual and management responsibility for safety 
performance. 
• A statement about the priority attributed to flight safety relative to 
commercial, operational, environmental and working practice pressures. 
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• A statement about compliance with safety standards and regulatory 
requirements. 
• A statement about ensuring sub-contractors meets company safety 
standards and requirements. 
2. Typical Safety Management Principles 
• Safety management principles define the components or scope of a 
Safety Management System. 
• Published safety accountabilities (where applicable) of managers and 
key staff appointments. 
• Arrangements to conduct internal safety incident investigations and 
implement remedial action. 
• Arrangements for recording and monitoring the overall safety standards 
of the organization, usually a record of significant safety incidents, if 
applicable. 
• Arrangements to report internally and externally the results of 
investigations and dissemination of the lessons learned. 
• Arrangements to carry out regular safety audits, reviews or surveys 
within the organization and for ensuring that agreed actions are 
implemented. 
• Arrangements for ensuring staff are adequately trained and competent 
for the job they are required to do. 
• Supervision arrangements for early detection of deviations from 
intended practices or procedures that degrade safety. 
• Arrangements for monitoring any deterioration in performance of safety 
significant equipment or systems, if applicable. 
• Arrangements enabling staff to communicate significant safety concerns 
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to the appropriate level of management for resolution. 
• Arrangements to identify and address potential risks arising from 
changes in operations, systems, procedures and staff associated with 
safety significant functions or activities. 
2.2.2. Safety Performance Measures 
The safety performance of the operation needs to be monitored, proactively 
and reactively, to ensure that the key safety goals continue to be achieved. 
Monitoring by audit forms is a key element of this activity and should include both 
a quantitative and qualitative assessment. The results of all safety performance 
monitoring should be documented and used as feedback to improve the system. 
Performance measurement should be integrally linked to the company stated 
overall objectives. This requires two things: the development and implementation 
of a coherent set of safety performance measures; and, a clear linkage between the 
safety performance measures and the organization’s business performance 
measures. This shows a clear relationship between the company’s safety objectives 
and the achievement of its organizational and business goals.  A simple example is 
given in the table (2-1). 
Table 2.1: Safety Performance Measures [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 
2002] 
Objective Type Safety Performance Measures 
Business Objective: Reduce 
Costs 
Reduction in insurance rates 
Safety Objective: Decrease 
number and severity of 
hangar incidents 
Total number of events 
Number of damage-only events 
Number of near-miss accidents 
Lessons learned from event analyses 
Number of corrective action plans 
developed and implemented 
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2.2.3. System Safety Process 
The Management of an aerodrome requires that the organization should 
assess all aspects of its operation, and changes to it, for safety significance.  Safety 
Assessments should be performed and documented to ensure that due 
consideration is given to the safety of all parts of the system.  The Safety 
Assessment should be conducted to ensure that the management of any hazards is 
commensurate with the risk involved and the safety objectives that have been 
identified.  
The System Safety discipline is defined as the application of special 
technical and managerial skills to the systematic, forward-looking identification 
and control of hazards throughout the life cycle of a project, program, or activity.  
The primary objective of System Safety is accident prevention. Proactively 
identifying, assessing, and eliminating or controlling safety-related hazards, to 
acceptable levels, can achieve accident prevention.  A hazard is a condition, event, 
or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired 
event.  Risk is an expression of the impact of an undesired event in terms of event 
severity and event likelihood.  Throughout this process, hazards are identified, 
risks analyzed, assessed, prioritized, and results documented for decision-making.  
The continuous loop process provides for validation of decisions and evaluation 
for desired results and/or the need for further action [Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004].The System Safety process steps, are depicted graphically in 
the figure (2-10). 
  A systematic approach to process improvement requires proactively 
searching for opportunities to improve the process at every step, not simply 
identifying deficiencies after an undesired event.  Risk Management has been 
defined as the process by which Risk Assessment results are integrated with 
political, social, economic, and engineering considerations for decisions about  
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Figure (2-10) System Safety Process [Federal Aviation Administration, 2004] 
need/methods for risk reduction. The system safety process steps described 
as the following [Federal Aviation Administration, 2004]:   
1- Define Objectives 
The first step in the System Safety process is to define the objectives of the 
system under review. These objectives are typically documented in business plans 
and operating specifications 
2- System Description 
A description of the interactions among people, procedures, tools, materials, 
equipment, facilities, software, and the environment. This also includes 
descriptions of data available. 
3-  Hazard Identification: Identify Hazards & Consequences 
Potential hazards may be identified from a number of internal and external 
sources. Generally, hazards are initially listed on a Preliminary Hazard List , then 
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grouped by functional equivalence for analysis.  Prior to risk analysis you must 
also include the consequence (undesired event) resulting from the hazard 
scenarios. Hazard scenarios may address the following: who, what where, when, 
why and how. This provides an intermediate product that expresses the condition 
and the consequences that will be used during risk analysis. 
4- Risk Analysis: Analyze Hazards and Identify Risks 
Risk analysis is the process whereby hazards are characterized for their 
likelihood and severity.  Risk analysis looks at hazards to determine what can 
happen through, either a qualitative or quantitative analysis. The inability to 
quantify and/or the lack of historical data on a particular hazard do not exclude the 
hazard from the need for analysis. Some type of a Risk Assessment Matrix is 
normally used to determine the level of risk.  
5- Risk Assessment Consolidate & Prioritize Risk 
Risk assessment is generally defined as the process of combining the 
impacts of risk elements discovered in risk analysis and comparing them against 
some acceptability criteria. Risk assessment can include the consolidation of risks 
into risk sets that can be jointly mitigated, combined, and then used in decision 
making. 
6- Decision Making: Develop Action Plans 
This step begins with the receipt of a prioritized risk list. Review the list to 
determine how to address each risk, beginning with the highest prioritized risk. 
The four options that may be chosen for a risk are transfer, eliminate, accept, or 
mitigate. Generally, design engineering follows the “safety order of precedence”: 
1) design for minimum risk, 2) incorporate safety devices, 3) provide warning 
devices, or 4) develop procedures and training. This may result in alternative 
action plans.  
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7- Validations and Control: Evaluate Results of Action Plan for Further 
Action 
Validation and control begins with the results of scheduled analyses on the 
effectiveness of actions taken (this will include identification of data to be 
collected and identification of triggering events if possible; then developing a plan 
to review the data collected) and the current status of each prioritized risk. if the 
residual risk is acceptable, then documentation is required to reflect the 
modification to the system, and the rationale for accepting the residual risk. if it is 
unacceptable, an alternate action plan may be needed, or a modification to the 
system/process may be necessary. 
8-   Modify System/Process (if Needed) 
If the status of a risk should change or the mitigating action does not 
produce the intended effect, a determination must be made as to why. It may be 
that the wrong hazard was being addressed, or the system/process needs to be 
modified.  In either case, one would then re-enter the system safety process at the 
hazard identification step.  
2.3. Creating Positive Safety Culture  
2.3.1. Supportive Culture  
The commitment of a company’s top management those who direct and 
control the organization at the highest level towards safety, safety practices and 
safety oversight will determine how business is conducted from a safety 
standpoint. The safety culture of the company underpins the entire safety 
achievement of the company and is crucial to its success. The ideal safety culture 
is one that is supportive of the staff and systems of work, recognizes that errors 
will be made and blaming some of the staff for those errors will not resolve the 
problems. 
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 Therefore, the supportive culture will encourage open reporting, seek to 
learn from its failures and be just in dealing with those involved. Punitive action 
must not follow automatically from the open acknowledgement of human error. 
However, it must be made clear that indemnity will not be guaranteed where there 
has been gross negligence. The front line defence is that operating staff must not 
accept unsafe behaviour from their peers. Figure (2-11) shows the components of 
safety culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Components of Safety Culture [Global Aviation Information 
Network (GAIN), 2004] 
2.3.2. Learning from Unsafe Acts 
A Just Culture supports learning from unsafe acts. The first goal of any 
manager is to improve safety and production. Any event related to safety, 
especially human or organizational errors must be first considered as an 
opportunity to improve operations through experience feedback and lessons learnt. 
Failures and ‘incidents’ are considered by organizations with good safety cultures 
as lessons which can be used to avoid more serious events to attaint his goal of 
learning from errors it is imperative to maintain a continuous recording of those 
errors and to subject them to study. Hence there is a strong drive to ensure that all 
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incidents and accidents should be reported and investigated to discover the root 
causes, and that timely feedback is given on the findings and remedial actions, 
both to the work groups involved and to others in the organization or industry who 
might experience the same problem. This ‘horizontal’ communication is 
particularly important. 
2.3.3. Benefits of Just Culture 
A “Just Culture” refers to a way of safety thinking that promotes a 
questioning attitude, is resistant to complacency, is committed to excellence, and 
fosters both personal accountability and corporate self-regulation in safety matters. 
A “Just” safety culture, then, is both attitudinal as well as structural, relating to 
both individuals and organizations. Personal attitudes and corporate style can 
enable or facilitate the unsafe acts and conditions that are the precursors to 
accidents and incidents. It requires not only actively identifying safety issues, but 
responding with appropriate action. 
The benefits that can be gained from the creation of a Just Culture in an 
organization include measurable effects such as increased event reports and 
corrective actions taken, as well as intangible organizational and managerial 
benefits: 
• A Just Culture can lead to not only increased event reporting, particularly of 
previously unreported events, but also the identification of trends that will 
provide opportunities to address latent safety problems. 
• It has been estimated that for each major accident involving fatalities, there 
are as many as several hundred unreported incidents that, if properly 
investigated, might have identified an underlying problem in time to prevent 
the accident.  
• A lack of reported events is not indicative of a safe operation, and likewise, an 
increase in reported events is not indicative of a decrease in safety. Event 
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reporting illuminates potential safety concerns, and any increase in such 
reporting should be seen as a healthy safety indicator. 
• It can be expected that a Just Culture will enhance the organization’s 
effectiveness by defining job performance expectations, establishing clear 
guidelines for the consequences of deviance from procedures, and promoting 
the continuous review of policies and procedures. 
• Just Culture can allow an organization to be better able to determine whether 
violations are occurring infrequently or if deviation from established 
procedures has become normalized among its front-line employees and 
supervisors. 
• Outdated or ineffective management structures can be manifested in many 
ways, as by operational inefficiencies, lost opportunities, or safety lapses. 
While Just Culture is primarily implemented by a safety motive, it is 
recognized “that the same factors which are creating accidents are creating 
production losses as well as quality and cost problems. 
2.4. Strategic Management 
2.4.1. Strategic Management Elements  
Strategic management can be defined as that set of managerial decisions and 
actions that determines the long-run performance of a corporation, also can be 
defined as the art and science of formulating, implementing, and evaluating cross- 
functional decisions that enable an organization to achieve its objectives. 
Strategic management is one of the significant reasons that it can make a 
difference in how well an organization performs. Studies of the factors that 
contribute to organizational performance have shown a positive relationship 
between strategic planning and performance. Strategic management consists of 
four basic elements [Shams Eldein, 2004]: 
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1- Environmental scanning. 
2- Strategy formulation. 
3- Strategy implementation 
4- Evaluation and control 
1- Environmental Scanning 
Before the organization can begin strategy formulation, it must scan the 
external environment to identify possible opportunities and threats and its internal 
environment for strengths and weaknesses. 
Environmental scanning is a tool to identify signals of change in the external 
environment in order to gain lead time to respond or to adapt to these signals. It is 
a critical component of an effective strategic planning system. Environmental 
scanning is the monitoring, evaluating, and disseminating of information from the 
external and internal environments to key people within the corporation. Its 
purpose is to identify strategic factors-those external and internal elements that will 
determine the future of the corporation.  
2- Strategy Formulation  
Strategy formulation includes developing a strategic vision, mission, 
identifying an organization's external opportunities and threats determining 
internal strengths and weaknesses, establishing long-term objectives, generating 
alternative strategies, and choosing particular strategies to pursue Strategy-
formulation.  
Issues include deciding what new businesses to enter, what businesses to 
abandon how to allocate resources, whether to expand operations or diversify, 
whether to enter international markets, whether to merge or form a joint venture, 
and how to avoid a hostile takeover. 
Since no organization has unlimited resources, strategists must decide which 
alternative strategies will benefit the firm most. Strategy-formulation decisions 
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commit an organization to specific products markets, resources, and technologies 
over an extended period of time Strategies. 
3- Strategy Implementation 
Strategy implementation requires a firm to establish annual objectives, 
devise policies. motivate employees, and allocate resources, so that formulated 
strategies can be executed, strategy implementation includes developing a strategy- 
supportive culture, creating an effective organizational structure, redirecting 
marketing effort, preparing budgets, developing and utilizing information systems, 
and linking employee compensation to organizational performance 
Strategy implementation is often called the action stage of strategic 
management. Implementing means mobilizing employees and managers to put 
formulated strategies into action. Often considered to be the most difficult stage in 
strategic management strategy implementation requires personal discipline, 
commitment, and sacrifice. Successful strategy implementation hinges upon 
managers' ability to motivate employees, which is more an art than science 
strategies formulated but not implemented serve no useful. 
4- Evaluation and control 
Control and Strategy evaluation is the final stage in strategic management, 
some considers it a part of strategy implementation stage, while others considers it 
separate stage. Managers desperately need to know when particular strategies are 
not working well and strategy evaluation. All strategies are subject to future 
modification because external and internal factors are constantly changing.  
Strategy evaluation is needed because success today is no guarantee for success 
tomorrow. Success always creates new and different problems. Figure (2-12) 
below explains the Strategic Management Process. 
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Figure (2-12) the Strategic Management Process [Shams Eldein, 2004] 
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2.4.2. Analysis of Organizational Resources and Capabilities 
Two critical steps in the strategic management process are analysis of the 
organization and analysis of its environment. They may be approached by a 
technique known as SWOT analysis: the internal analysis of organizational 
Strengths and Weaknesses as well as the external analysis of environmental 
Opportunities and Threats. 
SWOT analysis begins with a systematic evaluation of the organization's 
resources and capabilities. A major goal is to identify core competencies in the 
form of special strengths that the organization has or does exceptionally well in 
comparison with competitors. They are capabilities that by virtue of being rare, 
costly to imitate, and no substitutable become viable sources of competitive 
advantage. 
Core competencies may be found in special knowledge or expertise, 
superior technologies, efficient manufacturing technologies, or unique product 
distribution systems, among many other possibilities. But always, with the 
notion of strategy itself, they must be viewed relative to the competition. Simply 
put, organizations need core competencies that do important things better than 
the competition and that are very difficult for competitors to duplicate.  
The goal in strategy formulation is to create strategies that leverage core 
competencies for competitive advantage by building upon organizational 
strengths and minimizing the impact of weaknesses [Schermerhorn, 2004]. 
Figure (2-13) explain SWOT analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats. 
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 Figure (2 -13) the SWOT Analysis: Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats [Schermerhorn, 2004] 
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Internal Assessment  
of the Organization 
What are our Strengths?  
• Manufacturing efficiency? 
• Skilled workforce? 
• Good market share? 
• Strong financing? 
• Superior reputation? 
What are our Weaknesses?  
• Outdated facilities? 
• Inadequate R & D? 
• Obsolete technologies? 
• Weak management? 
• Past planning failures? 
What are our Opportunities?  
• Possible new markets? 
• Strong economy? 
• Weak market rivals? 
• Emerging technologies? 
• Growth of existing market? 
What are our Threats?  
• New competitors? 
• Shortage of resources? 
• Changing market tastes? 
• New regulations? 
• Substitute products? 
External Assessment 
Of the Environment 
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2.4.3. Strategic Vision and Mission  
Strategic vision is future forecasting has much greater direction-setting 
and strategy-making value. There's an ever-present managerial imperative to 
look beyond today and think strategically about the impact of new technologies 
on the horizon: how customer needs and expectations are changing, what it will 
take to overtake or outrun competitors, which promising market opportunities 
ought to be aggressively pursued, and all the other external and internal factors 
that of an organization’s for being existence in society, drive what the company 
needs to be doing to prepare for the future.  
The roles of a mission statement is to give the organization its own special 
identity, business emphasis, and path for development from other similarly 
situated companies, the mission statement speaks to what a company is doing 
today and the scope of its purpose and a declaration. 
The importance of a mission statement to effective strategic management 
is well documented in the literature and is needed before alternative strategies 
can be formulated and implemented.  A mission statement reveals the long-term 
vision of an organization in terms of what it wants to be and whom it wants to 
serve and developing a business mission compels strategists to think about the 
nature and scope of present operations and to assess the potential attractiveness 
of future markets and activities [Shams Eldein, 2004]. 
2.4.4. Strategic Management and Performance 
Strategic management typically focuses on analyzing the problems and 
opportunities faced by people in top management.  Many empirical studies have 
been conducted to measure the relationship between strategic management and 
the performance of enterprises. The majority of these studies reported a positive 
relationship; there is strong reason to associate effective performance with good 
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strategic management process.  This positive relationship is attributed to many 
factors as follows [Ali, 2005]: 
• Enterprises are working in changing environment; due to this fact 
planning becomes more difficult. Strategic management allows a firm’s 
top executives to anticipate change and provide direction and control for 
the enterprise.  
• Most people perform better if they know what is expected of them and 
where the enterprise is going, this can also help reduce conflict. Effective 
strategic management points the way for the employees to follow.  
• Strategic management is one way to systematize the most important of 
business decisions. 
• Strategic management helps educate managers to become better decision-
makers. It helps managers examine the basic problems of an enterprise. 
• Strategic management helps improve corporate communication, the 
coordination of individual projects, the allocation of resources, and short-
range planning. 
• Strategic management provides an enterprise with consistency of action. 
A sound strategic management process helps ensure that all organizational 
parts are working toward the same objectives and purposes. 
2.5. Hazards and Risks of Airport Operations 
2.5.1. Hazard Identification and Risk Management 
A hazard is a condition with the potential of causing injury to personnel, 
damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of the ability to 
perform a prescribed function. Risk is the chance of injury or loss. This concept 
includes both the likelihood of a loss and the magnitude.  
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Risk management is a proactive activity that looks at the risks associated 
with identified hazards and assists in selecting actions to maintain an appropriate 
level of safety when faced with these hazards. Once hazards have been 
identified, either through occurrence/hazard reporting, or a safety assessment the 
risk management process begins. Risk management is an evaluation of the 
potential for injury or loss due to a hazard and the management of that 
probability. risk  management  comprises  three  essential  elements:  hazard  
identification,  risk assessment  and  risk  mitigation.  The concepts of risk 
management have equal application in decision-making in flight operations, air 
traffic control, maintenance, airport management and State administration. 
Hazard identification and risk management should be put in high 
consideration in the following circumstances: 
• during implementation of the safety management system and then at 
regular intervals; 
• when major operational changes are planned; 
• if the organization is undergoing rapid change, such as growth and 
expansion, offering new services, cutting back on existing service, or 
introducing new equipment or procedures; and 
• When key personnel change. 
• Systematically identify Possible Hazards to aircraft. 
• Evaluate the seriousness of the consequences of the hazard occurring. 
• Consider the chances of it happening. 
• Determine whether the consequent risk is acceptable. 
2.5.2. Risk Assessment  
The risk assessment methodology for the Airport described as follows: 
• Identifying and defining the system being reviewed. 
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• Identifying hazards from operation of the runway system to give both a 
current and a future risk profile. 
• Identifying consequences arising from the hazard. 
• Identifying the likelihood of these consequences happening in their 
entirety. 
• Carrying out an analysis and assessment of the risk issues identified 
taking note of mitigation measures that are in place. The three risk regions 
can be summarized as follows: Figure (2-14) explains the Risk Categories 
[Australian Brisbane Airport Corporation, 2006]: 
• Region 1: Risk unacceptable Risk is so high that it is not acceptable 
unless extraordinary circumstances apply. Risk reduction must be 
undertaken. 
• Region 2: Risk tolerable if ALARP Risk reduction measures must be 
implemented where reasonably practicable. That is unless further risk 
reduction is clearly not possible or the cost is disproportionate to the 
improvement gained.  
• Region 3: Risk broadly acceptable Risks must be managed to ensure that 
they remain at this level and, if practicable, continually reduced. In 
principle, the ALARP concept extends to this region as well. Reasonably 
practicable’ is a difficult phrase: both its words require judgments to be 
made. Informal day to day interpretation of what is reasonably practicable 
is the adoption of accepted best practice in safety for an activity. If a more 
formal analysis is considered necessary, cost benefit analysis is being 
increasingly used; risk reduction is considered practicable if and only if it 
is possible to find appropriate risk reduction measures where the cost of 
these is proportionate to the improvement gained in terms of risk. 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: the Risk Categories [Australian Brisbane Airport Corporation, 
2006] 
2.5.3. Occurrence and Hazard Reporting 
Every event is an opportunity to learn valuable safety lessons. The lessons 
will only be understood, however, if the occurrence is analyzed so that all 
employees, including management, understand not only what happened, but also 
why it happened. This involves looking beyond the event and investigating the 
contributing factors, the organizational and human factors within the 
organization that played a role in the event. To achieve this, the company should 
maintain procedures for the internal reporting and recording of occurrences, 
hazards and other safety related issues. The collection of timely, appropriate and 
accurate data will allow the company to react to information received, and apply 
the necessary corrective action to prevent a recurrence of the event. An 
operator’s safety reporting system should encompass the following fundamental 
elements: 
• Systems for reporting hazards, events or safety concerns 
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• Systems for analyzing data, safety reports and any other safety related 
information. 
• Methods for the collection, storage and distribution of data. 
• Corrective action and risk reduction strategies. 
• On-going monitoring. 
• Confirmation of the effectiveness of corrective action. 
2.5.4. Operational and Construction Hazards 
Dangerous goods management during the construction and general 
operations can arise due to the following: 
• Security issues during construction and operation. 
• Dangerous goods management during the operational stages including any 
additional on site refueling storage. 
• Assessment of fire risks measures for treatment of hazardous material 
spills. 
• The risk of uncovering dangerous material during sand extraction. 
• Modification of existing emergency plans, procedures and relationships 
with disaster control organizations including command and control; and 
• Access points to the Airport for accidents and/or retrievals during the 
construction and operational stage, including alternative access in the 
event of gridlock during construction. 
2.5.5.Bird Strike 
Another significant issue to consider with airport operation is ‘bird strike’ 
where birds collide with aeroplanes in normal flight or adjacent to airports. 
While bird strikes must be reported, they have a very low probability of causing 
significant aircraft accidents since modern aircraft and aircraft engines are 
designed to minimise the resultant consequences.  However, there is a need of 
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redesign and precautions to ensure full protection that bird will not enter the 
engines. 
Control of bird species will be an important issue during reclamation and 
construction works. This issue is addressed in the Environmental Management 
Framework. Overall, provided the application of best practice techniques for the 
management of bird hazards on and around Airport continues, the risk from 
aircraft crash incidents as a result of bird strikes with the operation should be 
considered as low as reasonably practicable and thus broadly acceptable. A 
number of staff dedicated to bird control techniques. These may include 
methods such as [Australian Brisbane Airport Corporation, 2006]: 
• Monitoring of bird activity by Airport Operations Officers, particularly 
during the three hours after sunrise which have been identified as the ones 
with highest bird activity. 
•  Reducing the amount of water lying on the Airport grounds to avoid 
attracting birds etc. 
• Maintaining the grass at a length which deters birds; 
• Minimizing available food. 
• Harassing birds using: 
– Vehicle lights and horns. 
– Cracker shot; and/or 
– Live shotgun rounds. 
2.5.6.Mitigation Measures  
The following existing risk mitigation measures already must be in place 
for Airport operation with the current runway configuration will remain in place 
[Australian Brisbane Airport Corporation, 2006].  
• Highly regulated air traffic environment in and out of the Airport. 
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• Highly regulated aircraft inspection and maintenance protocols for 
operations. 
• Highly regulated pilot licensing regimes for operations. 
• Existing security and related control systems. 
• Existing emergency planning regimes. 
• Existing management systems for managing the storage and handling of 
dangerous goods and hazardous substances. These systems will be 
updated for the operation of the runway situation. 
2.6. Total Quality Management 
2.6.1. Need for TQM 
Total Quality Management, (TQM), can be defined as 'the process of 
integration of all activities, functions and processes within an Organization in 
order to achieve continuous improvement in cost, quality, function and delivery 
of goods and services for customer satisfaction'. Goal of TQM is customer 
satisfaction, by means of continuous improvement. TQM occurs when an entire 
organizational culture becomes focused on quality and customer satisfaction 
through an integrated system of processes, tools, techniques and training. 
TQM is a basic strategy for this performance excellence. TQM is not 
merely a system of quality management; it is a strategy that is designed to seek 
improvement in business performance by focusing on customers, empowering 
people, restructuring processes and leading the organization by vision and 
purpose. TQM is the outcome of the collective actions and efforts of all 
members within and outside the organization, who have a stake in the company's 
well-being and performance [Mandal, 2005]. 
TQM: "Doing the Right Thing, Right the First Time, All the Time; always 
striving for Improvement & always satisfying the Customers. It emphasizes 
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team activity, brings pride in performance to all levels of the organization, 
develops more informed and supportive managers and supervisors, and so leads 
to an improved climate in the workplace.  It offers lower costs and improved 
productivity, leading to greater effectiveness, long-term competitive advantage, 
and improved job prospects [PAL Management Solutions, 2005]. 
2.6.2.   TQM Principles 
The principles governing the TQM system are [Tricker, 2005]: 
1- ‘Customer Focused’ approach to all activities and processes in the 
organization. This approach ensures that all are concerned with the customers’ 
needs and their efforts should be directed towards winning customer 
satisfaction. 
2- Strategic Planning and Leadership for achieving the customer focused 
quality targets in all activities and processes. Leadership should lead to strong 
‘customer orientation’ in the organization and be willing to make long-term 
commitments to its customers, employees, vendors, stockholders and to society. 
3- Restructuring of Vertical Processes To ‘cross-functional’ horizontal 
processes where clear view of customer needs can be established in each of 
these processes. This is the new approach to change the work culture o 
teamwork and making everyone in the process responsible for the quality. 
4- Creating A Culture of Working Through ‘internal customer’ system, where 
each stage in the process and each person in the process can be linked as 
customers to each other in the chain of activities for production and delivery of 
goods and services.  
5- Continuous Improvement of all Processes and Activities, leading to total 
customer satisfaction and competitive advantage. This is a critical measure for 
TQM, for performance excellence continued thinking and working for 
improvements becomes a part of corporate life. 
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6- Training and development of people: TQM believes that people are at the 
core of every process and activities of the organization. People should be trained 
and developed for understanding the process of TQM, the values and vision 
systems and tools of TQM and, above all, understanding customer needs.  
7- Empowerment and Teamwork of People: This is to provide people with the 
opportunity to learn, apply and practice their skills, creativity and knowledge. 
Sufficiently empowered by management to facilitate immediate response to 
customer needs, to eliminate bureaucracy and delay in decision-making, which 
otherwise adversely affects customer service.  
2.6.3. Quality Management System Approach 
Customers require products and/or services that continually meet their 
needs and expectations and in order to be profitable, an organization must be 
able to offer them so that it can continually achieve customer satisfaction and 
satisfy its customers’ requirements.  
As well as providing a framework for providing customer satisfaction, a 
QMS also provides confidence (to the organization and to its customers) that the 
organization is capable of providing products and services that consistently 
fulfill requirements. This is achieved by [Mandal, 2005]: 
• Determining the needs and expectations of the customer. 
• Establishing the quality policy and quality objectives of the organization. 
• Determining the processes and responsibilities necessary to attain the 
quality objectives. 
• Establishing measures for the effectiveness of each process towards 
attaining the quality objectives. 
• Applying the measures to determine the current effectiveness of each 
process. 
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• Means of preventing non-conformities and eliminating their causes. 
• Looking for opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
processes. 
• Determining and prioritizing those improvements which can provide 
optimum results. 
• Planning the strategies, processes and resources to deliver the identified 
improvements. 
• Implementing the plan. 
• Monitoring the effects of the improvements. 
• Assessing the results against the expected outcomes. 
• Reviewing the improvement activities to determine appropriate follow-up 
actions.  
Any organization that adopts the above approach will create confidence in 
the capability of its processes and the reliability of its products. It will also 
provide a basis for continual improvement and can lead to increased customer 
satisfaction.  
2.6.4. Performance Measures in TQM Practice 
TQM is a process that is guided by vision and directed towards accomplishing 
strategic goals, which must be achieved for superior performance and growth. 
These goals should relate to critical areas like customer satisfaction, cost 
leadership, employee satisfaction, new product launching, environment 
management, shareholders value addition etc. Goals must have clear 
performance measures. To achieve the goals, TQM practice may strategically 
resort to identifying ‘critical success factors’ and ‘key business processes’. The 
former is related to factors that must be internally built into the work culture of 
the organization to facilitate performance, and the latter are processes through 
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which the goals and objectives are to be accomplished. TQM practice should 
identify and define these factors and process objectives before venturing into 
restructuring key processes into” horizontal team based organization [Mandal, 
2005]. 
Action for TQM refers to activities and processes for accomplishment of 
objectives. This accomplishment or actualization of TQM objectives in an 
organization is the cornerstone of success of all efforts towards total quality 
management. For actualization of TQM, areas to act and address are: 
• Setting up of appropriate business strategy and strategic plans, including 
identification of key success factors. 
• Designing and engineering of ‘key business processes’. 
• Setting up of organization for TQM implementation, monitoring and 
review. 
• Integration of key business processes with ‘TQM process categories’. 
• Planning on approaches i.e. how the organization will address the 
requirements of TQM principles. 
• Planning on deployment of approaches i.e. the extent of coverage in 
practice. 
• Measurement and analysis of results, and 
• Actions for continuous 
Figure (2-15) shows the steps for determination of performance measures.  
Basically, TQM is a customer-focused process, geared towards the satisfaction 
of the customers' expectations and needs.  This in turn requires the 
determination of the specific targets which should be measured and by whom 
they will be measured, besides fixing the manner and method of their analysis 
and interpretation. It is also equally important to make efforts to continually 
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upgrade the processes by redesign and benchmarking in order to achieve 
improved and innovative products for customer delight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15: the Steps for Determination of Performance Measures 
[Mandal, 2005] 
2.6.5. TQM Road Map 
TQM road map is a tool which helps in systematic approach. As a road 
map of a country or state needs a starting place and a destination, the TQM road 
map requires basic information about the present status of company- this is 
48 
 
analogous to the starting point in the country road map. The end result or the 
destination is the goal of the company that has to be achieved within the given 
time period. Introduction of TQM in an organization requires meticulous plan. 
Thus, the road map of TQM essentially consists of the following factors 
[Suganthi & Anand, 2005]: 
• Understand the current status, where you stand. 
• Decide the destination, where you want to be.  
• Take stock of the available resources and recoup the needed resources, 
what is needed-manpower, money, machines, etc. 
• Locate the constraints, if any problem areas.  
• Finalize the methodology to be adopted and tools to be used, How to do-
technology. 
•  Devise a training plan for the personnel involved.  
• Prepare the time schedule for the whole exercise. 
• Formulate an appropriate monitoring system- auditing. 
• Celebrate the success by rewarding the contributors-Reward, Recognition. 
2.7. Human Resource Management 
2.7.1. Human Resource Management Contribution  
Human resource management is a relatively new functional area in many 
organizations. These units were usually called personnel departments and were 
headed by personnel managers. The original personnel function is now more 
commonly called human recourse management and generally it activities much 
more respect and significance in organization than was case in earlier times. 
Human resource management deals with a variety of complex and 
strategic issues. The basic tasks and functions of human resource  managers 
today include adopting a strategic perspective, understanding their 
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environmental context staffing the organization, enhancing motivation and 
performance of employees, conducting the ongoing management of the existing 
workforce, and meeting other challenges. An integrated human resource 
management system, supported by an electronic information system, typifies the 
human resource function in most companies today.  
Human resource management generally has four basic goals to pursue. 
These goals are facilitating organizational competitiveness, enhancing 
productivity and quality, complying with legal and social obligations, and 
promoting individual growth and development.  
Today’s human resource managers must become more and more 
professional in both their training and their orientation toward their work various 
career paths are also available for people wanting to work in the human resource 
function. Regardless of approach or career path, however, humanly resource 
manager need a broad and thorough knowledge of all aspects of the organization 
if they are to make meaningful contributions [Denisi & Ricky, 2001]. 
2.7.2. Organizational Human Resource Management 
The management of people takes place in, or in relation to, some 
organization and co-ordination of their activities. This produces synergy: 
working together to produce a result that is greater than the sum of the 
individual parts. That co-ordination spreads beyond the employees of the 
business along the supply chain, or value chain, to include suppliers and 
customers.  The processes of organization are concerned with communication 
and information. One of the main instruments in organization is planning 
requirements before working out how those requirements can be met, and one of 
the main methods of co-ordination is organization structure and culture. 
The structure describes the bare bones of the various working 
relationships between the people in the business, while the culture is a collection 
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of values and attitudes that the people of the business have in common to 
energize them and get them working effectively together [Torrington et al., 
2002]. 
2.7.3. Human Resource Planning Process 
The human resource management process is the process of attracting, 
developing, and maintaining a quality workforce, and planning process of 
analyzing staffing needs and identifying actions to satisfy these needs over time. 
The purpose of human resource planning is to make sure the organization 
always has people with the right abilities available to do the required work. A 
complex legal environment influences human resource management, giving 
special attention to equal employment opportunity [Schermerhorn, 2004]. Figure 
(2-16) explains the steps in the strategic human resource planning process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: the Steps in the Strategic Human Resource Planning Process 
[Schermerhorn, 2004] 
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and strategies  
 
Legal environment and 
Government regulations 
Step 4: Forecast human 
resource needs
 
Step 1: Review Organization mission, 
objectives, and strategies 
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2.7.4. Human and Strategic Management Criteria 
The organization carefully must develop a written mission statement to 
ensure unanimity of purpose within the organization and provide a basis or 
standard for allocating organizational resources. Organization must specify 
purposes and the translation of these purposes into objectives in such a way that 
cost, time, and performance parameters can be assessed [Shams Eldein, 2004]. 
The human resource management should process in plan attracting, 
developing and maintaining a quality workforce.  Human resource planning 
includes analyzing staff needs and identifying actions to satisfy these needs over 
time. It must always have people with the right abilities available to do the 
required work. Helpful criteria for attract and develop quality employees as 
follow [Schermerhorn, 2004]: 
• Recruitment should attract qualified job candidates involved in realistic job 
with accurate information on the job and organization. 
• Performance management systems focus on the establishment of work 
standards and the assessment of results through performance appraisal. 
• Career planning systematically matches individual career goals and 
capabilities with opportunities for their fulfilment. 
• Whenever employees must be replaced over time because of promotions, 
transfers, retirements, and terminations, the goal should be to treat everyone 
fairly while ensuring that jobs are filled with the best personnel available. 
• Compensation and benefits packages must be continually updated so that 
the organization maintains a competitive position in external labour 
markets. Where labour unions exist, labour-management relationships 
should be positively approached and handled with all due consideration of 
applicable laws. 
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2.8. Balanced Scorecards 
2.8.1. Balanced Scorecard Concept 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is a performance management program that 
puts strategy at the center of the process. At the highest conceptual level, the 
Balance Scorecard is a framework that helps organization translates strategy into 
operational objectives that drive both behavior and performance. The Balanced 
Scorecard translates your mission and strategy into tangible objectives and 
measures. To focus teams and individuals on strategic priorities The Balanced 
Scorecard IS a tool and framework with a Goals of Strategic Measures. 
Companies use the Balanced Scorecard for these reasons [PAL Management 
Solutions, 2005]: 
• Clarify the vision throughout the organization. 
• Gain consensus and ownership by the executive team. 
• Provide a framework to align the organization. 
• Provide structure for multiple initiatives. 
• Drive the capital and resource allocation process. 
• Integrate the strategic management process across the organization. 
2.8.2. Balanced Scorecard Principles  
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2.8.3. Balanced Scorecard Evaluation and Measurements Objectives  
• Management uses strategic measures to test the organization's progress in 
achieving strategic objectives. 
• Accountability for BSC implementation must be clear. 
• Measures function as a tool to drive desired behavior. 
• Measures give individuals direction in what they need to accomplish for the 
organization's strategy. 
• Strategic measures show the relationship between strategic and objectives as a 
constant test upon the validity of strategy. 
• Leadership and groups for making the BSC operational e.g. missing measures, 
communications, reporting. 
• The Leadership Team must set and accept responsibility for such major 
activities.   
• Monitoring the Balanced Scorecard through: initiatives, measures, targets, 
projects, and reporting to the leadership team on the status. 
• Responsibility forecasting the BSC through the organization and management 
of change. 
2.8.4.Balanced Scorecard Key Performance Indicators    
Balanced Scorecard start from defining strategic objectives, and then 
define the activities that will support the achievement of such objectives, and 
then define the responsible person for this activity, whom will be reporting, 
about the level of achievement that activity has reached. For that purpose key 
Performance Indicators (KPls) are needed   for measuring the performance of 
the activities. These measures will provide feedback to management about who 
good strategic objectives are achieved [PAL Management Solutions, 2005]. The 
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main objectives of KPls as follows: (Figure (2- 17) explains Balanced Scorecard 
loop) 
• Provide benchmarking against which business or project's performance can 
be measured or evaluated. 
• Used to provide information about a unit or process. 
• Provide a solid input for decision making. 
• Used to provide information about a unit or process for decision making. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Balanced Scorecard Loop [PAL Management Solutions, 2005] 
2.9. Maintenance and Operation Safety Working Conditions 
The aerodrome certification process  includes  approval/acceptance  of  
an  aerodrome  manual  that  outlines  the  aerodrome’s  safety management 
system (SMS). Although the potential for a catastrophic accident during aircraft 
operations on the ground exists, the likelihood of a minor accident while the 
aircraft is on the ground, particularly during a turnaround, is high. Each year, 
aircraft operators incur significant financial losses associated with accidents 
during ground operations.  Accidents  and  incidents  occurring  in  flight  are  
generally  well  reported  and  investigated. However, ground accidents do not 
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always receive the same level of attention. Minor accidents and incidents may 
not be reported to the aerodrome management by the operators and service 
providers based at the aerodrome.  These  minor  accidents  and  incidents  may  
be  a  breeding  ground  for  more  serious accidents . Understanding the 
conditions that create hazards to safety at aerodromes is vital to effective safety 
management. 
Safety  at  aerodromes  requires  much  the  same  approach  to  safety  
management  as  that required  for  safe  flight  operations.  The concentration of 
many different activities at aerodromes creates unique circumstances with 
significant accident potential.  Given  the  complexity  of  the  aerodrome  
environment,  a  systematic  approach  to  safety  is required in order to 
coordinate the various activities for the safe delivery of services. Safety 
Management System provides such a coherent approach,  in  so  doing,  the  
safety  philosophy  and  the  supporting  policies  are  developed, operating   
procedures   are   coordinated   and   implemented,   and   day-to-day   
operational   practices   are systematically  monitored.  In  short,  the  SMS  helps  
create  an  aerodrome  safety  culture  conducive  to  safe operations. Appendix 
(A) shows a typical aircraft maintenance working conditions. 
Effective  operation  of  the  SMS  for  maintenance  builds  upon  risk-
based  decision-making,  a concept that has long been integral to maintenance 
practices. For example, maintenance cycles are built upon probabilities that 
systems and components would not fail for the period of the cycle. 
Components are often  replaced  because  they  are  “time  expired”,  even  
though  they  may  remain  functionally  serviceable. Based on knowledge and 
experience, risks of unexpected failure are reduced to acceptable levels. Some of 
the principal tools for operating the SMS for maintenance function include 
[International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]: 
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• Clearly defined and enforced SOPs. 
• Risk-based resource allocations. 
• Hazard and incident reporting systems. 
• Flight data analysis programmes. 
• Trend monitoring and safety analyses (including cost-benefit 
analyses). 
• Competent investigation of maintenance-related occurrences. 
• Training in safety management. 
• Communication and feedback systems (including information 
exchange and safety promotion). 
2.10. Mechanisms and Features of SMS 
2.10.1. Senior Management Commitment 
Senior management commitment will not lead to positive action unless 
that commitment is expressed as direction. Senior management must develop 
and communicate safety policy that allocates responsibilities and holds people 
countable for meeting safety performance goals. The organization is required by 
regulation to meet defined standards in the formulation and documentation of 
safety related policy. The relevant regulation should be consulted to make sure 
that required standards are met. Safety Policy should include, at a minimum: 
• Clear declaration of commitment and objectives. 
• Means for setting safety goals and regular review of safety performance. 
• Clear statements of responsibility applying to every department or 
functional area in the organization. 
• Clearly stated accountabilities converging at the top of the organization. 
• Means for ensuring compliance with regulations. 
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• Means for ensuring adequate safety management knowledge and skills at 
all levels. 
• Compatibility or integration with other management systems. 
2.10.2. Non Punitive Disciplinary Polices 
The company should strive to develop a non-punitive, disciplinary policy 
as part of its safety management system. Employees are more likely to report 
events and cooperate in an investigation when some level of immunity from 
disciplinary action is offered. When considering the application of a non-
punitive disciplinary policy, the company might want to consider whether the 
event involved wilful intent on the part of the individual involved and the 
attendant circumstances. 
2.10.3. Training 
In order for employees to comply with all safety requirements, they need 
the appropriate information, skills and training. To effectively accomplish this, 
the company should make clear the training requirements for each area of work 
within the company. The type of training to be offered is already mandated via 
regulation for certain positions in the company.  
This includes initial, recurrent and update training requirements and, 
where required, training specific to the operation of the safety management 
system. These regulations will provide a good starting point to identify what 
training is required. It is recommended that a training file be developed for each 
employee, including management, to assist in identifying and tracking employee 
training requirements.  
2.10.4. Corrective Action Plan 
Once a safety event report has been investigated and analysed, or a hazard 
identified, a safety report outlining the occurrence, and if available, the results of 
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a hazard assessment, should be given to the appropriate director for 
determination of corrective or preventative action.  
The functional director should develop a corrective action plan, a plan 
submitted in response to findings, outlining how the company proposes to 
correct the deficiencies documented in the findings. Depending on the findings 
the plan might include short-term and long-term corrective actions.   
2.10.5. Roles and Responsibilities 
An organization should document and define the roles and responsibilities 
of all personnel in the safety management system. Furthermore, a statement 
should be made to ensure that everyone has a responsibility for safety. This 
includes a commitment on the part of top management to be accountable for 
safety within the company. 
 The dedication and involvement of top management towards safety and 
safety practices should be clearly visible. It is important that senior management 
is seen to provide a strong and active leadership role in the safety management 
system. This includes a commitment to provide the resources necessary to attain 
the strategic safety objectives established by the organization. 
2.10.6. Emergency Response Plan  
An emergency response plan outlines in writing what should be done after 
an accident happens, and who is responsible for each action. When the plan is 
adopted, relevant staff should be briefed on the plan and their responsibilities. 
Appropriate staff should receive training in emergency response procedures. The 
plan should be readily available and a copy should be at the work station of the 
person who normally answers the company telephone as this is likely to be the 
first person notified of an occurrence. The plan issues can be described as 
follows: 
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• Relevant and useful to people on duty at the time of an accident; 
• Inclusive of checklists and emergency contact details; 
• Updated when contact details change; and 
• Exercised to ensure the adequacy of the plan and the readiness of the 
people who must make it work. 
2.10.7. Pro-Active Safety Assessment 
For a safety management system to transition from a reactive to a 
proactive, it must actively seek out potential safety hazards and evaluate the 
associated risks. This can be achieved through a safety assessment. A safety 
assessment allows for the identification of potential hazards and then applies 
risk management techniques to effectively manage the hazard. A certificate 
holder’s safety assessment system should encompass the following basic 
elements: 
• Systems for identifying potential hazards 
• Risk management techniques 
• On-going monitoring/quality assurance. 
2.10.8. Report Investigation and Analysis 
Every event should be investigated. The extent of the investigation will 
depend on the actual and potential consequences of the occurrence or hazard. 
This can be determined through a risk assessment. Reports that demonstrate a 
high potential should be investigated in greater depth than those with low 
potential. The investigative process should be comprehensive and should 
attempt to address the factors that contributed to the event, rather than simply 
focusing on the event itself - the active failure. Active failures are the actions 
that took place immediately prior to the event and have a direct impact on the 
safety of the system because of the immediacy of their adverse effects. They are 
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not, however, the root cause of the event; as such, applying corrective actions to 
these issues may not address the real cause of the problem. 
 A more detailed analysis is required to establish the organizational 
factors that contributed to the error. The investigator, or team of investigators 
must be technically competent and either possess or have access to background 
information, so the facts and events are interpreted accurately. The investigator 
should have the confidence of the staff and the investigation process should be a 
search to understand how the mishap happened, not a hunt for someone to 
blame. 
2.10.9. Documentation 
Up to date documentation is essential if the company is to operate in a 
safe and efficient manner in accordance with current aviation safety regulations, 
standards and exemptions. For this reason an operator’s Safety Management 
System must address the four following documentary requirements: 
• The identification of applicable aviation safety regulations 
• Consolidated documentation describing the systems for each component 
of the safety management system. 
• The implementation of changes to company documentation required by 
changes to aviation safety regulations, standards and exemptions. 
• The maintenance of current, applicable and effective documentation. 
2.10.10. Safety Office 
There is no regulatory requirement to have a safety office. It is 
recognized, however, that the company may choose to employ a safety officer as 
a consultative or administrative body. The safety office may provide data 
directly to the accountable executive regarding major safety issues identified by 
the system.  
61 
 
The safety office serves as a focal point for safety-related activities, acts 
as a repository for safety reports and information, and provides expertise on 
safety management to line managers. A safety office fulfils a variety of corporate 
safety functions. Some of the more common functions include the following: 
• Setting safety policy, defining responsibilities and accountabilities for 
safety. 
• Establishing an effective corporate SMS for resource allocations in 
support of safety initiatives. 
• Assessing identified risks and organizing emergency response planning.  
• Selecting the most appropriate risk mitigation measures for those risks 
deemed unacceptable. 
• Data analysis programmes; incident reporting systems and occurrence 
investigations.  
• Safety studies; trend monitoring and coordinating safety committees.  
• Sustaining awareness and understanding of the organization’s safety  
management processes across all operational areas. 
• Disseminating safety lessons and providing training on safety 
management methods. 
• Exchanging safety information with external agencies and similar 
operations. 
• Conducting safety survey sand providing guidance on safety oversight. 
• Reporting on safety to meet the requirements and participating in 
accident and incident investigations. 
2.10.11. Safety Manager 
In most small and medium sized companies it is expected that the 
Flight Safety and Quality tasks will have many common points and there 
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can be no objection to the combination of the roles in one staff member. 
This ‘safety manager’ must have a direct reporting line, on safety matters, to 
the accountable manager. It is important that this person has the respect of 
the staff from the shop floor up to the senior management, yet is able to be 
objective in the fulfilment of safety Management task. 
The safety manager (SM) should possess operational management 
experience  and  an  adequate  technical  background  to  understand  the  systems  
that support  operations. Operational skills alone will not be sufficient.  The SM 
must have a good understanding of safety management principles that has been 
acquired through formal training and practical experience.  SM requires strength 
in several areas to complement his professional expertise may include the 
following: 
• A broad knowledge of aviation and the organization’s functions and 
activities. 
• Human being skills (such as tact, diplomacy, objectivity and fairness). 
• Analytical and problem-solving skills. 
• Project management skills. 
• Oral and written communication skills. 
2.10.12. Safety Committee 
The use of a safety committee in larger, more complex organizations can 
provide benefits for the organization. Safety committees provide a forum for 
discussing safety related issues from a cross-functional perspective and may lead 
to the inclusion of issues that look at safety from a broader viewpoint. 
Conventional safety at work concerns is a good example of this. Frequently, 
safety issues are not limited to one specific area and require inputs and expertise 
from a variety of different fields. 
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Safety committee can provide a forum for discussing safety-related issues 
from different perspectives to enable management to cooperate in promoting and 
developing measures to ensure the safety.  Safety committee also ensures the 
active involvement of the senior management of the organization for assessing 
safety performance from a system perspective. .The role of the safety committee 
may include the following: 
• Act as a source of expertise and advice on safety matters to senior 
management. 
• Review the progress on identified hazards and actions taken following 
accidents and incidents. 
• Study of accidents and notified diseases and trends 
• Examine safety audit reports. 
• Consider reports and factual information provided by Government 
departments, ICAO, other states' CAA’s, consultants, and other 
appropriate sources. 
• Monitor the effectiveness of the safety content of personnel training 
• Keep under review the adequacy of personal protective equipment and its 
method of control. 
• Monitor the performance of the different directorates and contractors in 
meeting airport standards. 
• Review at regular internals the airport's Safety Policy and the organization 
and arrangements in force to implement them and advise the Director 
responsible for Safety of their adequacy. 
• Determine annually the need for corrective actions arising from the results 
of safety audits, reviews, and surveys. 
• Determine collectively the time scales for the corrective action. 
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• Ensure that senior management continually maintains the priority afforded 
to safety. 
• Look for deviations from intended safety requirements. 
2.10.13. Safety Management Manual 
A safety management manual provides management with a key 
instrument for communicating   the organization’s approach to safety to the 
whole organization. The manual should document all aspects of the SMS, 
including the safety policy, safety procedures, and individual safety 
accountabilities.  The safety management manual should be a living document, 
reflecting the status of the SMS. 
The  SM  will  likely  be  responsible  for  the  development  of  the  safety  
management  manual.  The manual should be written so that it reflects the intent 
and processes of the SMS. Thus, a significant change   to the SMS will require 
an update of the safety management manual.  The  safety  management  manual  
should  be  kept  as  short  and  concise  as  possible.  Any information that 
changes regularly should be put into appendices.  This includes, for example, 
names of personnel assigned specific safety responsibilities.  The safety 
management manual should include the following:  
• Document control procedures. 
• Scope of the SMS. 
• Safety policy. 
• Safety accountabilities. 
• Hazard identification schemes. 
• Safety performance monitoring. 
• Safety assessment. 
• Safety auditing; 
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• Safety promotion. . 
• Safety organizational structure. 
2.11. Proposed Model for Airport Certification Manual (ACM) 
The purpose of this order is to provide guidance to assist airport operators 
in the development of an acceptable Airport Certification Manual.  The model 
manual in this order fulfills ICAO requirements and best practice. For all civil 
airport operators who are required to certify the airport. The main issues for 
proposed model for Airport Certification Manual are described as follows 
[Jordanian Civil Aviation Authority, 2008]: 
1. Related Reading Material. 
2. Airport Familiarization. 
3. General Information. 
4. Maintenance of the ACM. 
5. Airport Safety Management System. 
6. Safety Requirements. 
7. Personnel Requirements. 
8. Safety Areas. 
9. Inspection Procedures of Safety Areas. 
10. Maintenance of Safety Areas. 
11. Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting.  
12. Airport Emergency Plan.  
13. Apron Safety Management. 
14. Safety Audit. 
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1. Related Reading Material 
Additional information is found in the following publications: 
a. ICAO   Safety Management Manual. 
b. ICAO Document 9774, Manual on Certification of Aerodromes. 
c. ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I, Aerodrome Design and Operations and its related 
manuals. 
2. Airport Familiarization 
Operator Identification:          Airport Operator:              Mailing Address:                          
   P.O Box:   Area Code:           Fax:         Tel:                       E – Mail:                                
  Location of the airport:       operating air carriers:           The aircraft types:  
3. General Information 
Airport dimensions and related information (general information), including 
the following: 
• Runway true bearing designation number, length, width, 
displaced threshold location, slope, surface type, type of 
runway, and for a precision approach runway the existence of an 
obstacle free zone. 
• Length, width and surface type of the strip, runway end safety 
areas, and stop ways. 
• Length, width, and surface type of taxiways (the ground used by 
the aircraft before and after flying). 
• Apron surface type and aircraft stands. 
• Clearway length and ground profile. 
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 Visual aids for approach procedures, visual approach lighting type, and 
visual approach slope indicator system. 
4. Maintenance of the Aerodrome Certification Manual 
Airport Director is responsible for the maintenance of the ACM as required 
by SCAA as follows: 
• Maintain the ACM current at all times.  The Airport Director is 
responsible for maintaining the currency of the ACM. 
• Maintain the official copy of the ACM at the Airport Director's Office. 
• Furnish a CAA approved and current copy of the ACM to the personnel 
directly responsible for implementation of the ACM. 
• Make the official copy of the ACM available for inspection by the CAA. 
• Provide the CAA with one complete and current copy of the ACM. 
• Airport Director is responsible for the amending the ACM. 
5. Airport Safety Management System 
A Safety Management System will be established at airport to ensure 
compliance with all safety requirements and to achieve continuous 
improvement in safety performance.  The essential features of the airport 
SMS are: 
• Safety policy must be applicable on the process of safety management and 
its relation to the operational and maintenance process; 
• Structure or organization of the SMS including staffing and assignment of 
individual and group responsibilities safety issues; 
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• SMS strategy and planning such as setting safety performance targets, 
allocating priority for implementing safety initiatives and providing a 
framework for controlling the risks to a level as low as reasonably 
practicable keeping always in view the requirements of the Standard and 
Recommended Practices in Annex 14, Volume I to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation and the national regulations, standards, rules 
or orders; 
• SMS implementation including facilities, methods and procedures for the 
effective communication of safety messages and enforcement of safety 
requirements; 
• System for the implementation of, and action on, critical safety areas 
which require a higher level of safety management integrity (Safety 
Measures Program); 
• Measures for safety promotion, accident prevention and system for risk 
control involving analysis and handling of accident, incidents, complaints, 
defects, faults, discrepancies and failures, and continuing safety 
monitoring; 
• Internal safety audit and review system detailing the systems and 
programs for quality control on safety; 
• System for the documentation of all safety related airport facilities as well 
as airport operational and maintenance records including information on 
the design and construction of aircraft pavements and aerodrome lighting.  
The system should enable easy retrieval of records including charts; 
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• Staff training and competency including review and evaluation of the 
adequacy of training provided to staff on safety related duties and of the 
certification system for testing their competency; and 
• Incorporation of safety related clauses in the contracts for work at the 
airport. 
6. Safety Requirements 
• A pre-work meeting will be held with all related parties to give them a 
briefing on the work intended to be done and ensure that nothing will 
affect the safe operations of flights. 
• NOTAMs will be disseminated through the airport NOTAM system 
(Airport Condition Reporting) and will include all declared distances. 
• All safety requirements specified in "the work in progress plan" will be 
strictly adhered to. 
• All unserviceable areas will be marked in accordance with SCAA 
requirements. 
• The ground operations staff will check that any equipment which affects 
landing and takeoff of aircrafts is removed before the runway is opened. 
•  The ground operations staff will check to see if all required permits have 
been issued for works on the movement area and then check that all 
underground services in the area of work are located and marked before or 
at the commencement of work to reduce the risk of damage to all 
infrastructure services. 
• The ground operations staff will ensure that all personnel are aware of the 
location of runway and taxiway lights and other vital services and 
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markings so that they will not be damaged by vehicles and equipment.  
The ground operations staff will also ensure that routes of access to the 
work sites are clearly marked.  Flashing lights may be used for night 
marking. 
• The ground operations staff will ensure that adequate parking space is 
allocated for workers and employees responsible for accomplishing the 
work required in addition to all needed vehicle equipment. 
• A distance of at least 50 meters will be between the runway edge and any 
parked vehicle at the side of the strip. 
7. Personnel Requirements 
•  Airport will maintain sufficient qualified, competent, and certified 
personnel to comply with the requirements of this Airport Certification 
Manual. 
•  Personnel are subject to recurrent competency training covering airport 
topography, traffic rules and traffic procedures in the airport movement 
area and airport radio-communications system, training as will as 
operation& maintenance field. 
•   Marshallers (persons who direct the traffic in the taxiways and apron) 
are subject to recurrent tests for qualification covering rules and 
regulations governing aircraft movement and positioning, airport 
operational procedures, airport topography, radio-communications, 
docking handling, and air passenger bridges. 
?    Airport safety Unit inspectors are familiar with the airport facilities, 
regulations and the airport certification manual requirements concerning the 
self inspection program. 
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8. Safety Areas 
  Safety area dimensions conform to ICAO standards and recommended 
practices contained in Annex 14, Vol. 1. A map is included to depict the 
conditions and locations of areas safety must be attachment. Safety area 
conditions are maintained as follows:  
• Each safety area is cleared and graded, and will be maintained free of 
potentially hazardous ruts, humps, depressions, ditches or other surface 
variations. 
• Each safety area is drained by grading and storm sewers to prevent water 
accumulation.  
• Each safety area is capable under dry conditions of supporting aircraft 
rescue and firefighting equipment and the occasional passage of aircraft 
without causing major damage.  In wet conditions it is also able to support 
snow removal equipment.  Manhole or duct access covers are constructed 
from steel of sufficient thickness and strength to support equipment and 
aircraft. 
• No objects are located in any safety area, except for objects that need to 
be located in the safety areas because of their function.  The objects 
currently located in the safety areas because of their function are 
constructed on frangible mounted structures of the lowest practicable 
height and are maintained so the frangible point is no higher than 7.5 cm 
above grade.  Any future objects that will be located in the safety areas 
because of their function will be constructed on frangible mounted 
structures. 
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• Safety areas will conform to dimensions acceptable to the Director 
General of Civil Aviation if any runways or taxiways are constructed, 
reconstructed, or extended. 
• Vegetation should be cut at all time. 
9. Inspection Procedures of Safety Areas 
•  Daily inspections of the safety areas are done by ground operations 
personnel and an inspection report should be made. 
•  If any unsatisfactory condition is found an airport condition report form will 
be filled and delivered to the Civil Engineering Department. 
•  All inspection records are kept and made available to safety inspectors upon 
request. 
10. Maintenance of Safety Areas 
•    Preventive maintenance program established at the airport to maintain 
facilities in condition which does not impair the safety of aircraft operations. 
•    Corrective action will be initiated by Civil Engineering staff as soon as  
Practical when any unsatisfactory condition is found in the safety areas. 
•    If the airport operator determines that an uncorrected condition in a safety 
area is unsafe for aircraft operations, that portion of the airport will be closed 
to aircraft operation until the unsafe condition is corrected. 
•  The Airport Maintenance including preventive and corrective maintenance 
shall be executed through nominated contractors. 
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11. Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting  
Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) equipment complies with (ICAO 
Category). ARFF vehicles conform to standards set in Guidance Specifications 
for Water Foam Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Vehicles.  ARFF Standby 
Procedures and Response Capability as follows: 
• ARFF will respond to each emergency during periods of air carrier 
operations. 
• ARFF will demonstrate compliance with the response requirements 
when requested. 
• The response time required  will achieve the following performance: 
a. Within 2 minutes from the time of alarm and the time when the first 
responding vehicle(s) reach any point of the operational runway(s)and 
discharge 50% of the total vehicle discharge rate. 
b. Within 3 minutes from the time of alarm, all remaining vehicles will reach 
the location and shall deliver the amount of distinguishing agent specified  
• Sufficient ARFF personnel will be available during all air carrier 
operations to operate the vehicles, meet the response time, and meet the 
minimum agent discharge rates required . 
• Procedures and equipment are established and maintained for alerting 
ARFF personnel by the Airport crash alarm which will be tested daily at 
every 0800, 1600, and 2100 and shall consist of continuous 83 seconds 
blasts activated by the Airport Tower or Fire Control Center to any existing 
or impending emergency requiring their assistance. 
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• Fire fighters authorized for ARFF duty will be at standby alert at the 
airport fire station with the ARFF vehicle at least 15 minutes prior to 
scheduled arrivals and until 15 minutes after departure. If departure is 
scheduled at a later time the standby alert will be discontinued until 15 
minutes before the scheduled boarding time. 
12. Airport Emergency Plan  
An Airport Emergency Plan (AEP), meeting the standards must be 
developed and is included in Appendix. The (AEP) is distributed to all 
concerned departments and agencies. All airport personnel having duties and 
responsibilities under the (AEP) are properly trained and familiar with their 
assignments.   Annual Review of the AEP as follows: 
• A review of the (AEP) is conducted at least every 12 months to ensure 
that the (AEP) is current and all parties with whom the plan is coordinated 
are familiar with their responsibilities. 
• All of the agencies involved in the AEP are invited to participate in an 
annual review meeting at the airport.   
• Tri-Annual Full-Scale Exercise of the AEP 
• A full-scale exercise of the AEP will be conducted every two 
years. 
• The full-scale exercise will involve, to the extent practicable, all 
mutual aid participants and a reasonable amount of emergency 
equipment. 
• The purpose of the exercise will be to test the effectiveness of the 
AEP through a response of the airport and its mutual aid to an 
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aircraft accident at the airport, and to familiarize emergency 
personnel with their responsibilities in the plan. 
13. Apron Safety Management 
Apron safety management is the responsibility of Ground Sٍafety personnel. 
Safety precautions as follows: 
• No person shall walk, stand, drive a vehicle, park a vehicle or aircraft, or cause 
an obstruction on the movement area of the airport except in accordance with 
permission given: 
? By the airport operator, and 
? When applicable, by the appropriate air traffic control unit or flight service 
station. 
• No person shall go to an aircraft on an active movement area at night unless 
the aircraft displays operating wingtip, tail and anti-collision lights, or is 
illuminated by lights mounted on the towing vehicle and directed at the 
aircraft being towed. 
• No person shall park or otherwise leave an aircraft on an active maneuvering 
area at night unless the aircraft displays operating wingtip, tail and anti-
collision lights or illuminated by lanterns suspended from the wingtips, tail 
and nose of the aircraft. 
• No person shall operate a vehicle at night or during the hours of restricted 
visibility unless it is equipped with suitable lighting. 
• Knowingly remove, deface, extinguish or interfere with a marker, marking, 
light or signal that is used for the purpose of air navigation, except in 
accordance with permission given: 
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a. By the airport operator, and 
b. Where applicable, by the appropriate control unit or flight 
service station. 
c. On the airside 
d. On an aircraft loading bridge or on a gallery or balcony that is 
contiguous to or that overhangs an apron 
e. In an area where smoking, or the presence of an open flame, is likely 
to create a fire hazard that could endanger persons or property. 
f.  Smoking is permitted only in specified locations in an 
enclosed     building/shelter where such smoking will not 
create a fire hazard 
• At, or on the vicinity of ،the airport, knowingly display a marker, marking, 
sign, light or signal that is likely to be hazardous to aviation safety by 
causing a glare or confusion with, or preventing clear visual perception of, a 
marker, marking, sign, light or signal that is required for the airport 
operations. 
• No person will leave a vehicle unattended where it may create a hazard. 
• Vehicles and personnel will not approach aircraft until propellers and engines 
have stopped revolving. 
•  Opening the passenger doors and the disembarking of passengers from 
aircraft will not take place before propellers and engines have stopped 
revolving. 
•  Propellers will not be stopped or slowed down by hand. 
•  All personnel working on the airside will wear high visibility clothing. 
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•  All personnel working in the vicinity of aircraft with engines running will 
wear ear defenders. 
• Wheel chocks are to be placed before any aircraft engine start-up. 
• Smoking, or display of an open flame, is prohibited: 
•  All traffic on the airside will at all times comply with any lawful order, 
signal, or direction from any authorized airport authority representative. 
Where such traffic is controlled by traffic lights, signs, mechanical or 
electrical signal, or pavement marking; such signals and marking will be 
obeyed unless instructed by an authorized airport personnel to do otherwise. 
•  None of the following will be allowed when operating a vehicle on the 
airport: 
a. Operating the vehicle in a careless or negligent manner and 
without due caution 
b. Operating in a manner which endangers unreasonably persons or 
property Disregard of the right and safety of others 
c. Speeding 
d. Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic 
• The Airport operator will remove from any area of the airport any vehicle 
which is disabled, abandoned, parked in violation of these rules and 
regulations, or which presents an operational problem to any other area at the 
airport.  The Airport operator may store vehicles, at the owner’s or operator’s 
expense, without liability for damage which may result in the course of 
removing, towing, or storing of the vehicle. 
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•  Coupling devices holding small baggage type trailers together will have 
positive-locking and release mechanism through manual action only for any 
combination of vehicle. 
•  All ground support vehicles will display lights from one-half hour after 
sunset to one-half hour before sunrise, and at all other times when there is 
insufficient light to render persons, vehicles, and property clearly at a 
distance of 150 meters, except when such vehicles are parking in areas 
designated by the airport operator for such purposes. 
•  Windscreens, windshields, and windows of any vehicle or mobile equipment 
working on the airport will be free of cracks, blisters, discoloration or 
obstructions to vision of the operator of the vehicle. 
•  The use or placing of posters, stickers, signs or other objects on the 
windscreen, windshield or rear windows of any vehicle other than those 
authorized by the airport operator is prohibited. 
•  The vision of the operator of an automotive vehicle or any mobile equipment 
will not be obstructed by an extended superstructure or load. 
•  No motorized vehicle will be operated on the airside unless the following is 
maintained: 
a. The driver is duly authorized to operate such vehicle and is licensed by 
the license authority to operate on a public highway or roadway. 
b. The vehicle is registered in accordance with the provisions of the law or, in 
the case of specialized vehicles, by the airport operator. 
• Fire extinguisher equipment will not be tampered with at any time or used for 
any purpose other than fire fighting or fire prevention. 
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•  Vehicle speed limits are set as follows: 
10 km/hr approximately to aircraft. 
20 km/hr at night and bad visibility. 
25 km/hr in daytime. 
40 km/hr elsewhere.        
14. Safety Audit 
Audit is necessary to confirm that the processes and results of that system 
actually achieve their intents, having implemented a system to manage safety 
within the airport. Several elements are assessed during a safety audit: 
• Surveillance of compliance with requirements. 
• The Audit Team will ascertain that the appropriate regulations of ICAO, 
SCAA, and safety standards have been identified and implemented. 
• Areas & Degree of Risk and their effective management. 
• In order to ensure that an organisation’s activities continue to be adequately 
safe operation. Procedures and processes with safety significance must be 
periodically reviewed in order to ensure that they continue to meet airport 
safety objectives. 
• The competence and performance of those responsible for safety. 
• The Audit Team will seek to confirm that the competence of key personnel 
remains adequate. For this, it will also examine procedures and specifically 
training programme for assuring the safety culture. Tables (2-2), (2-3) and 
(2-4) respectively, used for continuous surveillance, periodic evaluation and 
special inspection checklist to ensure safety in the aircraft movement area.  
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Table 2.2: Continuous Surveillance Checklist [Jordanian Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2008] 
DATE:______________              DAY:__________________                                   √ Satisfactory 
TIME: ______________              INSPECTOR:________________                          X Unsatisfactory 
FACILITIES CONDITIONS √ X             REMARKS 
Ground Rules / Procedures followed       
Vehicles     
Fuelling Fire / Explosion Hazards    
Operations Ground / No smoking    
 Auto Shut off system    
Water & Humidity Surface conditions    
 Safety plan    
Construction Runway Incursions    
 Runway & Taxiway use    
 Unauthorized Persons    
Public Protection Unauthorized Vehicles    
 Gates Clear    
Wildlife Birds     
Hazards Animals    
 Pedestrians in movement 
area 
   
Miscellaneous Passenger load / unload    
 Debris in movement area    
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Table 2.3: Periodic Condition Evaluation Checklist [Jordanian Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2008] 
DATE:______________              DAY:_        _________________                                                     √ Satisfactory 
TIME: ______________            INSPECTOR:________________                                                    X Unsatisfactory 
FACILITIES CONDITIONS √ X                 REMARKS 
Pavement Rubber Depositing    
Areas Polishing    
Markings & Signs Visible / Standard    
 Power Generator Check    
Lighting Circuit Resistance Test    
 Aim / Adjustment    
Visual Aids REILs/ PAPI/ Aiming    
Obstructions Surveyed Trees / Structures    
 Check Overhead Power 
Lines 
   
 Physical Facilities    
Fuelling Mobile Fuelers    
Operations Fire Extinguishers    
 Fuel Marking / Labeling    
 Grounding Clips    
Aircraft Rescue Response Times    
and Firefighting Live Fire Drills    
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Table 2.4: Special Inspection Checklist [Jordanian Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2008] 
DATE:______________              DAY:__________________                                       √ Satisfactory 
TIME: ______________            INSPECTOR:________________                                            X Unsatisfactory 
FACILITIES CONDITIONS √ X                   REMARKS 
Pavement Ponding / Edge Dams    
Areas Polishing    
 Drainage    
Safety Areas Reopening Runways    
 Reopening Taxiways    
Marking & Signs Visible after rain    
 Standard after construction    
 Surface conditions    
 Snow bank Clearance    
Water and Humidity Lights & signs obscured    
 FOD    
 Braking action reports    
 Barricades    
Construction Construction lights    
 Equipment parking    
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2.12. Previous Studies 
2.12.1. Quality and Strategic Studies 
2.12.1.1. Foreign Studies 
Thompson et al., (1995) explained that senior executives commonly 
ponder such questions as “What might give us continued competitive 
advantage?” and “What new products should be make or markets should enter 
and how?” These questions go to the heart of a firm's strategic vision, the shared 
understanding of what the firm should be and how it must change. This present a 
framework to answer such questions critically and creatively. Knowing the 
answers constitutes the difference between muddling through and managing 
with confidence and foresight. The framework has four steps:  
• Generate broad scenarios of possible futures that your firm may 
encounter. 
• Conduct a competitive analysis of the industry and its strategic 
segments. 
• Analyze your company's and your competitions core capabilities. 
• Develop a strategic vision and identify your strategic options.  
Al-Quran, (2002) developed a model of TQM in the administrative units at 
Jordanian universities the major findings of the study were as follows: 
• The possible degree of application of the TQM elements generally was 
moderate. 
• The technique of "Building Team" became the highest, with a moderate 
degree, while the technique of administration by recording results was 
the lowest, with a moderate degree. 
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• The findings revealed that the shortage of qualified trained staff in 
quality improvement was the greatest obstacle to the application of 
TQM in the administrative units of Jordanian universities. 
Zawati,(2005) tackled the Balanced Score-Card (BSC) in the Jordanian 
public sector, in this research; the focus is on the importance of implementing 
the BSC concept in the public sector organizations. The researcher has modified 
the original BSC model to define first the needed strategies to achieve the 
organization vision. The definition of strategies based upon the analysis of 
environment of the organization in order to be able to adapt to the keep-
changing surroundings.   
JPS faces difficulties in measuring its performance systematically and in 
managing all the activities carried out to pursue its key strategies and objectives. 
Al-Seker, (2006) designed a model for total quality management (TQM) 
in Saudi Arabia universities the results showed: sample items showed a great 
desire to implement the proposed in conformity with creating the appropriate 
environment for total quality management implementation. 
Al-Kamim, (2003) evaluated the TQM in Yemen the main findings of the 
study are: There is a positive relation between TQM with all its elements (total 
and individual) and all the study domains (domestic and foreign sales, costs, 
profitability, market share, competitive advantage` and the export ability). The 
application TQM system improves the performance level of the company. The 
best results of applying TQM are represented in market share, competitive 
advantage, export ability, respectively, followed by foreign' sales, profitability, 
local sales, where as negative or no-significant results were noted in one domain 
only (costs). 
Otaibe, (2006) proposed a model for total quality management at Kuwait 
university finally the researcher comes up to the following recommendations: 
85 
 
• Publicizing TQM culture and increasing its presence among top level 
management, through conferences, discussions and workshops, to inform 
all of Kuwait University employees about what is TQM, and encourage 
them to discuss its expected obstacles. 
• Providing training programs for university employees in TQM techniques 
to help in understanding the conditions for its success. 
2.12.1.2. Local Studies 
Abu Ganaya, (2002) proved that the success of any organization depends 
greatly on implantation of strategic management approach. Adopting the 
strategic management process has a significant impact on an organization 
financial success, and becomes the critical factor in a company’s survival and 
growth. The result of One-way Anova test showed that the level of knowledge 
with strategic management have an influence on the success of the 
organizations. 
Mohammed, (2006) covered the cost of quality control and it's 
measurement at Sudanese industrial enterprise the results confirmed to the study 
concluded that:  
• Quality control measurement leads to continuous improving product and 
minimizing cost. 
• The higher quality leads to increase the share of competitive market. 
• A traditional measure doesn’t realize the effective level of quality progress. 
Ali, (2005) examined the strategic management in Sudan the study shows 
that the performance of the enterprise under consideration varied according to 
their practice of strategic management. The enterprise which practiced strategic 
management properly was able to perform better than the others; and thus 
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enterprises experienced the poorest practice consequently its performance were 
the worst. 
2.12.2. General   Aviation    Studies  
Al-Sheikh, (2005) dealt with the air transportation enterprise in Sudan.  
The research focuses on conducting a comprehensive assessment of the air 
transport industry in Sudan, in the period 1985 through 2003. Studying air traffic 
indicators and financial ones, comparing them with global and regional 
indicators. The indicators for Sudan airports and Sudan Airways performance 
are found to be poor. The study findings include: 
• The implementation of a policy of open skies leads to shortage in 
infrastructure capacity. 
• Unorganized competition leads to monopoly and hikes in costs of air 
transport services. 
• Non-proportionate alliances lead to hegemony by the mightier party over 
the weaker. 
Mohammed, (2007) treated the strategic management in Sudan Civil 
Aviation Authority.  This study aimed at the elucidation of the concepts of 
strategic management. Furthermore it clarified the importance of the strategic 
planning and its role in enabling the organizations to achieve their objectives 
successfully as required. This study reflects the importance of planning in 
finding out the needs of the organization in different fields. It is known that 
human resources and financial funds are rare, and limited so they should be 
utilized to the optimum by planning.  
Planning focuses on the future: what is to be accomplished and how and 
when. In essence, the planning function includes those managerial activities that 
determine objectives for the future and the appropriate means for achieving 
those objectives. 
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Mohammed, (2003) addressed the airports operation and air navigation on 
economical Principles the study results and conclusion as follows:  
• Balance between cost and services depends on global measurements and 
financial profit, and surrounding environmental factors in transport such 
as; social, political and economical.  
• Perfect model deal with a significant relation between airports operation 
and air navigation according to economical principles. 
• Research results and recommendations dealt with the importance of 
developing the finance, training, management and laws in order to 
simplify and create a conducive environment of work and the basic of 
economic principle. 
Adam, (2007) broached the optimum utilization of Sudan air space  this 
study is focused for the planning and the usage of human resource and generous 
financial support to speed up the development   of  air traffic control   center  to 
accommodate for the whole region and   serve the international air transport 
demand. 
Otrakji, and Khashab, (2001) prepared mission report evaluation of the 
Sudan Civil Aviation structure and Khartoum international airport the main 
conclusion and findings of the report as follows:        
• The general directorates were further divided into directorates then into 
sections but without any explanation of their specific function, other 
than that what could be construed from their title.  
• There were no job descriptions mandates or duties of the senior personnel 
in charge of the general directorates and the subordinate directorates. 
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• The mandate and authority of Director General remained however mainly 
the financial and administrative areas with no clear references to his 
authority in technical, operational, aviation safety and security area. 
• The 1999 law like its predecessor, did not contain, any organizational 
structure for CAA below the level of the Director General. 
• No coordination seems to have been effected to avoid duplication of 
duties and overlapping of responsibilities units. Thus has result in a 
situation divisions claim responsibility for the same duties and where 
certain confusion prevails. 
• The CAA offices remain therefore dispersed in various rented buildings in 
town and in the airport. 
2.12.3. Safety Aviation Studies  
O'Hare, (1999) considered that the human performance in general aviation 
the training is an activity designed to prepare people for performance. Effective 
performance in many skills is based on the ability to recognize situations on the 
basis of subtle cues and distinctions. In aviation there needs to be a greater 
emphasis on analyzing expert performance and task structure to identify these 
critical constraints. The results can form the basis to enhance the ability of the 
novice to pay attention to the critical cues and constraints which govern action 
in a wide variety of circumstances.  
Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, (1999) studied and analyzed the repeated 
aviation accidents in Sudan the aviation accidents in Sudan started to upset the 
public, responsible and workers in aviation field. By having a look at the global 
fatal accidents review of the period 1980-1996, it is found that the African 
average of accident is massive and there is accident in every 75.000 departures. 
With reference to statistics about Sudan in the period from 1988 to 1997 and 
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according to 80.000 departures a year, Sudan's accidents represent 50 accidents 
in every million flight and Sudan is the second large country where accidents 
take place in Africa.   
 Sudanese Aviation Industry Development Organization (SAIDO), (2008) 
helped a seminar on aircraft Accidents the main conclusion and findings as 
following: 
• Africa's aircraft accidents rate is the highest in the world. (World 
Airnews, May 2000). 
• The Africa has accounted for 13% of the world's accidents, between 
1987 and 1996. 
• Sudan topped the list with an average of 41 accidents per million 
departures. 
• It listed the latent reasons for making mistakes include: 
• Inadequate selection, training, facilities, equipment and resources. 
• Poor communication, planning, inspection, oversight, motivation and 
management problems.  
Federal Aviation Administration, (2006) introduced the benefits of SMS 
are essentially a quality management approach to Ling risk. It also provides the 
organizational framework to support a sound safety culture. General aviation 
operators, a SMS can form the core of the company’s safety efforts. For 
certificated operators such as airlines, air taxi operators, and aviation training 
organizations, may also serve as an efficient means of interfacing with 
certificate oversight offices. The SMS provides the company’s management 
with a detailed roadmap for monitoring safety related processes. Development 
and implementation of a SMS can give the aviation service provider’s 
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management a structured set of tools to meet their legal responsibilities but they 
can also provide significant business benefits.  
Air Accident Investigation Central Directorate: SCAA, (2007), explained 
that the sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident under the 
Regulation shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It shall not be the 
purpose of such an investigation to apportion or liability. An investigation shall 
include: 
• Gathering, recording and analysis of all available information on the 
accident or incident.  
• If appropriate, the issuance of safety recommendations. 
• If possible, the determination of the causes. 
• In the case of an accident, the completion of the Final Report. 
Abd Elhadi, (2006) prepared implementation of Aerodrome Regulations 
and Safety Management system in Sudan the objective of mission was to assess 
the resources, facilities and services available in Sudan Aerodromes, to evaluate 
the procedures, working methods used to its operation, particularly those related 
to implementation of certification of aerodrome and safety management systems 
requirements, in compliance with Annex 14 Volume I provisions, as well as 
other relevant ICAO specifications. The main discussion and findings as 
follows: 
• National regulations specific to aerodromes are not yet developed and 
completed. 
• No entity was established within CAA implementation of airdrome 
certification regulations. 
• All Aerodromes in Sudan are owned and operated by the government. 
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• No regulatory framework was established for the implementation of the 
certification of aerodromes in Sudan and no established criteria 
certification of aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14. 
• Non-implementation of the certification of aerodromes is due mainly to 
a lack of regulatory framework, experience, availability of qualified and 
trained aerodrome inspectors. 
• Competence and skills of the aerodrome engineers and inspectors are 
not regularly evaluated. No licensing system for the aerodrome 
personnel is in place. 
• Risk assessments are not conducted to support the application of a non-
conformance or non adherence to ICAO SARPs at existing aerodromes. 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), (2005-2006) approved 
the expansion of the existing ( USOAP) in April 2005 along with other safety 
related aviation activities, under a comprehensive systems approach including 
Aerodromes. ICAO  recognizes  the  need  for  States  to  exercise  effective  
safety  oversight  of  their  aviation industries. Audit results analyzed and 
reported within main eight critical elements described as follows:  
Critical Element 1: Primary Aviation Legislation 
The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consistent with the 
environment and complexity of the states aviation activity, and compliant with 
the requirements contained in the convention on international Civil Aviation. 
Critical Element 2: Specific Operating Regulations 
The provision of adequate regulation to address, at a minimum, national 
requirements emanating from the primary aviation legislation and providing for 
standardized operational procedures, equipment and infrastructures, in 
conformance with the ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs). 
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Critical Element 3: State Civil Aviation System and Safety Oversight 
Function  
The establishment of Civil Aviation authority (CAA) and/or other 
relevant authorities or government agencies, headed by a chief executive officer, 
supported by the appropriate and adequate technical and non-technical safety 
and provided with adequate financial resources.  
Critical Element 4: Technical Personnel Qualification and Training  
The establishment of minimum requirements for knowledge and 
experience of the technical personnel performing safety oversight function and 
the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence 
at the desired level. 
Critical Element 5: Technical Guidance, Tools and the Provision of Safety 
Critical Information 
The provision of technical guidance including processes, procedures 
facilities, equipment and safety critical information, as applicable, to the 
technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight function in 
accordance with established requirements. 
Critical Element 6: Licensing Certification, Authorization and/or Approval 
Obligations 
The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel 
and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established 
requirements. 
Critical Element 7: Surveillance Obligation 
The implementation of processes, such as inspections and audits, to 
proactively ensure that aviation license, certificate, authorization and/or 
approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and safety 
required by the state. 
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Critical Element  8: Resolution of Safety Concerns 
The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified 
deficiencies impacting aviation safety. Table (2-5) shows the comparison 
between Sudan, Canada, Germany, Gambia , Malaysia, Panama, Thailand and  
Czech  Republic for lack of effective implementation of ICAO, USOAP audits 
results within two years 2005-2006. 
Table 2.5: Critical Elements of a Safety Lack of Effective Implementation (%) 
[International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2005-2006] 
 
State  Critical 
element 
1 
Critical 
element 
2 
Critical 
element 
3 
Critical 
element 
4 
Critical 
element 
5 
Critical 
element 
6 
Critical 
element 
7 
Critical 
element 
8  
Total  
(%) 
 
Sudan  13.64 27.21 52.48 87.50 40.41 49.48 65.79 65.91 50.26
Canada  3.70 5.14 1.58 5.81 4.44 7.65 1.10 7.65 4.62 
Germany  29.63 10.29 17.18 11.62 26.67 8.09 15.85 7.55 15.80
Gambia  0.00 16.78 21.50 8.75 27.02 27.44 28.17 18.60 18.64
Malaysia  7.41 18.29 24.22 31.40 26.67 5.58 14.29 30.19 19.74
Panama  20.00 13.91 18.81 13.75 14.74 9.41 18.29 13.64 15.31
Thailand  25.93 20.00 18.76 22.67 16.67 14.04 17.58 20.75 19.54
Czech 
Republic 7.50 9.72 21.43 27.18 18.32 10.74 18.95 15.63 16.18
 
2.13. Comments on the Previous Studies  
This study is similar to the previous studies, in the importance of the 
analysis of the current situation, and the determination of the points of strengths 
and to work for their maximization. Likewise, the acknowledgement of the weak 
points; and to work for their treatment by many techniques. This is done through 
adopting the strategic management approach and the introduction of the Total 
Quality Management policy; in addition to caring for the human cadre and it is 
training. Thus, this study was different from the previous studies in the 
following:- 
• There were no similar scientific and academic studies which handled the 
topic of the study; practically or fully, despite the importance of the study; 
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and that the registered advanced figures and situations vis-a-vis many other 
states, in the increase of aircrafts accidents, rather progressively; and the 
negative and destructive results that followed. 
• The collection of information and full reports about the topic of the study, for 
a continuous period of more than the past 20 years in the period 1988-2008; 
and knowing the nature of the conditions which proceeded this period, from 
several sources each confirm the other.  The classification of these data and 
their analysis, in an exact form, is attained by the use of the modern statistical 
techniques, such as SPSS / Excel.  
• The study conducted many comparisons; for local, regional and international 
experiences. It clearly defined the nature of the problems and their 
classifications. At the same time; it proposed an integrated and 
comprehensive (SMS), for the treatment of these problems and the 
mechanism for the continuous self-development.  
2.14. The Perspective and Guidelines of the Study   
2.14.1. Basic Guidelines Process     
• Eliminate non value adding steps. 
• Provide the shortest possible route requirements.   
• Possible to track progress of the transaction. 
• Eliminate "black holes". 
• Develop vision, mission. 
• Determine high level safety requirements. 
• Conduct strength / weaknesses / opportunity / threat (SWOT) Analysis. 
• Identify core competencies. 
• Identify major business processes. 
• Develop the process map. 
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• Conduct detailed safety requirements analysis. 
• Categorize/ prioritize process improvement projects. 
• Establish safety project of the organization. 
• Develop project plan. 
2.14.2. Evaluation and Follow-up Action  
• Specifying the company’s SMS standards. 
• Allocating adequate resources to the SMS. 
• Ensuring the standards are known and accepted by all staff. 
• Ensuring there is a system in place to that deviation from the standards 
are recognized and reported. 
• Hazard and occurrences are reported in a timely manner. 
•  All staff are encouraged to report hazard, occurrences and safety 
concerns. 
• Procedures are in place to track significant events, and detect 
unexplained increases in safety related events.  
• There are processes to regularly review the effectiveness of the 
company reporting and notification system. 
• Compliance with ICAO Annex 14 Volume SARPs.  
• Provision and maintenance of facilities and services. 
• Responsibilities being clearly defined. 
• All staff consistently achieves the standards. 
2.14.3. Establishing Safety Management System  
• A safety management plan 
• Clear authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities for safety at all 
levels within the organization. 
• Occurrence and Hazard reporting,  
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• Data collection procedures. 
• Incident analysis.  
• Hazard identification and risk management.. 
• Documentation. 
• Change operational procedures to minimize the hazard. 
• Involve all staff in safety. 
• Develop a positive safety culture. 
• Maintain commitment. 
• Assess progress. 
• Prevention of accidents. 
• Aerodrome safety. 
• Reduction/elimination of deficiencies. 
• Aerodrome safety management system. 
• CAA aerodrome safety oversight. 
• ICAO USOAP aerodromes audit. 
• Prepare aerodrome manual. 
• Possess an Aerodrome Certification. 
• Benchmarking for Best Practices 
• Implement safety management systm. 
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Chapter Three 
Air Transport and Aviation Accidents in Sudan  
3.1. Development of Air Transport in Sudan’s Airport 
The country obligation to prepare the airports and air navigation services 
and its responsibility towards them.  The air-transport sector is characterized by 
several features from the other economic sectors; distinction in air navigations 
services, natural monopoly and the large amount of money required by the 
sector [Mohammed, 2003]. 
The traffic of air transport has developed in different airports of Sudan, 
and the number of the airports have been rebuilt become nine international 
airports and eight domestic airports, to enable the international and domestic air 
transport to develop and connect all parts of Sudan with the international and 
regional surroundings. Figures (3-1) and (3-2) show the distribution and 
locations of airports, and the routes of air traffic in Sudan. 
The international and regional relationships have been strengthened with 
several agreements, for instance; ICAO, AFCAC (African Civil Aviation 
Commission), Arab Civil Aviation Organization and bilateral relations with 
different countries and companies. 
The development includes all the fields in Civil Aviation; and it is 
positively reflected on the growth of air traffic in all airports of Sudan. With the 
rapid increase, and more than forty international and domestic companies are 
working in the field of passengers transport and despite the sanctions imposed 
on Sudan, the number of flights for some airports were 500 aircrafts flights and 
the number of passengers in Khartoum airport reached more than two million 
passengers a year and the number of aircraft's movement is more than 60,000 
aircrafts per year [Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008]. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution and locations of Airports in Sudan [Sudan Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2007] 
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Figure 3.2: Air Traffic Routs in Sudan (Upper) [Sudan Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2007] 
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Table (3-1), Figures (3-3), (3-4) & (3-5) and the graphics (3-6), (3-7) & 
(3-8) show the size of development and increase of air traffic is evident out in all 
Sudan Airports performance, during the period (1991-2008).It is worth 
mentioning here that these situations in the period (1991 – 2008) do not include 
any data for the year 2005. Therefore, it was excluded, due to the lack of 
accurate documentation in the civil aviation sources. 
Moreover, Sudan is situated in the area of air traffic from north of Africa 
and Europe to the middle and South of Africa where the over flying reach more 
than 27,000 flights a year and the fees of over flying services are more than 30% 
of Civil Aviation Authorities earnings [Al-Sheikh, 2005]. 
Table 3.1: Air Traffic Movement in Sudan Airports, 1991-2008 [Sudan 
Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008] 
Numbers Years Aircraft flights Passengers Freight (Tones) 
1 1991 13330 675860 30928 
2 1992 18868 691681 96958 
3 1993 16478 720687 59020 
4 1994 19376 761276 72733 
5 1995 18940 774623 51675 
6 1996 15482 716315 52322 
7 1997 15742 719606 75935 
8 1998 24614 808202 122243 
9 1999 36756 939209 120455 
10 2000 39066 1015545 121406 
11 2001 36132 1093363 165108 
12 2002 38098 1204790 168318 
13 2003 39648 1291940 126456 
14 2004 52562 1334061 162511 
15 2006 106340 1969295 155463 
16 2007 100338 1992302 89545 
17 2008 106656 2015005 85300 
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Figure 3-3: Aircraft Movement, 1991-2008 
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Figure 3.4: Passengers Movement, 1991-2008 
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Figure 3.5: Freight (Tones) Movement, 1991-2008 
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Figure 3.6: Aircraft Regression Curve and Correlation Coefficient,1991-
2008 [Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008] 
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Figure 3.7: Passengers Regression Curve and Correlation Coefficient, 1991-
2008 [Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
Figure 3.8: Freight Regression Curve and Correlation Coefficient, 1991-2008 
[Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008] 
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3.2. Conditions and Increase of Aviation Accidents 
There are no registered observations, information and reports about the 
nature and details of aviation accidents that occurred before the year 1979.  For 
more than 40 years, which had succeeded the establishment of the Civil 
Aviation Authority in 1936, there was slow increase in air traffic in terms of the 
type and numbers of the aircrafts working during this period in the Sudan. 
The period from 1979 to 1987 witnessed increasing in number of 
occurrences where their total number in this period amounted to 134 
occurrences. The number of victims was 98 and the injured was 6. The details of 
these occurrences are not available, for lack of documentation. 
        Table (3-2) shows the accidents in this period and table (3-3) shows some 
data about the nature of fatal accidents. But the accidents developed widely 
during the period from 1988 to 2008 because of the increase in the size of air 
traffic and there are data about the circumstances and conditions of these 
accidents, where the number of accidents during this period reached 288; 
classified in fatal, serious, minor accidents and serious incident. 
 Table (3-4) and Figure (3-9) show the occurrences in this period. The 
results show that there is a clear difference in number of accidents from one year 
to the other, where it found that the least number of accidents is 3 in the year 
1998, while it found that the highest number is 32 accidents in the year 2003 
with a percentage of 11% of the total accidents. The mean number of accidents 
is 14 per a year, it is a large value. This means that there is spread of accidents 
which affect the work safety in aviation field. 
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Table 3.2: Total Number of Accidents, 1979-1987   
Numbers Years Number of Accidents 
1 1979 12 
2 1980 10 
3 1981 27 
4 1982 21 
5 1983 11 
6 1984 17 
7 1985 9 
8 1986 12 
9 1987 15 
Total of Accidents 134 
 
Source: Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008. 
 
 
  Table 3.3: Fatal Accidents, 1979-1987  
 
 
 
 
Numbers Date A/C Type A/C 
Registration 
Number of 
Causalities 
Killed Injured 
1 June 1979 PA-28 ST-AFE - 2 
2 Septemper1979 PA-32r ST-AHJ 2 2 
3 November1979 DC-3 ST-AHH - 2 
4 February 1980 F-27 ST-AAS 1 - 
5 November1981 STR-T34 OE-EVP 1 - 
6 April 1983 RS-748 EE-ADIH 17 - 
7 Septemper1984 C-188 OH-CIX 1 - 
8 November1984 PZL-106 SP-ZBA 1 - 
9 December1984 C-188 N2071J 1 - 
10 August 1986 F-27 ST-ADY 63 - 
11 May 1987 C-404 ST-AIJ 11 - 
 
 
Source: Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008. 
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Table 3.4: the Number of Accidents, 1988-2008[ 
 
Percentage  Number of Accidents Year  Numbers 
7,6% 22 1988 1 
6,6% 19 1989 2 
6,6% 19 1990 3 
4,9% 14 1991 4 
6,3% 18 1993 5 
4,9% 14 1994 6 
4,5% 13 1995 7 
2,1% 6 1996 8 
2,1% 6 1997 9 
1,0% 3 1998 10 
2,1% 6 1999 11 
2,8% 8 2000 12 
3,1% 9 2001 13 
5,2% 15 2002 14 
11,1% 32 2003 15 
2,8% 8 2004 16 
7,6% 22 2005 17 
5,9% 17 2006 18 
5,9% 17 2007 19 
6,9% 20 2008 20 
100% 288 Total of Accidents 
 
Source: Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, 1988-2008. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: The Number of Accidents, 1988-2008 
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3.3. Summary of Accidents for the Last Twenty Years 1988-2008 
Summary of the accidents for the last twenty years 1988-2008 during which 
the increasing frequency of such accidents could be attributed to similar 
circumstances and causes. 
There are no studies and evaluation in the previous situations and the 
lessons learned from them. The information and data are available and a great 
value in conducting analysis and evaluation to determine the real reasons that 
leads to the occurrence of these accidents. 
The summary explains the locations of these accidents, their reasons and 
the size of loss, by taking into considerations the fact that most of these 
accidents occurred on landing or take off that means these accidents occurred 
inside or around the airports, and amounted to 288 accidents. 
The period did not include the accidents occurred in 1992, because there 
is no data during this year involved in documents of Civil Aviation; means that 
there is shortage of data and reports, and incompletion of investigation in some 
of them or authorize out side parties to the investigation process, that amounted 
to 5% of the total number of accidents during the period. 
The available data is adequate for analysis and evaluation process, and the 
period is essential for the nature of the previous accumulation and current 
situations and the possibility of evaluation according to these data and 
possibility of changing the situation to new situations based on requirements of 
this important period. 
3.4. The Study Methodology and Analysis of Accidents 
3.4.1. Sample and Population of the Research 
The population of the research includes Civil Aviation Authority staff and 
different aviation service companies working in Khartoum Airport. The sample 
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for this study is the managers at top, middle and direct supervisor's levels. 
Stratified simple random sampling is used to select the sample. 
A questionnaire of 150 Samples is used to collect the relevant data of the 
study, and it represents 30% of the population. Appendixes (B)&(C) show the 
questionnaire and referees names (those who revise and approved the final shape 
of the questionnaire) respectively.  This sample is considered sufficient to 
represent the individuals of the study population, as the pervious studies indicated 
that the sample is selected with average not less than 10% of the original 
population of the study [Elnour, 2005]. 
3.4.2. Cause and Effect Analysis (Fish Bone) 
Cause and effect analysis is used as a useful technique for helping to examine 
the underlying causes. It helps to see patterns and relationships among potential 
causes, a more specific definition of the problem; it stimulates further 
 brainstorming and clarification of the problem. Figure (3-10) shows the cause 
and effect diagram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3. Statistical Analysis 
This study adopted a descriptive analytical approach of the sake of 
capturing the relationship between the different variable.  The statistical package 
for social sciences (SPSS) and excel interactive spread sheets had been used for 
descriptive statistics, cross tabulation, frequency distribution, Chi-square tests 
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and statistical confidences.  The findings show how confidently it can be 
generalize for a large population from a selected sample of that population. 
3.4.4. Chi-squared Test  
Chi-square test is used to compare between observed frequencies of 
categories; and expected frequencies. The Chi-squared test (Chi is pronounced 
‘ki’, and written as    ) allowing hypothesis testing for categorical data. Chi-
square value measures the probability of getting a value of a minimum given 
size to determine whether it is significant. 
  The value of chi-square is calculated using the following formula:[Bashier, 
2003] 
∑ −= EEO
2
2 )(χ  
Where       is chi-square 
O is Observed frequency for the corresponding cell. 
E is expected frequency for the corresponding cell. 
To measure the Chi-square value, it is needed to know probability of 
getting a Chi-square value of a minimum given size to determine whether it is 
significant. 
The probability depends on the degrees of freedom of the table from 
which chi-square value is derived. 
Mathematically, degrees of freedom (df) is expressed as follows: 
df = ( r – 1) (c – 1) where: r is the number of row, c is the number of 
column [Elfaki, 2006]. 
3.4.5. Correlation 
The relationship between two aspects is called correlation. The correlation 
can be linear or non linear. The used measurement which measures the 
2χ
2χ
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correction degree is known as correlation coefficients and represented with R 
and its value ranging between -1 to 1.             
The simple linear correlation coefficient is contend with assuming that 
there is a linear relationship only between two of the variances, bearing in mind 
that, having small value (close to the zero) for this coefficient, does not mean 
that there is no relationship between the two variances, there can be a second 
class relationship called non linear correlation [Bashier, 2003]. 
3.4.6. Testing of Hypothesis 
The Chi-square had been used to test hypothesis and explain the 
relationship between variables. Chi-square tested the hypothesis whether two or 
more samples that are different enough in some characteristics or aspects of their 
behavior to generalize from our samples that the populations samples are drawn. 
They are also different in their behavior. Probability Level of Significance is the 
probability that a subject with a positive test result really has the value < (α = 
0.01). Where α is a value of error equal to 1%. 
3.4.7. Questionnaire Reliability 
Reliability data used Alpha Cronbach's to be sure of unit co-ordination 
and they are free of random mistakes that affect the measurement. It's been 
realized that the questionnaire is defined with high reliability and Alpha 
Cronbach's coefficient reliability, reached 71% and it's very good level of 
reliability. Appendix (D) shows the reliability results. 
3.5. Study Difficulties  
•    Civil Aviation departments suffered from weaknesses in data saving and 
documenting.  
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•   It is not easy for the researcher to obtain all the needed material due to the 
wide scope of the study and the existence of the necessary data in a 
considerably scattered and varied source locations. 
•   The paucity of previous literature and studies relevant to the topics of the 
present study.  
 
112 
 
Chapter Four 
 Results and Analysis  
4.1. Accidents Classification Criteria  
The accidents have been classified during the indicated period (1988-2008) in 
order to get acquaintance with the causes and circumstances which led to their 
occurrences and to know the nature of such accidents in terms of the place and time of 
their occurrences, size of damage, in addition to the other administrative, technical 
causes and natural conditions. The classification includes the following: 
• Distribution of accidents during every month, so as to know in which month the 
aviation accidents had increased. The results proved that some accidents occurred 
as a result of sandstorm, thunderstorm and bird strike. The accidents showed an 
increase in the rainy season in the months of August, September and October. 
• The classification of accidents according to the property damage and human 
causalities, aircrafts and assets damage is classified as: fatal, serious and minor 
damage. 
• Location of accidents to know the required precautions of work suitable and 
required for research and rescue. It was found that most of the accidents occurred in 
or around airports.  
• The classification of accidents according to their causes whether it is technical, 
administrative or natural. 
• The classification according to the circumstances of accidents; while landing, take 
off, on ground or cruising. 
• The casualties of victims according to killed or injured persons in each accident. 
4.2. The Monthly Distribution of Accidents 1988-2008  
Figure (4-1) shows the monthly distribution of aviation accidents during the 
period 1988-2008.  The results of the accidents distribution indicate that there is an 
obvious variation in the number of accidents from month to the other, where it found 
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that the least accidents occurred in April with 12 accidents, while it found the highest 
number of accidents occurred in October with 41. It found that accidents were 
increased during the period of August, September and October, and that is due to 
natural conditions in rainy season and the accidents occurred as a result of the wind, 
rain, low visibility and birds strike. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Accidents versus Months, 1988-2008 
4.3. Damage Type of Accidents 1988-2008 
Figure (4-2) shows the type of accidents damage occurred during the period 1988-
2008. It is noticed that most of the minor accidents and serious incidents are not 
registered, because of the lack of concern and attention; and these occurrences don’t 
represent obligations and responsibilities to any body, and their registration represents 
the first defense line to ensure their non-repetition and thus not causing serious 
accidents.  
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Figure 4.2: The Type of Accidents Damage 1988-2008. ∗ 
4.3.1. Fatal Damage of Accidents 
Figure (4-3) shows the distribution of fatal accidents damage during the period 
1988-2008.There is a variance between the numbers of accidents in each year; it 
includes the accidents which occurred during the operations of spray in agricultural 
projects, and it has been noticed that the crash of aircrafts increased during the period 
from 1988-93 in five successive years with a noticeable rapid increase in year 2005 
and 2008.  Where terrible accidents occurred and the number of victims increased 
4.3.2. Serious Damage of Accidents 
                                                 
∗ Remarks: 17 accidents have not been evaluated, due to insufficient data   and they represent 6% of 
the total. 
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Figure (4.4) shows the distribution of serious accidents damage during the 
period 1988 – 2008.  It indicates that the accidents during the period from 1988 – 1995 
are above the mean and the year 2003 witnessed the highest average of serious 
accidents, as a result of unaddressed causes. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Serious Damage of Accidents 1988-2008 
4.3.3. Minor Damage of Accident, 1988-2008  
Figure (4-5) shows the distribution of minor accidents damage during the period 
1988-2008.  The number of occurrences of minor accidents and serious incidents does 
not find the consideration and exact record for all the occurrences, which took place, 
and their registration can contribute to avoid the occurrences of serious accidents and 
that may occur, and most of accidents occurred in 2007 and 2008.  
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4.4. Location of Accidents 1988-2008  
Figure (4-6) shows the distribution of accidents location during the period 1988-2008. 
Most of the accidents took place with a percentage of 81 % in or around airports; 
precautions and effective emergency plan should be done and activated to reduce the 
occurrences or the effects of accidents in airports.  
55(19%)
127(45%)
101(36%)
Khartoum A/P Other A/Ps Other Locations
 
Figure 4.6: Location of Accidents 1988-2008 
4.4.1. Accidents Occurred in Khartoum Airport 
Figure (4-7) shows the distribution Accidents Occurred in Khartoum Airport 
during the period 1988-2008.The average of occurrences took place in Khartoum 
Airport during the period 1988-2008; reached 101 with a percentage of 36% of the 
total accidents, which occurred in Sudan during this period reaching the highest 
average. This means that any efforts made in Khartoum Airport should contribute 
towards the reduction of accidents in Sudan.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Accidents Occurred in Khartoum Airport 1988-2008 
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4.4.2. Accidents Occurred in all Sudan's Airports except Khartoum Airport 
Figure (4-8) shows the distribution of accidents occurred in all Sudan's Airports 
except Khartoum Airport during the period 1988-2008.  The number of accidents for 
all Sudan's airports except Khartoum Airport during this period amounted to 127 
accidents with a percentage of 45%, noting that the number of accidents during the 
period 1989-1994 is above the mean number and there are no recorded accidents in 
year 2004. However, the year 2003 witnessed the highest average of accidents where it 
reached to 16 accidents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Accidents Occurred in all Sudan's Airports except Khartoum Airport 
4.4.3. Accidents Occurred in Other Locations 
Figure (4-9) shows the distribution of accidents occurred in other locations 
during the period 1988-2008.  The total occurrences took place out of airports 
amounted to 55 representing 19% of the total accidents in which the operations of 
search and rescue are carried out by the authorities in the locations of accidents under 
the supervision and participation of units of search and rescue in the Civil Aviation 
Authority in case of fatal accidents.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: The Distribution of Accidents Occurred in Other locations 1988-2008. 
118 
 
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1991
1990
1989
1988
y e a r s
1 5
1 2
9
6
3
0
N
um
be
r o
f A
cc
id
en
ts
8
9
2
1 4
3
1 5
3
2
3
22
3
5
3
1 1
1 2
8
1 5
1 3
1 2
4.5. Causes of Accidents 1988-2008    
Figure (4-10) shows the distribution of accidents causes during the period 1988-
2008.  The majority of the accidents which occurred due to technical reasons were 
55%, the administrative aspect was 29% and the natural aspects such as wind, rain and 
work environmental conditions represent 16% of the total accidents (266), which 
occurred during the period 1988-2008. 
43(16%)
78(29%)
145(55%)
Technical Administrative Natural  
Figure 4.10: Causes of Accidents 1988-2008 
4.5.1. Accidents Occurred due to Technical Causes 1988-2008    
Figure (4-11) shows the distribution of accidents which occurred as result of 
technical causes during the period 1988-2008.The total accidents occurred due to 
technical causes were 145, which represent 55% of the total accidents. The period 
1988-1994 witnessed an increase in the accidents, and the two years 2003 and 2005 
witnessed the highest increase of accidents for technical causes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Accidents Occurred due to Technical Causes 1988-2008 
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4.5.2. Accidents Occurred Due to Administrative Causes 1988-2008 
Figure (4-12) shows the distribution of accidents occurred as result of 
administrative causes during the period 1988-2008.  The total accidents occurred as a 
result of administrative faults include the Civil Aviation Authorities and the 
companies' errors and violations amounted to 78 represents 29% of total accidents. The 
period 2006-2008 witnessed an increase above the mean number of accidents, while 
the year 2003 witnessed the highest average of accidents. Most of these accidents 
occurred on the ground due to the overlapping of authorities, unclear assignment of 
responsibilities, violations and weak inspections and observations.  
 
Figure 4.12: Accidents Occurred Due to Administrative Causes 1988-2008 
4.5.3. Accidents Occurred due to Natural Causes, 1988-2008 
Figure (4-13) shows the distribution of accidents occurred as result of natural 
causes during the period 1988-2008.  The total accidents occurred as result of natural 
causes amounted to 43 which represents 16% of the total accidents, and they include 
the conditions of wind, rain, storm and low visibility conditions. Most of them 
occurred due to weakness of precaution and infective emergency plan. To remedy this 
situation, there is an urgent need for some measures, in order to overcome the natural 
conditions and circumstances.  
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Figure 4.13: Accidents Occurred due to Natural Causes, 1988-2008 
4.6. Circumstances of Accidents 1988-2008 
Figure (4-14) shows the distribution of accidents circumstances during the 
period 1988-2008.  40% of accidents occurred on landing, 18% on Take off, ground 
accidents represented 22% of the accidents, cruising accidents amounted to 20,6%. 
Totally 79,4% of the accidents occurred on landing, take off and on ground in locations 
in or around airports, while only 20,6% on cruising.  
55 (22%)
45 (18%)
101 (39%)
52 (21%)
landing Take off Ground Crusinig
 
Figure 4.14: Circumstances of Accidents 1988-2008 
 
4.6.1. The Circumstances of Accidents during Landing 1988-2008 
Figure (4-15) shows the distribution of accidents circumstances during landing 
in the period 1988-2008. The total accidents occurred during landing amounted to 101 
with a percentage of 40% of total accidents, the highest average of landing accidents 
occurred in the year 2003, while the year 1998 hasn’t witnessed any accidents and the 
period 1988-1994 witnessed an increase above the mean.  
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Figure 4.15:  Circumstances of Accidents during Landing 1988-2008 
4.6.2. The Circumstances of Accidents during take off 1988-2008 
Figure (4-16) shows the distribution of accidents circumstances during take off 
in the period 1988-2008.The total accidents occurred during the Take off amounted to 
45 with a percentage of 18%, as a result of overload, technical faults, crash and 
collision with other bodies. The period 1988-1995 witnessed an increase above the 
mean.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16:  Circumstances of Accidents during Take off 1988-2008 
4.6.3. Circumstances of Accidents on Ground 1988-2008 
Figure (4-17) shows the distribution of accidents circumstances on ground in the 
period 1988-2008.  The total accidents on the ground amounted to 55 with a 
percentage of 22% and most of them are considered as faults in the operation and low 
visibility, the year 2003 witnessed increasing of accidents in comparison to the other 
years. Most of these accidents occurred due to managerial and operational faults 
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shortcomings in the part of Civil Aviation Authority, the airlines and aviation 
companies' services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17: the Circumstances of Accidents on Ground 1988-2008 
 
4.6.4. Circumstances of Accidents during Cruising 1988-2008 
Figure (4-18) shows the distribution of accidents conditions during cruising in 
the period 1988-2008. Total accidents occurred during cruising was 52 with a 
percentage of 21% of total accidents; the year 1988 witnessed an increase in 
comparison to the other years. Most of accidents occurred as a result of technical 
problems due to collision with other bodies or shortage of fuel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.-18:  Circumstances of Accidents during Cruising 1988-2008 
4.7. Human Casualties of Accidents 1988-2008 
Figure (4-19) shows the distribution of human casualties, during the period 
1988-2008.  The total number of Casualties of Accidents includes both passengers and 
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crew members during the period amounted to 383 killed and injured persons, the year 
2003 witnessed large number of casualties. The worst accidents of the aircraft B737, 
which belongs to Sudan Airways in the year 2003, in which 116 persons were killed in 
Port Sudan Airport, with only one child survived and the accident of the aircraft A310 
which belongs to Sudan Airways occurred in 2008, where 30 persons were killed and 
20 were injured. 
46(12%)
337(88%)
Killed Injured  
Figure 4.19: Human Causalities of Accidents 1988-2008 
4.7.1. Killed Persons due to Accidents 
Figure (4-20) shows the distribution of killed persons during the period 1988-
2008.The total number of persons killed during the period amounted to 337. The years 
1996, 2003 and 2008 witnessed large numbers of casualties.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Killed Persons due to Accidents 1988-2008  
 
4.7.2. The Injured Persons due to Accidents 1988-2008  
Figure (4-21) shows the distribution of injured victims of accidents during the period 
1988-2008.The total number of injured persons during the period amounted to 46, the 
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year 2008 witnessed large numbers of the injured persons. There is no exact record on 
the number of the injured persons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Injured Persons due to Accidents 1988-2008 
 
4.8. Questionnaire Analysis and Results  
A questionnaire of 150 Samples is used to collect the relevant data of the study, 
and it represents 30% of the population.  Intentional simple random sampling is used to 
select the sample. The population includes Civil Aviation Authority staff and different 
aviation service companies working in Khartoum Airport. The sample for this study is 
selected from the managers at the top, middle and direct supervisor's levels. 
4.8.1. The Kind of the Sample 
Figure (4-22) shows the aviation kind of the sample.  The analysis results 
indicate that 75% of the sample is workers in the Civil Aviation Authority and 25% 
from other Civil Aviation companies. Most of the sample has been surveyed are 
working in the Civil Aviation Authority and that due to their responsibility and 
obligation for safety in airports.  
112(75%)
38(25%)
Civil Aviation Companies  
Figure 4.22: Aviation Kind of the Sample 
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4.8.2. The Gender Type  
Figure (4-23) shows the Type of Gender.  The number males are 136 with a 
percentage of 91% against 14 females with a percentage of 9% and that because the 
numbers of female employed is very few in comparison to men. Most of them occupy 
low job levels.  
136(91%)
14(9%)
Male Female  
Figure 4.23: The Type of Gender 
4.8.3. The Sample Field of Work  
Figure (4-24) shows the sample field of work.  50% of the samples are managers, and 
37% are working in operation field, and most are responsible for the critical situation 
solution, while 13% are working in the field of maintenance.  
75(50%)
19(13%)
56(37%)
Operation Maintenance Management  
Figure 4.24: The Sample Field of Work 
4.8.4. The Sample Years of Experience 
Figure (4-25) shows the sample years of experience.  55% of he sample are 
experts, having more than 20 years experience, the most competent to evaluate the 
situation for their acquired and accumulated knowledge, while 35% are with 10-20 
years of experience in aviation and 10% with 5-10 years experience.  
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63(55%) 41(35%)
12(10%)
From 5-10 experience From 10-20 experience More than 20 experience  
Figure 4.25: The Sample Years of Experience 
4.8.5. The Degree of Responsibility of the Sample 
Figure (4-26) shows the degree of responsibility of the sample.  The sample 
includes 13% top management, 39% middle and executive staff and 48% the direct 
supervising responsible staff.  
72(48%)
59(39%)
19(13%)
High Executive Supervising  
Figure 4.26: The Degree of Responsibility of the Sample 
4.8.6. The Questionnaire Components: 
The Questionnaire composed of two parts described as follows:  
Part one: Considers the basic data of the sample members to get acquaintance 
with their nature and capabilities.  The data comprises aviation kind/gender 
type/work sphere/experience level and degree of responsibility. 
Part two: Consists of (18) phrases covering the objectives of the study. The 
questionnaire phrases formulated in accordance with the axes of the hypotheses 
using 5 (Recatres) model: Strongly agree/Agree/I don't know/Disagree/ or 
Strongly disagree  
4.8.7. The Questionnaire Classifications: 
  The questionnaire phrases can be summarized in five axes explained in the 
following: 
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The first axis:  The main causes of aviation accidents are due to weak 
coordination, bad execution or weak planning. 
The second axis: The main factors of aviation accidents are due to technical 
reasons related to problems in maintenance, technical reasons related to problems 
in operation or technical reasons related to both technical and administrative 
reasons. 
The third axis: Weakness of the administrative body led to the occurrence of 
ground accidents, the unclear definition of responsibilities and duties, the 
insufficiency of the responsibilities imposed by Aviation Authority on Aviation 
Service companies or the plans and programs of performance and change are not 
good. 
The forth axis:  Considers the work environment and reality which comprises: 
work conditions, infrastructures, training level or the extent of availability of 
communication and control equipment. 
The fifth axis: It tackles with the climatic conditions and the level of dealing 
with emergencies.   
4.8.8. The Questionnaire Statements Results  
Table (4-1) and Figure (4-27) show the questionnaire results of the statements. 
The issues questionnaire statements results which have more agreement and emphasis 
include the following items:  
The main factor in aviation accidents is: technical causes related to maintenance 
problems. 
• The current negative aspects are the result of not clearly defining responsibility 
and duties. 
• Training programmes are not sufficient. 
• Plans and programmes of performance and changes are not good. 
There is disagreement with the fact that the main cause of aviation accidents is 
due to the lack of qualification and experience of workers.  
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For the rest of the issues, there is widely agreement on the statements given in 
the questionnaire.  
Table 4-1: The Questionnaire Statements Results: 
       
Total  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
I don’t 
Know Agree 
Strongly 
agree  The Statements No 
150 
100% 
3 
2.0% 
45 
30.0% 
6 
4.0% 
58 
38.7% 
38 
 25.3% 
The main cause of 
aviation accidents is: 
weak co-ordination 
1 
150 
100% 
4 
2.7% 
49 
32.7% 
7 
4.7% 
59 
39.3% 
31 
20.6% 
The main cause of 
aviation accidents is 
bad execution 
2 
150 
100% 
6 
4.0% 
44 
29.3% 
6 
4.0% 
55 
36.7% 
39 
26.0% 
The main factor of 
aviation accidents is : 
weak planning 
3 
150 
100% 
 
 
4 
2.7% 
23 
15.3% 
3 
2.0% 
49 
32.7% 
71 
47.3% 
The main cause of 
aviation accidents is: 
technical reasons 
relating to problems in 
maintenance 
4 
150 
100% 
5 
3.3% 
38 
25.3% 
1 
0.8% 
68 
45.3% 
38 
25.3.% 
The main cause of 
aviation accidents is: 
technical reasons 
relating to problems in 
operation 
5 
150 
100% 
1 
0.8% 
33 
22.0% 
3 
2.0% 
66 
44.0% 
47 
31.2% 
The main factor in 
aviation accidents is 
both technical and 
administrative reasons 
6 
150 
100% 
16 
11.7% 
54 
36.0% 
3 
2.0% 
40 
26.6% 
37 
24.7% 
The main cause of 
ground accidents is due 
to the weak 
authoritative body 
7 
150 
100% 
8 
5.3% 
26 
17.3% 
2 
1.3% 
44 
29.3% 
70 
47.8% 
The current system lack 
an effective 
administrative body 
8 
150 
100% 
5 
3.3% 
18 
12.0% 
4 
2.7% 
61 
40.7% 
62 
41.3% 
The current negative 
aspects are the result of 
unclear definition of 
responsibilities and 
duties 
9 
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Continue- Table 4-1: The Questionnaire Statements Results  
Total Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree I 
don’t
Know 
Agree Strongly 
agree  
The Statements No 
150 
100% 
8 
5.3% 
45 
30.0% 
1 
0.8% 
43 
28.6%
53 
35.3% 
The responsibilities of 
Civil Aviation 
Authority imposed on 
aviation service 
companies are not 
sufficient 
10 
150 
100% 
4 
2.8% 
26 
17.3% 
2 
1.3% 
59 
39.3%
59 
39.3% 
The working 
environment at 
Khartoum Air Port is 
not suitable for good 
performance 
11 
150 
100% 
6 
4.0% 
37 
24.7% 
2 
1.3% 
59 
39.3%
46 
30.7% 
The infrastructure at 
Khartoum Air Port is 
not sufficient for 
achieving the best of 
safety 
12 
150 
100% 
17 
11.3% 
60 
40.1% 
2 
1.3% 
44 
29.3%
27 
18.0% 
The main cause of 
aviation accidents is 
due to the lack of 
qualification and 
experience of workers 
13 
150 
100% 
2 
1.3% 
15 
10.0% 
5 
3.3% 
52 
34.7%
76 
50.7% 
Training programmes 
are insufficient 
14 
150 
100% 
3 
2.0% 
16 
10.6% 
4 
2.7% 
64 
42.7%
63 
42.0% 
Plans and programmes 
of performs and 
changes are not good 
15 
150 
100% 
12 
8.0% 
31 
20.7% 
5 
3.3% 
53 
35.3%
49 
32.7% 
There is no sufficient 
equipment  of 
communication and 
control 
16 
150 
100% 
5 
3.3% 
29 
19.3% 
7 
4.7% 
63 
42.0%
46 
30.7% 
There are no 
alternatives and 
choices in dealing 
with emergencies 
17 
150 
100% 
11 
7.3% 
37 
24.7% 
0 
0.0% 
54 
36.0%
48 
32.0% 
Climate conditions are 
the main cause of 
aviations accidents 
18 
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Figure 4-27: The Questionnaire Statements Results 
4.9. Discussion and Validity of Hypotheses 
4.9.1. The First Hypothesis  
The working environment at Khartoum Airport is not suitable for good 
performance and the current system lacks an effective administrative body. 
Chi-square test has been used to know the relationship between the variables of 
the study by using; Pearson, Spearman and Chi-square tests. Table (4-2) shows the 
hypothesis relationships and validity. 
Table 4.2: First Hypothesis Variables Relations and Results  
Number 
of 
Relation 
Variables 
Pearson chi-square Spearman 
correlation Significance Results Calculated tabulated
1 The current system 
lacks an effective 
administrative body 
and 
 
 
 
43.364 26.3 
 0.334 0.000 
Statistical 
Significance The working 
environment is not 
suitable for good 
performance  
2 The current system 
lacks effective 
administrative body 
 
 
 
40.703 26.3  0.248 0.001 
Statistical 
Significance There is no sufficient equipment  
of communication 
and control  
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From the table (4.2) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square  is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square for each variables relationship, hence the null 
hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The 
significance level of tabulated chi-square is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In the first relationship, there was a relationship with statistical significance 
between the current administrative condition in the Civil Aviation Authority and the 
working environment in Khartoum Airport attributed to that the current condition 
affects the working environment. 
In the second relationship, there is statistical significance between the current 
system's lacks of an effective administrative body and there is no sufficient equipment 
of communication and control due to the current system's lack of an effective 
administrative body affects there is no sufficient equipment of communication and 
control system. 
Findings: 
• The current administrative conditions, affects the working environment. 
•  There is no sufficient communication equipment and control system to establish a 
satisfactory and sufficient safety requirement.    
4.9.2. The Second Hypothesis 
The ineffective administrative body led to the current negative aspects and not 
clearly the defining the responsibilities. Table (4-3) shows the hypothesis relationships 
and validity. 
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Table 4.3: the Second Hypothesis Variables Relationships and Results 
Number of 
Relationship 
Variables Pearson's chi-square Spearman's 
correlation  
Significance Results 
Calculated Tabulated
1 
The main cause of ground accidents 
is due to the weak administrative 
body 40.808 
 
26.3 
 
0.404 0.001 Statistical Significance Responsibilities of Civil Aviation 
Authority imposed on aviation 
service companies are not sufficient 
2 
The main cause of ground accidents 
is the ineffective administrative body 
56.896 
 
26.3 
 
0.350 0.000 Statistical Significance The current negative aspects are the result of not clearly defining the 
responsibilities and duties  
3 
The responsibilities of Civil Aviation 
Authority imposed on aviation 
service companies are insufficient  66.00 
 
26.3 
 
0.320 0.000 Statistical SignificanceThe current negative aspects are the 
result of not clearly defining the 
responsibilities and duties  
 
From the table (4-3) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square for each variables relationship, hence the null 
hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The 
significance level of tabulated chi-square is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In the first relation, there was a relationship of statistical significance between 
the main cause of ground accidents due to the weak authority body and responsibilities 
of Civil Aviation Authority imposed on aviation service companies are un-sufficient.  
This means that the weak administrative body caused the ground accidents and it also 
led to an unclear definition of responsibilities towards Aviations Services Companies. 
In the second relation, there was a relationship of statistical significance between 
the weak administrative body and the current negative aspects as a result of not clearly 
defining the responsibilities and duties due to the weak administrative body affects 
clearly the negative aspects. 
In the third relationship, there was a statistical significance relationship between 
the responsibilities of Civil Aviation Authority imposed on aviation service companies 
which insufficient; and the current negative aspects which result of not clearly defining 
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the responsibilities and duties attributed to the responsibilities imposed on aviation 
service companies, which in turn are not sufficient. This leads to the current negative 
aspects.  
Findings: 
• The weak administrative body was the main cause of ground accidents. 
• Ground accidents were a result of the current negative aspects. 
•  The role of Civil Aviation Authority towards aviation service companies was 
limited and weak. 
4.9.3. The Third Hypothesis 
The current ineffective administrative condition affects the training programmes 
that affect the worker's proficiency in levels of maintenance and operation. Table (4-4) 
shows the hypothesis relationships and validity. 
Table 4.4: the Third Hypothesis Variables Relationships and Results  
Number of 
relationship Variables 
Pearson chi-
square 
Spearman 
correlation 
Significance Results 
Calculated Tabulated 
1 
The current system lacks of 
an effective administrative 
body  
The current training 
programmes insufficient  
72.123 
 
26.3 
 
    0.394 0.000 
Statistical 
Significant 
From the table (4.4) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square, hence the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the 
alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The significance level of tabulated chi-square 
is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In this relationship there was a statistical significance relationship between the 
current condition, lack of an effective administrative body and the training 
programmes are insufficient. This means that current ineffective administrative 
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condition affects the training programmes. This in turn, affects the workers' 
proficiency in levels of maintenance and operation. 
Finding: 
The current administrative conditions affected the levels of maintenance and 
operation, because of the poor training programmes and employees' proficiency. 
4.9.4. The Fourth Hypothesis  
The current system lack of effective administrative body led to aviation 
accidents in both technical and administrative causes and thus plans and programmes 
of performs and changes are not good. Table (4-5) shows the hypothesis relationships 
and validity. 
Table 4.5: the Fourth Hypothesis Variables Relationships and Results 
Number of 
relationships Variables 
Pearson chi-
square 
Spearman 
correlation Significance Results 
Calculated Tabulated
1 
 
The current 
system lacks an  
effective 
administrative 
body  
33.743 
 
26.3 
 
0.173 0.006 
Statistical 
Significance
 
The main factor 
in aviation 
accidents is 
both technical 
and 
administrative  
2 
The current 
system lacks an 
effective 
administrative 
body  39.58 
 
26.3 
 
0.263 0.001 Statistical SignificancePlans and 
programmes of 
performance 
and changes are 
not good 
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From the table (4.5) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square for each variables relationship, hence the null 
hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The 
significance level of tabulated chi-square is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In the first relationship, there was a statistical significance relationship between 
the current system which lacks of an effective administrative body; and the main factor 
in aviation accidents is both technical and administrative causes. This means that 
current system lacks of an effective administrative body; and the main factor in 
aviation accidents, is both technical and administrative. This means that current system 
lacks of an effective administrative body. This leads to the occurrence of aviation 
accidents.  
In the second relationship, there was a statistical significance between the 
current system which lacks of an effective administrative body; and the plans and 
programmes of performance and changes are not good. This means that current system 
lack of an effective administrative body; leads in turn, to the weak plans and 
programmes of performance and changes. 
Findings: 
• The lack of effective administrative body led to the increase of number of accidents, 
as a result of both technical and administrative problems. 
• The lack of effective administrative body led to weakness in plans and programmes 
of performance and changes. 
4.9.5. The Fifth Hypothesis 
The alternative and choices in dealing with emergencies are ineffective, as a 
result of insufficient equipment of communication and control. Table (4-6) shows the 
hypothesis variables relationships and results. 
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Table 4.6: the fifth Hypothesis Variables Relationships and Results 
Number of 
Relationship Variables 
Pearson chi-
square 
Spearman 
correlation Significance Results 
Calculated Tabulated 
 
1 
There is no 
alternative and 
choices in 
dealing with 
emergencies 44.695 
 
32.0 
 
0.174 0.000 Statistical SignificanceThere is no 
sufficient 
equipment of 
communication 
and control 
 
  From the table (4.6) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square, hence the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the 
alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The significance level of tabulated chi-square 
is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In this relationship there was a statistical significance between there is no 
alternative and choices in dealing with emergencies and that there is no sufficient 
equipment  of communication and control .This means that lack of equipment lead to 
the lack of dealing with emergencies effectively. 
Finding: 
The negative administrative and technical role led to the insufficient equipment 
of communication and control which in turn affected dealing with emergencies. 
4.9.6. The Sixth Hypothesis 
Climatic conditions lead to aviation accidents as a result of unsuitable working 
environment at Khartoum Airport. Table (4-7) shows the hypothesis variables 
relationships and results 
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Table 4-7: the Sixth Hypothesis Variables Relationships and Results 
Number of 
Relationship Variables 
Pearson chi-
square Significance Results 
Calculated Tabulated
1 
Climate 
conditions are 
the one of the 
main cause of 
aviation 
accidents  
28.933 9.49 0.000 Statistical Significance
 
From the table (4-7) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square, hence the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the 
alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The significance level of tabulated chi-square 
is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In this relationship there was a difference with statistical significance between 
the opinions of the subjects over the Hypothesis variables attributed to the climatic 
conditions are the one of the main cause of aviation accidents. 
Finding: 
Climatic conditions were among the main causes of aviation accidents. 
4.9.7. The Seventh Hypothesis 
The infrastructure at Khartoum Airport is insufficient for achieving the best 
safety. Table (4-8) shows the hypothesis variables relationships and results 
Table 4.8: the Seventh Hypothesis Variables Relationships and Results 
Number of 
Relationship Variables 
Pearson chi-
square Sig. Result 
Calculated Tabulated
1 
The infrastructure at 
Khartoum Airport is 
insufficient for 
achieving the best 
safety  
83.53 9.49 0.000 Statistical Significance 
From the table (4-8) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square, hence the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the 
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alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The significance level of tabulated chi-square 
is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In this relationship there were differences with a statistical significance between 
the opinions of the subjects about the variables of the Hypothesis attributed, in favour 
of those who agree with that the infrastructure at Khartoum Airport is not sufficient for 
achieving the best safety.  
Finding: 
The infrastructure at Khartoum airport was not sufficient for achieving the best 
level of safety. 
4.10. The Variables Relationship of Accidents, 1988-2008 
4.10.1. The Relationships between Damage and Causes of Accidents 1988-2008 
From the table (4.9) results, the value of calculated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the tabulated chi-square, hence the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted. The 
significance level of tabulated chi-square is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In this relationship there were no differences with a statistical significance 
between the type of damage and the Cause of accidents. Figure (4-28) shows that 
12.7% of the fatal accidents occurred by the cause of technical problems, while it 
found 3.9% by the cause of administrative problems and 3.5% refers to the 
environment. It found for serious accidents, 37.5% for technical cause and 20.8% 
administrative and 10% for environment. In minor accidents, it found that 4.6% 
occurred as a result of administrative problems and 4.2% technical and 2.7% for 
environment.  
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      Table 4.9: The Chi-square Tests Results of the Damage and Causes of 
Accidents 1988 - 2008  
Number of 
Relationship Variables 
Pearson chi-square Sig. Result Calculated Tabulated
1 
Causes of accidents : 
Technical, Administrative 
or Environmental 6.806 9.49 0.146 
Not 
Statistically 
Significance Types of damages : 
Fatal, Serious or Minor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.28: The Relationships between Damage and Causes of Accidents 1988-
2008 
4.10.2. The Relationships between the Damage and Circumstances of Accidents 
1988-2008 
From the table (4-10) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square, hence the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the 
alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The significance level of tabulated chi-square 
is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In this relationship there is a difference with a statistical significance between 
the type of damage and the circumstances of accidents. Figure (4-29) shows that 7.6% 
of fatal accidents occurred on landing and 29.5% of serious accidents on landing and 
4% of minor accidents on landing. This means that most of the accidents occur on 
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landing and then on ground and after in cruising. It conclude that most of the problems 
due to technical causes. Other causes of accidents are administrative in the second 
level and then the natural causes. This means that the organizing plans of performs 
must be done according to these priorities and important findings obtained.  
Table 4.10: The Chi-square Tests Results of the Damage and Circumstances of 
Accidents 1988 - 2008 
Number of 
Relationship Variables 
Pearson chi-square Sig. Result Calculated Tabulated
1 
Types of damages : 
Fatal, Serious or Minor
20.357 12.6 0.002 Statistically Significance Circumstances of accidents: Landing, 
Takeoff, Ground or Cruise
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.29: The Relationships between the Damage and Circumstances of Accidents 
1988-2008 
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4.10.3. Circumstances and Causes of Accidents Relationships  1988-2008 
From the table (4-11) results, the value of tabulated Chi-square is less than the 
value of the calculated chi-square, hence the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and the 
alternatives hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The significance level of tabulated chi-square 
is taken at (α = 0.01).  
In this relationship there were differences with a statistical significance between the 
circumstances and causes of accidents. Figure (4-30) results shows that most of the 
accidents due to technical causes: landing due to technical with average of 26.5% in 
landing, 11.4% in take off and 14% while cruising .This  means that  most of the 
problems due to technical occurred in the condition of landing and in take off.  
Table 4.11: The Chi-square Tests Results of the Circumstances and Causes of 
Accidents 1988 - 2008 
Number of 
Relationship Variables 
Pearson chi-square Sig. Result Calculated Tabulated
1 
Causes of Accidents : 
Technical, Administrative 
or Natural. 72.071 12.6 0.000 Statistically Significance Circumstances of 
accidents: Landing, 
Takeoff, Ground or Cruise
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.30: The Relationships between Circumstances and Causes of Accidents 1988-
2008 
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4.11. The Causes of Accidents 
As a result of the wide survey and analysis of this study and some of accidents 
investigation findings, evaluation of accidents data collection, safety reports and 
recommendations the repetition of accidents were occurred due to the following 
causes: 
• Absence of surveillance and application of recommendations issued by some of 
the boards of investigation, to know the causes and the best direction of 
solutions. 
• The weak infrastructure of air transport industry in Sudan such as, landings, 
navigation and control devices, laboratories and training centre. 
• The weakness of deficiencies in training, system and programs are not complete 
and advanced courses for air and ground are non-existing. So they cannot cope 
with the rapid developments in this field; and especially in the field of aviation 
simulation.  
• Pressure on Civil Aviation Authority and the rapid increase in the air traffic in 
the country. This had lead to weakness in applying the rules and their 
requirements. Also; the successive change of administration in short periods, led 
to weakness of surveillance and inspection plans. 
• There are no information surrounding the aircraft, in some cases, during the 
operations or in the completion of tasks. 
• There is no consistence among members of cockpit management, in some 
occurred accidents. 
• The economic sanctions imposed on Sudan and its effects, due to the following: 
- Import of the devices and equipment to develop the infrastructure, so that cost 
of rehabitation is expensive.   
- Provide the spare parts of aircrafts in the suitable time. 
- Maintenance of aircrafts abroad. 
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- No exchange of information, periodicals and technologies with the international 
institutions. Such as: ICAO, JAA, and FAA. 
- Exchange of technologies with other counter parts abroad. 
• Introduction of Russian aircrafts with Russian pilots, engineers and navigators in 
Sudan and the difficulty of communication. 
• The aircrafts fleet in some companies is obsolete in addition to the lack of spare-
parts, test equipments and guidance materials. 
• More than 90% of the accidents occurred because of human faults, and they are 
above the common global average, which are 80% and that because of lack of 
training. 
• The administrative errors have been along subordinate causes for accident, so 
they can not be overlooked. 
• Some accidents occurred due to the bad climate and low visibility. This 
indicated that, the role of weather conditions can not be ignored, in a large 
country with changing weather conditions, like Sudan, also with poor weather 
forecast. 
• Concern of the owners of private aviation for earnings only and the subjection of 
the pilots to their pressure to violate the overloads of aircrafts. 
• The ineffective exchange of communication between the working bodies in the 
field of aviation in the country such as; Air Force, Civil Aviation Authority and 
working companies, to coordinate between themselves, in relationship to the air 
safety such as; validity of airports, meteorology, training, search, and the lessons 
learned form accidents occurrences, is not existent.  
• There is no specialized institute to qualify and train persons as: the pilots, 
engineers and traffic controllers in Sudan, which led some of the wealthy people 
to study abroad on their own private expenses. 
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• The requirements of works such as, offices, furniture and equipment in most 
companies are not adequate for the work in the aviation field; that requires 
accurate and organized companies. 
• The instability and the unsatisfactory financial credit of employees was behind 
the losing many experienced staff either by immigration or leaving the work. 
• The working companies in Sudan are tiny. This makes the departments on these 
companies impose number of jobs and tasks to one person led to inconsistence 
in the performance of duty. 
• The companies are not informed or do not understand the results of accidents 
that occurred and recommendations of investigation these accidents. 
• There are disorders in some airports and a lot of errors and violations may be 
occurred in sometimes. 
• Some of the airports are very bad; despite the heavy air traffic in these airports. 
This causes a lot of incidents and accidents. 
4.12. Road Map for Enhancing Safety 
The study classified the real causes behind the occurrence of defects in the 
safety system within the present situation.  This was made through analysis and 
evaluation of the incidents and accidents recorded during the period of (1988 - 2008).  
Furthermore, study provided a road map to address the negatives which led to this 
reality.  This road map comprises the following: 
• Approving the strategic management methodology and the concept of the total 
quality management for all the civil aviation activities, for enhancing safety 
environment and thus achieve Civil Aviation objectives.  
• The SCAA must regulates and establish a disciplinary and enforcement policy that 
promotes SMS implemented from a day-to-day involvement in all activities. The 
day-to-day issues must be discovered, analyzed and corrected internally. 
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• The SMS must develop a safety culture that promotes open reporting, through non-
punitive disciplinary policies and continual improvement through, proactive safety 
assessments and quality assurance. 
• The Safety Management System philosophy requires that responsibility and 
accountability for safety be retained within the management structure of the 
organization. 
• Safety Management system must   remains at the forefront of methods by which the 
organization can make aviation, already the safest, and move beyond the traditional 
reactionary systems to predict areas of exposure. 
• Imposition of strict enforcement and effectuation of the law and its exigencies in 
order to ensure the full compliance with the safety requirements implementation. 
• Revival of the role of Civil Aviation Authority and exercise of its observative and 
inspection role on aviation companies and their employees. 
•  Revision of the requirements of offering sanctions on aviation companies and 
apply these requirements upon which these sanctions are imposed. 
• Diffusion and dissemination of the culture in the field of safety. 
• Formation of a committee for air safety including the specialized departments in: 
Civil Aviation Authority, and aviation companies, meteorology and civil defence. 
The tasks of this committee are observation, supervision and protection. 
• Maximization of the training in all fields of safety and to up-raise the proficiency 
and efficiency. 
• Obligation of the companies that buy or rent aircrafts to have their documents and 
guidance material in English or Arabic language. 
• Establishment of principles for the maintenance of registered aircrafts in Sudan, and 
to obligate all the companies and institutions that own or rent aircrafts for work in 
Sudan and to lay down the necessary conditions to check that the required 
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maintenance is done for these aircrafts and their devices by qualified engineers and 
technicians. 
• Improvement of the work environment for employees in this field by paying good 
salaries and under good working conditions. 
• Renewal and up-dating of the navigation control equipment and communication 
devices, and to introduce the radars, improve the airports, fire-fighting, search and 
rescue equipment. 
• Development of the investigation unit of aircraft accidents and separate it from the 
operation department and provide it with specialized staff knowledge in all aspects 
of investigation and empower them with authority to perform their work, regarding 
their reports and exchange information of the previous investigations. 
• The general Civil Aviation Authority should ensure that there is an operation 
manual and maintenance schedule for the companies, as a must, to provide the 
certificate of A.O.C. 
• Promotion of the procedures of medical check for the aircraft crew, by a medical 
committee specialized in aviation medicine. 
• The general Civil Aviation Authority and its various departments should increase 
the field visitations and inspections of aviation companies to up-raise the degree of 
air safety. 
• Hold periodical conference and meetings for air safety to discuss the principles 
between the companies and employees in this field, such as: Civil Aviation 
Authority, Air Force, private companies and governmental companies. 
• Obligation of all the governmental companies to respect the rules and laws that 
govern the work in the field of aviation industry. Which their work in the 
commercial field of passengers and goods transportation. 
• Revision of the barriers and buildings around the airports and remove what is not 
convenient to safety.  
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• Removal of the paradox between different departments such as: airports 
engineering, traffic control and airside administration. 
• Up-dating of the communication and navigation devices in the airports. 
• Recruit qualified technical cadres and train them in civil aviation. Organize courses 
and grand opportunities for qualified employees to attend seminars and courses 
according to the field of work. 
• Giving the employees a chance in experienced in foreign countries, and attend 
seminars and conference related to safety held every year in different countries to 
develop the performance and technical skills. 
• Establishment of a national institute specialized in aviation with clear 
formulated academic training curriculum for the training and qualification of 
pilots, engineers, air-traffic controller and other relevant functions to aviation. 
• Obligation of the aircrafts’ validity to stop the prolongation of aircrafts’ validity to 
short terms. 
• Improvement of  the provincial airports and provide them with the necessary 
equipment to receive aircrafts and provide them with qualified cadres staff in 
different safety concern such as; airports officer, air transport, air traffic controller, 
meteorology, security and civil defence. 
• The general Civil Aviation Authority should check that airport departments have 
modernized with an emergency plan for different situations in airports and how to 
coordinate with other parties to give the necessary assistance. 
• Introduction of a system of confidential reports by pilots about the faults that lead 
to accidents and give them legal protection, to do this role and analyze the reports 
and issue suitable instructions to prevent the repetition of these faults. 
• Making sure that all employees in the field of aviation are endowed with good 
morals and conduct with equal the sensitivity of the job and the requirements of 
safety. 
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• Giving consideration to the reports of safety over sight and impose the requirements 
on aviation companies. 
• The safe and organized management depends widely on the technical competence 
of the employees, and therefore the specialized departments should be provided 
with qualified employees who are able to achieve the technical obligations and 
required performance. 
• There should be good working conditions and salaries must be according to 
qualifications, technical knowledge and experience and equal to work conditions 
and salaries of air investor’s employees which their activities under go to their 
supervision and inspection. 
• The Civil Aviation Authorities should have a clear system of regulations and 
rules for the maintenance of positive surveillance and guidance and they 
should commit the holders of Air Carrier Certificate (AOC) to abide with such 
regulations. 
• The main legislation of aviation (Civil Aviation Law) is the effective key for safety 
surveillance from the government side, and there should be powers given to the 
employees based on strong legal document and issued from the highest legislative 
level in the country. 
• The process of aircraft registration can be in itself one of the aviation safety issues, 
that imposes many obligations on the country under an agreement related directly to 
aviation safety; and thereby the country has to make sure that: 
• Certification of aviation validity fulfills the minimal limit of essentially prescribed 
decided principles.  
• Guaranteeing the continuation of the aircraft validity. 
• Checking that the individuals who carry out the maintenance have the necessary 
experience, knowledge and skills that is required to perform the job. 
• Issuance of the certificate of maintenance and operation. 
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• Checking that the cockpit management has the experience, knowledge and 
requirements of skills to drive an aircraft with safety. 
• Making sure that the aircraft and operation employees are continuing to satisfy the 
conditions required for insurance of the certificate and sanctions. 
• Taking the covenant procedures in the suitable time to correct the faults found out in 
relation to the aircraft’s maintenance and operation. 
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Chapter Five 
A Proposed Model for a Typical 
Safety Management System 
5.1. Introduction 
A safety management system will provide an organization with the capacity to 
anticipate and address safety issues before they lead to an incident or accident. A 
safety management system also provides management with the ability to deal 
effectively with accidents and near misses so that valuable lessons are applied to 
improve safety and efficiency. The safety management system approach reduces losses 
and improves productivity.   
Safety is established as a Core Value not accomplished solely by the owner, 
Chief Executive Officer, or any other individual in an organization. Safety involves 
everyone. A positive safety culture is invaluable in encouraging the kind of behaviour 
that will enhance safety. Positively re-enforcing safety conscious action sends the 
message that management cares about safety. 
The best way to establish safety as a core value is to make safety an integral part 
of the management plan. This is done by setting safety goals and holding managers and 
employees accountable for achieving those goals. The basic safety process is 
accomplished in five steps:  
1. A safety issue or concern is raised, a hazard is identified, or an incident or 
accident happens. 
2. The concern or event is reported or brought to the attention of management. 
3. The event, hazard, or issue is analyzed to determine its cause or source. 
4. Corrective action, control or mitigation is developed and implemented. 
5. The corrective action is evaluated to make sure it is effective. If the safety 
issue is resolved, the action can be documented and the safety enhancement 
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maintained. If the problem or issue is not resolved, it should be re-analyzed 
until it is resolved. 
5.2. Gap Analysis and Safety Plan 
A gap analysis is conducted to the organization’s existing systems compared to 
the SMS requirements; and best practice proposed to be implemented, the requirements 
of the results of the gap analysis develop a safety plan that clearly demonstrates how 
the organization will implement their SMS. The safety plan will include milestones for 
critical items such as dates for development and submission of policies and procedures, 
training of staff and review. These milestone dates are important, as principal 
inspectors will use them to plan their implementation responsibilities and 
commitments.  
The company must develop a Safety Management Systems Assessment Guide, 
which will assist the organization in conducting their gap analysis. This guide lists all 
the SMS components and elements and includes criteria linked to the appropriate 
regulation or standard. The SMS Assessment Guide will be appended to the Inspection 
& Audit Manual, and will form the basis of company's on going SMS evaluations 
Appendix (E) shows Area of responsibility in the SMS.  
A comprehensive SMS framework and gap analysis forms are included in 
Appendices (F) and (G) in sequence. Each gap analysis question is designed for a 
“yes” or “no” response. If you respond with a “yes” answer indicating that the 
organization already meets the criteria for that particular SMS component or element.  
A “No” answer indicates that a gap exists between the stated criteria and the 
organization’s policies, procedures or processes. If the response is ‘”yes”, the next 
column of the gap analysis form can be used to indicate where, in company 
documentation, the requirement is addressed. If the response is “no”, the same column 
can be used to indicate how and/or where the policy, procedure or process will be 
further developed to bring the organization into compliance with the requirement. 
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Appendix (H) provides a safety plan example with suggested headings to assist the 
organization in the development of their plan [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005].  
The Safety Plan should present and define safety responsibility, procedures for 
management and operators engaged in the design, installation and maintenance of a 
system with its components for the duration of its technical and operational life. Safety 
Management involves hazard identification and closing any gaps in the defences of the 
system. Effective SMS is build upon the defining, cornerstones namely as: A 
comprehensive corporate approach to effective safety organizational tools to deliver 
safety standards and a formal system for safety oversight.  The Safety Plan should at 
least present statements concerning: 
• Scope and purpose of the Safety Plan. 
• Policies and strategies along with the methods for analysis and assessment and 
in which way this is going to be disseminated throughout the organization to 
create a safety culture. 
• Organizational entities and staff with defined safety responsibilities to oversee 
the procedures and take action at detection of variations. 
• Description of the relationship between the National Aviation Safety Authority 
and the Aerodrome. 
• Description of the established safety procedures. 
• Measures for training and information both internally and externally. 
• How the organization's safety plan will apply through the life cycle of a 
system. 
• Assurance of the competency of the staff with regard to design, installation. 
• Maintenance of a system with its components. 
• Analysis and assessment of hazardous and potentially hazardous events to 
eliminate or minimise reoccurrence of risks. 
• Monitoring and analysis of operation and maintenance for systems. 
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• Initiation of modifications to systems with internal approval.  
5.3. Systems to Achieve Safety Oversight  
Safety oversight is fundamental to the safety management process. A principal 
of safety management policies, principles and procedures requires an organization to 
critically review its existing operations, proposed. Operational changes and additions 
or replacements, for their safety significance. This is achieved through two principal 
means: Figure (5-1) shows safety oversight process flow [Transport Canada Civil 
Aviation, 2002]. 
• Reactive - Occurrence/hazard reporting, and; 
• Proactive - Safety assessments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Safety Oversight Process Flow [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2002] 
For the most part these are two distinct elements in the safety management 
system:  one is reactive, the other proactive. The basic difference is the method of 
discovery: the reactive process responds to events that have already occurred, whilst 
the proactive method actively seeks to identify potential hazards through an analysis of 
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the everyday activities of the company. The exception to this rule occurs when a 
potential hazard has been reported through the company’s safety reporting program, 
with respect to the following considerations: 
• Conducting Internal Safety Incident Investigations and Implementing Remedial 
Actions. The company must ensure that their staff are aware of the internal 
safety-related investigation procedure. The subject and findings of the 
investigation should be disseminated to all staff affected.  
• Effective use of Safety Data for Performance Analysis. The company should be 
able to show the method of operation of any safety data capture programmes and 
the results of factual investigations which arise therefore. The response of 
executive management should ensure the effective use of safety data monitoring 
to address company safety issues and provide advice accordingly.  
• Arrangements for ongoing Safety Promotion. The company should have clearly 
defined arrangements to ensure that the work achieved by the Safety Manager 
and Committees, as well as line management, is transmitted to all those involved 
in the relevant activities.  
• Periodic Review of the Safety Management System. The effectiveness of the 
SMS in addressing safety-related findings and in the achievement of continuous 
safety improvement must be monitored. This should be achieved by periodic 
management review overseen. 
• Line Manager’s Monitoring. The practices used by operational and engineering 
staff and all others involved in safety sensitive areas of aviation are key to the 
achievement of safety. Compliance with procedures is often assumed but not 
invariably achieved. Whether through line or route checks, or compliance 
monitoring in line with standards, it is essential that managers and supervisors 
know how each safety critical task is actually achieved. 
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5.4. Establishing Safety Reporting System 
Aviation is a dynamic industry and conditions are constantly changing. To alert 
management that something has changed, or a new hazard is emerging, organizations 
need input from all levels. Employees must have a way to report hazards and safety 
concerns as they become aware of them and every employee must know how to report 
their concerns. When an employee reports a concern or hazard, the report should be 
acknowledged and analyzed. Acting on reported safety concerns will build employees’ 
confidence in the system. If, however, a reporting system is not maintained and 
attended to, people will quickly stop using it. Not all safety concerns require a special 
reporting system. Some should be made on existing paperwork, such as reports or logs. 
Other hazards might not fit well into existing reporting systems. It is fairly easy to 
create a form or process. 
The report must be analyzed to determine whether there is a real threat to safety 
and if so, what needs to be done. When the issue requires action, that information must 
go to the person who has the authority to take the action. This preserves the 
accountability of the safety management system. The credibility of the system is 
preserved when the outcome is fed back to the reporter. If it is decided that no action is 
appropriate, that information, and the causes for that decision should be fed back to the 
reporter. What really matters is that all staff knows how to report safety concerns and 
that their reports are acknowledged, analyzed, and resolved in a timely manner. 
The management and the specialist departments require information in order to 
make decisions and provide resources. Management should have access to, and be able 
to use, safety information. That is why a suitable reporting system must be established 
for the systematic collection, analysis and distribution of safety data. Reporting 
comprises: 
• Definition of safety objectives and analysis of progress. 
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• Documentation of accidents and incidents, including the results of 
internal/external investigations and corrective actions that have been initiated. 
• Statistical reports showing developments and trends. 
• Results of safety reviews and recommendations for corrective actions. 
• Documentation of safety-related events, training courses and measures. 
• All reservations concerning safety, along with their assessment and resultant 
adjustments. 
• Analysis of developments and findings. 
• All activities relating to the identification of risks, risk assessment and 
corrective actions that have been initiated.  
• Statistical surveys on accidents and incidents. 
• Results of all investigations into accidents and incidents, and corrective actions 
that have been initiated. 
• All safety reports received, including analysis of and response to them. 
• All SMS safety recommendations as well as initiated measures.  
• Results of internal safety audits and assessments. 
• Formation of an Airport Safety Committee. 
• Publication of a safety bulletin. 
• Training measures. 
• Safety campaigns. 
• Informational meetings. 
• Provision of safety information via databases or intranet. 
• Establishment of an airport-wide reporting system to give an account of 
accidents, incidents and safety reservations. 
• Participation in safety conferences and collaboration in national and 
international committees. 
• Co-operation with research and scientific institutions. 
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• Provision of technical journals and texts on laws. 
The organization will be required by regulation to institute a reporting system. A 
system that employees do not trust or use will not fulfil the requirements of the 
regulation. Any safety concern should be reported, but here are some real life examples 
[Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2001]: 
• High workload during passenger boarding, Unruly passengers. 
• Poor communication between operational areas. 
• Crews rushing through checks. 
• Inadequate checklists, tool or equipment control. 
•  Feeling fatigued on certain schedules. 
•  NOTAMS not being passed to crew. 
•  In-flight turbulence, difficulty obtaining parts. 
•  Unsafe ground movements, poor communication within maintenance. 
• Lack of emergency equipment, procedures, training. 
• Emergency exit paths blocked, Poorly designed task cards. 
• Vehicles left in fire lanes or other unauthorized area. 
• Confusing signs, poor lighting. 
• Dispatching overloaded aircraft, failing to maintain operational control. 
5.5. Establishment of a Safety Management System 
The establishment of a SMS at aerodromes means systematic integration and 
networking of safety measures for the day-to-day operations of airlines and airside 
service providers, taking into account human and technical factors. Rules on accident 
prevention and reduction of risks must be created on the basis of experience and 
research into the causes of accidents and/or incidents, and applied throughout the 
company. The employees of the companies involved in airport operations must identify 
with the rules of the SMS.  
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The basis of any SMS is airport-wide rules and policies relating to the avoidance 
of accidents and incidents. Safety rules and policies are based, on the one hand, on the 
risks identified by the company, and on the other, on the analysis of causal and 
assisting factors in previous accidents and incidents. The rules must be clear and 
understandable.  
Documentation and monitoring of the company’s rules and policies are an 
integral component of the SMS. They are the proof and, at the same time, means of 
communication of the existence and scope of the existing body of rules.  Figures (5-2) 
and (5-3) show in sequence a typical structure of aerodrome safety directorate and 
Safety Management System Flow Process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Organizational Structure of A typical Directorate of Aerodrome Safety 
and Standards [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2001]  
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Figure 5.3: Safety Management System Flow Process [Association of German 
Airports, 2002] 
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The following points must be taken into account when establishing a Safety 
Management System: 
• Top management must support the establishment of a SMS and the necessity of 
respecting and further developing the system must be communicated to the 
company. Company should adapt their SMS to already existing management 
systems. 
• The airport company should name one or more persons who are responsible for 
introducing, establishing, implementing and further developing the SMS. The 
SMS should have an across-the-board organisational structure, unhindered by 
organisational boundaries of existing areas of responsibility.  
• Tried-and-tested procedures form the foundation for establishment of the SMS. 
The obligation to collaborate in the airport’s SMS must be contractually 
regulated. 
• Effective safety management requires a systems approach to the development 
of safety policies, procedures and practices to allow the organization to achieve 
its safety objectives. Similar to other management functions, safety 
management requires planning, organizing, communicating and providing 
direction. Safety management integrate diverse activities into a coherent whole, 
follow-up will be required to evaluate and validate the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of the organization’s safety management practices, thereby 
closing the safety loop. 
• There are several ways of meeting the organization’s needs for safety 
management. There is on single model that “fits all”. Size, complexity and the 
type of operation, as well as the corporate safety culture and operating 
environment, will influence the structure most suited for individual 
organizations and their unique circumstances.  
161 
 
• This focuses on the factors to be considered in establishing the SMS. The 
degree of formality and rigidity in the SMS should be a reflection of the 
organization’s needs, rather than blind adherence to doctrine. It is important 
that the size and complexity of the SMS be appropriate for the organization.  
• Before the organization can implement an effective SMS, it needs to possess an 
aspect of safety culture to the success of the SMS. Having staff who are 
competent for the jobs they are performing is a fundamental prerequisite for 
safety Competency requirements and, where appropriate, requirements should 
be stated in the job description for each safety-related position. These 
requirements should be reflected in the recruitment requirements and internal 
training for these positions. 
• Effective safety management requires more than establishing an appropriate 
organizational structure and promulgating rules and procedures to be followed. 
It requires a genuine commitment to safety on the part of senior management. 
The attitudes, decisions and methods of operation at the policy-making level 
demonstrate the priority given to safety. The initial indication of corporate 
commitment to safety is in the organization’s stated safety policy and objective 
and whether staffs believes that concern for safety might, on occasion, override 
production objectives. 
• Key indicator of management’s commitment to safety is the adequacy of 
resource allocations. Establishing an appropriate management structure, 
assigning responsibilities and accountabilities, and allocating appropriate 
resources must be consistent with the organization’s stated safety objectives. 
Sufficient experienced staff, relevant and timely training, and funding for the 
necessary equipment and facilities are fundamental to creating a working 
environment in which everyone takes safety seriously. 
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• In successful safety cultures, there are clear reporting lines, clearly defined 
duties and well understood procedures. Personnel fully understand their 
responsibilities and know what to report, to whom and when .The senior 
management usually undertakes the same level; the revision of both the 
financial and the safety performance of the organization. 
5.6. Aerodrome Audit and Certification   
The state needs to enact basic legislation that will provide for the development 
and setting out Civil Aviation Authority regulations, including aerodrome regulation, 
consistent with their adoption of the Annexes. It retains its overseeing responsibility 
and ensures that the operator complies with the relevant ICAO SARPs and applicable 
nation regulations. Certification of aerodromes objectives [International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), 2001] 
• Prevention of accidents. 
• Aerodrome safety. 
• Reduction/elimination of deficiencies. 
• Aerodrome safety management system. 
• CAA aerodrome safety oversight and certification. 
• ICAO USOAP aerodromes audit. 
• Compliance with ICAO Annex 14 Volume I SARPs.  
• Provision and maintenance of facilities and services. 
• Prepare aerodrome manual. 
• Possess an Aerodrome Certification. 
• Implement safety management systems. 
The state should establish a criteria for the mandatory certification of all 
categories of airports, the requirements of the certification should ensure the safety of 
operations such as those related to the movement area and the visual aids.  These 
requirements comprise the following: 
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• The certification procedure. 
• The duties and responsibilities of aerodrome operators. 
• Safety audits, inspections and testing.  
• The imposition of sanctions for contravention of failure to comply with any of 
the provisions of the regulations.  
Safety  audits  are  one  of  the  principal  methods  for  fulfilling  the  safety  
performance  monitoring  functions. They are a core activity of any safety management 
system (SMS). Safety audits may be performed by an external audit authority, such as 
the State regulatory authority, or they may be carried out internally as part of the 
SMS. Safety audits are used to ensure that: 
• Safety  audits  should  be  conducted  regularly,  following  a  cycle  that  
ensures  each functional  area  is  audited  as  a  part  of  the  organization’s  plan  
for  evaluating  overall  safety  performance. 
• Safety audits should entail a periodic detailed review of the safety performance, 
procedures and practices of each unit or section with safety responsibilities.    
• Safety  audits  should  go  beyond  just  checking  compliance  with  regulatory  
requirements  and conformance with the organization’s standards, should assess 
whether the procedures in use  are  appropriate. 
• The structure of the SMS is sound in terms of appropriate levels of staff; 
compliance with approved procedures  and  instructions;  and  a  satisfactory  
level  of  competency  and  training  to  operate equipment and facilities and to 
maintain their levels of performance; 
• Equipment performance is adequate for the safety levels of the service provided; 
effective  arrangements  exist  for  promoting  safety,  monitoring  safety  
performance  and  processing safety issues; and adequate arrangements exist to 
handle foreseeable emergencies. 
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5.7. Safety Assessments 
Safety management provides the means by which organizations can control the 
processes that could  lead  to  hazardous  events,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  risk  of  
harm  or  damage  is  limited  to  an acceptable level. Much of this activity focuses on 
hazards as they are identified through such processes and activities  as  the  
investigation  of  safety  occurrences,  incident  reporting  systems  and  safety  
oversight programmes.  Safety assessments provide another proactive mechanism for 
identifying potential hazards and finding ways to control the risks associated with 
them.  A safety assessment should be undertaken prior to the implementation of any 
major change potentially affecting the safety of operations in order to demonstrate that 
the change meets an acceptable level of safety. For example, when major changes 
involving operating procedures, equipment acquisition or configuration,   
organizational   working   relationships,   etc.   are   planned,   a   safety   assessment   
may   be warranted.. The scope of a safety assessment must be wide enough to cover 
all aspects of the system that may be affected by the change, either directly or 
indirectly, and should include human, equipment, and procedural elements 
[International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]. 
If  the  result  of  an  assessment  is  that  the  system  under  review  does  not  
satisfy  the  safety assessment criteria, it will be necessary to find some means of 
modifying the system in order to reduce the risk. This process is called risk mitigation. 
The development of mitigation measures becomes an integral part of the assessment 
process.  The adequacy of proposed mitigation measures should be tested by re-
evaluating what the risk would be with the mitigation measures in place.   
Once a safety assessment is completed, it should be signed-off by the 
responsible manager, indicating that the manager is satisfied that the assessment has 
been properly performed and that the level of risk is acceptable. For the manager to be 
able to make an informed decision concerning this, the safety assessment must be well 
documented. The documentation should be retained to provide a record of the basis on 
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which the acceptance decision was made.  The implementation of a safety assessment 
programme requires the organization to [International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), 2006]: 
• Identify requirements as to when safety assessments must be performed. 
• Develop procedures for performing safety assessments. 
• Develop organizational risk classification criteria for identified hazards. 
• Develop acceptance criteria for safety assessments. 
• Develop   documentation   requirements   and   processes   for   retaining   and   
disseminating   safety information acquired through the assessments. 
Figure (5-4) illustrates the safety assessment process diagrammatically, and 
shows the possible need to perform a number of cycles of the process until a 
satisfactory method of risk mitigation is found. These are described in seven steps for 
safety assessment as follows [International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
2006]: 
Step 1: Development (or procurement) of a complete description of the system to be 
evaluated and of the environment in which the system is to be operated. 
Step 2: Identification of hazards. 
Step 3: Estimation of the severity of the consequences of a hazard occurring. 
Step 4: Estimation of the likelihood of a hazard occurring. 
Step 5: Evaluation of risk. 
Step 6: Mitigation of risk. 
Step 7: Development of safety assessment documentation. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
6-1 Conclusion 
 The study explained that the accidents of the last twenty years, during 
1988-2008, had witnessed rapid increase for causes and circumstances of a 
broad similar nature. However, there were no studies and evaluation in the 
previous situations and the lessons learned from them. The study indicated 
the locations of these accidents their causes, conditions and the magnitude of 
damage, by taking into consideration the fact that most of these accidents 
occurred on landing and taking off, that means these accidents occurred 
inside or around the airports, which amounted to (288) accidents. 
The study findings were adequate and essential for the nature of the 
previous accumulation and current situations and the possibility of change 
according to these findings to create a new situation based on requirements 
of these important results. The main study findings were as follows: 
• The current administrative conditions affect the working environment. 
• There were no sufficient equipments of communication and control for 
the establishment of safety situations. 
• The weak administrative body was the main cause of ground accidents. 
• Ground accidents were a result of the negative aspects in the current 
system. 
•  The role of Civil Aviation Authority towards aviation service 
companies was limited and weak. 
• Lack of effective administrative body led to the increase of the number 
of accidents, due to both technical and administrative problems. 
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• The lack of effective administrative body led to the weakness in plans 
and programmes of performance and changes. 
• The negative administrative and technical role led to the insufficient 
equipments of communication and control which in turn affected 
dealing with emergencies. 
• Climatic conditions were among the main causes of aviation accidents.  
•   The infrastructure at Khartoum airport was not sufficient for achieving 
the best level of safety. 
Also the study provided a comprehensive vision concerning the nature 
and components of the proposed Safety Management System.  
Furthermore, this proposed SMS answered and satisfied all the objectives 
of the study especially the identification and assessment of technical 
aspects of safety, identification of shortcomings and their rectification 
and lastly the identification of modern technology in the field of safety 
and modern technical control in operations and maintenance. 
6-2 Recommendations for Further Future Studies 
• The encouragement of the civil aviation studies in the field of improving 
performance and the promotion of the administrative and technical 
aspects, for modernizing and coping with modern and recent techniques. 
• A study about the development and modernization of the navigation 
services for enhancing air safety. 
• A study about the causes and remedies of repeated faults and violations 
in the runway (runway incursion) and aircraft movement area. 
• A study to develop an adequate methods and models to human factor in 
safety assessments and when introduced a new technologies. 
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Appendix (A) Aircraft Maintenance Working Conditions  
 Listed below are some of the typical issues impacting on the working 
conditions under which aircraft maintenance is carried out [International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2006]: 
a)   Organizational Issues: 
• Time pressures to sustain on-time departures and around-the-clock 
operations; 
• Ageing aircraft requiring intensive inspections for fatigue, corrosion, 
overall condition, etc.; 
• New technologies requiring new tools, new work procedures, costly 
retraining, etc.; 
• “Fix-it” focus to stay on schedule (e.g. replacing broken parts 
without determination as to why they failed  perhaps due to poor design 
or incorrect assembly); 
• Airline expansions and mergers (e.g.  combining maintenance  
departments with  different work practices and safety cultures); 
• Outsourcing of services to subcontractors (e.g. for heavy maintenance 
and overhaul); 
• Unwitting introduction of (lower cost, substandard) bogus parts, etc.; 
and 
• licensing  for different aircraft, aircraft generations, types and 
manufacturers; 
b)   Work Site Conditions: 
• Aircraft  designs  that  are  not  user-friendly  from  a  maintenance  
perspective  (for  example, cramped access to components and 
inappropriate height off the ground). 
• Control   of   aircraft   configurations   (which   are   continually   subject   
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to   modifications)   versus standardization of maintenance tasks and 
procedures. 
• Availability (and accessibility) of spares, tools, documentation, etc. 
• Requirements  for  having  ready  access  to  voluminous  technical  
information,  and  the  need  for maintaining detailed work records. 
• Variable  environmental  factors  (for  example,  conditions  on  the  
ramp  versus  in  the  technical workshop versus on the hangar floor). 
• Unique operating conditions created by concurrent activities and 
inclement weather on the ramp. 
Shortcomings in the provision of timely, accurate, understandable 
discrepancy reports by flight crews. 
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 ﺑﺴﻢ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ
  ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺍﳋﺮﻃﻮﻡ
  ﺔﻗﺴﻢ ﺍﳍﻨﺪﺳﺔ ﺍﳌﻴﻜﺎﻧﻴﻜﻴ –ﻛﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﳍﻨﺪﺳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﻤﺎﺭﺓ 
  ﺇﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎﻥ ﻋﻦ ﺣﻮﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻄﲑﺍﻥ ﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍﻷﺳﺒﺎﺏ ﻭﻣﻘﺘﺮﺣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻮﱘ ﲟﻄﺎﺭ ﺍﳋﺮﻃﻮﻡ
  
  ﺇﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎﻥ
  ......................... ........................................................................ﺍﻻﺧﺖ ﺍﻟﻜﺮﻳﻤﺔ/ﺍﻻﺥ
  ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ ﻋﻠﻴﻜﻢ ﻭﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﷲ                            
ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎﻥ ﺟﺰﺀ ﻣﻦ ﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺍﺳﺘﺤﺪﺍﺙ ﻧﻈﺎﻡ ﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻣﺔ ﺑﻤﻄﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺨﺮﻃﻮﻡ ﻭﻳﻬﺪﻑ 
 ﻑﺍﻟﻄﻴﺮﺍﻥ ﻭﺃﺳﺒﺎﺑﻬﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﻨﻬﺠﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻭﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﻹﻳﻘﺎ ﺙﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺮﻑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻮﺍﺩ
ﺪﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻴﻞ ﺩﺭﺟـﺔ ﺍﻟـﺪﻛﺘﻮﺭﺍﺓ ﻓـﻲ ﺍﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳـﺔ ﺣﺪﻭﺛﻬﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺁﺛﺎﺭﻫﺎ ﻭﺍﻟ
ﻧﺄﻣﻞ ﺍﻫﺘﻤﺎﻣﻜﻢ ﻭﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎﻥ . ﺍﻟﻤﻴﻜﺎﻧﻴﻜﻴﺔ  ﻭﻛﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﺄﻫﺪﺍﻑ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚ
  .ﺑﻌﻨﺎﻳﺔ ﻭﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﻗﻴﻤﺔ
  
   :ﺍﻟﻘﺴﻢ ﺍﻻﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ
  (?)ﺒﻌﻼﻤﺔ   ﺍﻟﺭﺠﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﺭﻡ ﺒﺎﺨﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺨﻴﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻰ ﺘﻨﺎﺴﺒﻜﻡ                 
  
  ﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ ﻤﺩﻨﻲ                          ﺸﺭﻜﺎﺕ              : ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺘﻌﻤل ﻓﻴﻪ ﻨﻭﻉ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ  ?
  ﺃﻨﺜﻰ             ﺫﻜﺭ                                 :                             ﺍﻟﺠﻨﺱ ?
  
  ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ         ﺎﻨﺔ          ﻟﺼﻴﺍ       ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻐﻴل            :                 ﺍﻟﻌﻤل ﻓﻲ ﻤﺠﺎل ?
   :(ﻓﻲ ﻤﺠﺎل ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ)ﻋﺩﺩ ﺴﻨﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺨﺒﺭﺓ   ?
  ﺴﻨﺔ 02ﺃﻜﺜﺭ ﻤﻥ       ﺴﻨﺔ   02-01ﺒﻴﻥ               ﺴﻨﺔ            01-5ﺒﻴﻥ           
  ﺇﺸﺭﺍﻓﻴﺔ           ﺘﻨﻔﻴﺫﻴﺔ              ﻋﻠﻴﺎ              :                 ﻴﺔﺍﻟﻤﺴﺌﻭﻟ ﻤﺴﺘﻭﻯ  ?
  
  
  
 
 771
 
  
  
  : ﻘﺴﻢ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻧﻰ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎﻥﺍﻟ
  (?)ﻤﺔ ﻟﺭﺅﻴﺘﻜﻡ ﺒﻌﻼﻤﺔ ﺀﺍﻟﺭﺠﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﺭﻡ ﺒﺎﺨﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﺃﻓﻀل ﺍﻟﺨﻴﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﻤﻭﺍ  
ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ   ﺍﻟﻌﺒﺎﺭﺓ  ﺍﻟﺭﻗﻡ
  ﺒﺸﺩﺓ
ﻻ   ﻻ ﺍﺩﺭﻱ  ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ 
ﻻ 
ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ 
  ﺒﺸﺩﺓ
            .ﺍﻟﺴﺒﺏ ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﺤﻭﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ ، ﻀﻌﻑ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺴﻴﻕ  1
            .ﺍﻟﺴﺒﺏ ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﺤﻭﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ ، ﺴﻭﺀ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺫ  2
            .ﺍﻟﺴﺒﺏ ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﺤﻭﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ ، ﻀﻌﻑ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻁﻴﻁ  3
            .ﺘﺘﻌﻠﻕ ﺒﻤﺸﺎﻜل ﺍﻟﺼﻴﺎﻨﺔ -ﻷﺴﺒﺎﺏ ﻓﻨﻴﺔ-ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻤل ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﺤﻭﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ   4
            .ﺘﺘﻌﻠﻕ ﺒﻤﺸﺎﻜل ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻐﻴل -ﻷﺴﺒﺎﺏ ﻓﻨﻴﺔ -ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻤل ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﺤﻭﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ  5
            .ﻭﺇﺩﺍﺭﻴﺔ ﻤﻌﺎﹰ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻤل ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﺤﻭﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ ﻤﺘﺩﺍﺨل ﻷﺴﺒﺎﺏ ﻓﻨﻴﺔ  6
            . ﻀﻌﻑ ﺴﻠﻁﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻲ ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟﺴﺒﺏ ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﺤﻭﺍﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻁﻴﺭﺍﻥ ﺍﻷﺭﻀﻴﺔ  7
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Appendix (D) Reliability: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.710 .709 18
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
Item-Total Statistics
.700
.717
.689
.728
.707
.712
.685
.669
.677
.681
.694
.710
.700
.672
.690
.674
.705
.741
The main cause of aviation accidents is: weak co-ordination
The main cause of aviation accidents is bad execution
the main factor in aviation accidents is : weak planning
The main cause of aviation accidents is: technical reasons relating to problems in
The main cause of aviation accidents is: technical reason relating to problems of o
The main factor in aviation accidents is both technical and administrative reasons
The main cause of landing accidents is: the weak authoritative body
The current system lack an effective administrative body
The current negative aspects are the result of not clearly defining responsibility an
The responsibilities of civil aviation imposed on aviation service companies are no
The working environment at Khartoum Air Port is not suitable for good performanc
The infrastructure at Khartoum Air Port is not sufficient for achieving the best of sa
The main cause of aviation accidents is due to the lack of qualification and experi
Training programmes are not sufficient
Plans and programmes of performs and changes are not good
There is not sufficient apparatus of communication and control
There are no alternatives and choices in dealing with emergencies
Climate conditions are the main cause of aviation accidents
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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Elements of SMS Categories 
(Checklist) 
Description 
Airport user regulations Regulations and policies 
Aerodrome reporting 
 
Procedures for: 
a) reporting on changes to aerodrome information in the AIP 
b) requesting a NOTAM publication 
Access to the aerodrome movement 
area 
 
Procedures for regulating access to the aerodrome’s airside 
for persons, aircraft, equipment, animals or other 
parties/objects 
Aerodrome emergency plan 
 
Plans and regulations for handling emergencies at the 
aerodrome and in its vicinity 
Rescue and fire-fighting  
 
Facilities, equipment, staff and procedures for complying with 
rescue and fire-fighting requirements  
Inspection of the aerodrome 
movement and obstacle limitation 
surface by the aerodrome operator 
Procedures for conducting inspections of all movement and 
open surfaces within the aerodrome area 
Visual aids and aerodrome electrical 
systems 
Procedures for examining and maintenance of 
lighting/navigation lights (incl. obstruction lights), signs, 
markings and the aerodrome’s electrical systems  
Maintenance of the movement area Facilities and procedures for maintenance of the movement 
areas 
Winter services Facilities, equipment and procedures for conducting winter 
services on movement areas and for aircraft de-icing 
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Continue-Appendix Table (E) Area of Responsibility in the SMS [Association of 
German Airports, 2002] 
 
Elements of SMS Categories 
(Checklist)  
Description  
Aerodrome works – Safety Procedures to ensure safety in the execution of construction and 
maintenance work on and in the vicinity of movement areas  
Apron management Procedures for apron traffic management 
Apron safety management Procedures for ensuring apron safety  
Airside vehicle control  
 
Procedures for controlling vehicles, driving permits and the 
observance of traffic regulations on movement areas and roads 
used for operations 
Wildlife hazard management  
 
Procedures for averting risks to air traffic from the presence of 
animals (birds and mammals) in the vicinity of the aerodrome  
Obstacle control  
 
Monitoring of the adherence to obstacle limitation surfaces in the 
area of the aerodrome and in its vicinity 
Removal of disabled aircraft 
 
Procedures for recovering aircraft that cannot move on or next to 
movement areas 
Handling of hazardous materials Procedures for secure handling and storage of hazardous 
substances at the aerodrome 
Low-visibility operations  Operational procedures in the event of restricted visibility / CAT 
2/3 procedures 
Protection of sites for radar and 
navigational aids 
Procedures and precautions for ensuring the working order of 
radar and navigation systems at locations in the aerodrome area 
Safety management a. Safety policy of the company 
b. SMS rules and affected persons/ procedures 
c. Names and telephone numbers of the persons responsible for 
the company’s SMS 
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Appendix Table (F) SMS Framework [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 
2005] 
 
Component Element 
Safety Management System Compliance Document, Gap Analysais, Project 
Plan 
1. Safety Management Plan 1.1 Safety Policy 
1.2 Non-Punitive Reporting Policy 
1.3 Roles, Responsibilities & Employee 
Involvement 
1.4 Communication 
1.5 Safety Planning, Objectives and Goals 
1.6 Performance Measurement 
1.7 Management Review 
2. Document Management 2.1 Identification and Maintenance of Applicable 
Regulations 
2.2 SMS Documentation 
2.3 Records Management 
3. Risk Management 
 
3.1 Reactive Processes 
3.2 Proactive Processes 
3.3 Investigation and Analysis 
3.4 Risk Management 
4. Training 4.1 Training, Awareness and Competence 
5. Quality Assurance 5.1 Operational Quality Assurance 
6. Emergency Preparedness 6.1 Emergency Preparedness and Response 
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Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
Component 1, Safety Management Plan - Element 1.1, Safety Policy 
  Is a safety management system with defined components 
established, maintained and adhered to? 
  Is the safety management system appropriate to the 
size and complexity of the Organization? 
  Is there a safety policy in place?  
  Has the organization based its safety management system on 
the safety policy? 
  Is the safety policy approved by the accountable executive? 
  Is the safety policy promoted by the accountable executive? 
  Is the safety policy reviewed periodically? 
  Is the safety policy communicated to all employees with the 
intent that they are made aware of their individual safety 
obligations?  
Component 1, Safety Management Plan - Element 1.2, Non-Punitive Safety Reporting 
  Is there a policy in place that provides immunity from 
disciplinary action for employees that report safety 
deficiencies, hazards or occurrences?  
Component 1, Safety Management Plan - Element 1.3, Roles & Responsibilities 
  Has an accountable executive been appointed with 
responsibility for ensuring that the safety management system 
is properly implemented and performing to requirements in 
all areas of the organization? 
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Continue -Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form 
[Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
  Does the accountable executive have control of the  financial 
and human resources required for the  roper 
execution of his/her SMS responsibilities? 
  Has a qualified person been appointed to manage the 
operation of the SMS? 
  Does the person managing the operation of the SMS fulfill 
the required job functions and responsibilities? 
  Are the safety authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities 
of personnel at all levels of the organization defined and 
documented? 
  Do all personnel understand their authorities, responsibilities 
and accountabilities in regards to all safety management 
processes, decisions and actions? 
Component 1, Safety Management Plan - Element 1.4, Communication 
  Are there communication processes in place within the 
organization that permit the safety management system to 
function effectively?  
  Are there communication processes in place within the 
organization that permit the safety management system to 
function effectively? 
  Are communication processes (written, meetings, electronic, 
etc.) commensurate with the size and scope of the 
organization?  
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Continue- Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
  Is information established and maintained in a suitable 
medium that provides direction in related documents?  
  Is there a process for the dissemination of safety information 
throughout the organization and a means of monitoring the 
effectiveness of this process?  
Component 1, Safety Management Plan - Element 1.5, Safety Planning, Objectives & Goals 
  Have safety objectives been established? 
  Is there a formal process to develop a coherent set of safety 
goals necessary to achieve overall safety objectives?  
  Are safety objectives and goals publicized and distributed?  
Component 1, Safety Management Plan - Element 1.6, Performance Measurement 
  Is there a formal process to develop and maintain a set of 
performance parameters to be measured? 
Component 1, Safety Management Plan - Element 1.7, Management Review 
  Are regular and periodic, planned reviews of company safety 
performance and achievement including an examination of 
the company’s Safety Management System conducted to 
ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness? 
  Is there a process to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective 
actions? 
Component 2, Documentation - Element 2.1, Identification & Maintenance of Applicable Regulations 
  Has a documented procedure been established and 
maintained for identifying applicable regulatory 
requirements? 
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  Continue -Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form [Transport 
Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
  Are Regulations, Standards and Exemptions periodically 
reviewed to ensure that the most current information is 
available?  
Component 2, Documentation - Element 2.2, SMS Documentation 
  Is there consolidated documentation that describes the safety 
management system and the interrelationship between all of 
its elements?  
  Does this information reside or is it incorporated by reference 
into approved documentation, such as Company Operations 
Manual, Maintenance Control/ Policy Manual, Airport 
Operations Manual, as applicable, and where these approved 
documents are not required by regulation, the organization 
includes the information in a separate, controlled document?  
Component 2, Documentation - Element 2.3, Records Management 
  Does the organization have a records system that ensures the 
generation and retention of all records necessary to document 
and support operational requirements, and is in accordance 
with applicable regulatory requirements?  
  Does the system provide the control processes necessary to 
ensure appropriate identification, legibility, storage, 
protection, archiving, retrieval, retention time, and disposition 
of records? 
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  Continue- Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form 
[Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
Component 3, Safety Oversight - Element, 3.1, Reactive Processes 
  Does the organization have a reactive process or system that 
provides for the capture of internal information including 
incidents, accidents and other data relevant to SMS? 
  Is the reactive reporting process simple, accessible and 
commensurate with the size of the organization? 
  Are reactive reports reviewed at the appropriate level of 
management?  
  Is there a feedback process notify contributors that their 
reports have been received and to share the results of the 
analysis?  
  Is there a process in place to monitor and analyze trends? 
  Are corrective and preventive actions generated in response 
to event analysis?  
Component 3, Safety Oversight - Element, 3.2, Proactive Processes 
  Does the organization have a process or system that 
provides for the capture of internal information including 
hazard identification, occurrences and other data relevant to 
SMS?  
  Is the proactive reporting process simple, accessible and 
commensurate with the size of the organization?  
  Are proactive reports reviewed at the appropriate level of 
management?  
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Continue- Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
  Is there a feedback process to notify contributors that their 
reports have been received and to share the results of the 
analysis? 
  Is there a process in place to monitor and analyze trends? 
  Has the organization planned self-evaluation processes, such 
as regularly scheduled reviews, evaluations, surveys, 
operational audits, assessments, etc.?  
  Are corrective and preventive actions generated in response 
to hazard analysis?  
  Is a process in place for analyzing changes to operations or 
key personnel for hazards? 
Component 3, Safety Oversight - Element, 3.3, Investigation & Analysis 
  Are there procedures in place for the conduct of 
investigations?  
  Do measures exist that ensure all reported occurrences and 
deficiencies are investigated?  
  Is there a process to ensure that occurrences and deficiencie
reported are analyzed to identify contributing and root causes?
  Are corrective and preventative actions generated in response 
to event investigation and analysis? 
Component 3, Safety Oversight - Element, 3.4, Risk Management 
  Is there a structured process for the assessment of risk 
associated with identified hazards, expressed in terms of 
severity, level of exposure and probability of occurrence?  
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  Continue-Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form 
[Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
  Are there criteria for evaluating risk and the tolerable level of 
risk the organization is willing to accept?  
  Does the organization have risk control strategies that include 
corrective/ preventive action plans to prevent recurrence of 
reported occurrences and deficiencies? 
  Does the organization have a process for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the corrective/preventive measures that have 
been developed?  
  Are corrective/ preventive actions, including timelines, 
documented?  
Component 4, Training - Element 4.1, Training, Awareness & Competence 
  Is there a documented process to identify training 
requirements so that personnel are competent to perform their 
duties? 
  Is there a validation process that measures the effectiveness of 
training? 
  Does the training include 
initial, recurrent and update 
training, as applicable?  
  Is the organization’s safety management training incorporated 
into indoctrination training upon employment?  
  Does the training include human and organizational factors?  
  Is there emergency preparedness and response training for 
affected personnel? 
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Continue- Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
Component 5, Quality Assurance - Element 5.1, Operational Quality Assurance 
  Is a quality assurance system established and maintained and 
is under the management of an appropriate person? 
  Does the organization conduct reviews and audits of its 
processes, its procedures, analyses, inspections and training?  
  Does the organization have a system to monitor for 
completeness, the internal reporting process and the 
corrective action completion? 
  Is there an operationally independent audit function with the 
authority required to carry out an effective internal evaluation 
program? 
  Does the quality assurance system cover all functions defined 
within the certificate(s)?  
  Are there defined audit scope, criteria, frequency and 
methods?  
  Are there selection/training process to ensure the  objectivity 
and competence of auditors as well as the impartiality of the 
audit process?  
  Is there a procedure for reporting audit results and 
maintaining records? 
  Is there a procedure outlining requirements for timely 
corrective and preventive action in response to audit results?  
  Is there a procedure to record verification of action(s) taken 
and the reporting of verification results?  
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Continue -Appendix (G) Gap Analysis Form [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
If yes, state where the 
requirement is addressed, If no, 
record SMS processes that need 
further development 
Response
(Yes/No) 
 
Safety Management 
System Requirements 
  Does the organization perform periodic Management reviews 
of safety critical functions and relevant safety or quality 
issues that arise from the internal evaluation program? 
Component 6, Emergency Preparedness - Element 6.1, Emergency Preparedness & Response 
  Does the organization have an emergency preparedness 
procedure, appropriate to the size, nature and complexity of 
the organization? 
  Have the Emergency preparedness procedures been 
documented, implemented and assigned to a responsible 
manager? 
  Have the emergency preparedness procedures been 
periodically reviewed as a part of the management review and 
after key personnel or organizational change?  
  Does the organization have a process to distribute the ERP 
procedures and to communicate the content to all personnel?  
  Has the organization conducted drills and exercises with all 
key personnel at intervals defined in the approved control 
manual? 
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Appendix (H) Safety Plan [Transport Canada Civil Aviation, 2005] 
 
Component or Element 
(identified by the gap 
analysis) 
Regulatory 
Reference 
 
Due Date 
 
Project 
Manager 
 
Project Status 
Update 
recommended 
Description 
of Required 
Changes 
Develop and document a 
safety policy that is 
appropriate to the size and 
complexity of the 
organization 
Add 
applicable 
reference 
 
Select a due 
date that will 
coincide with 
the terms of 
the 
Exemption 
As assigned 
 
Select a status 
update that is 
mid way to the 
due date 
 
- develop appropriate 
safety policy text-  
amend applicable 
company documents 
-communicate policy 
to staff 
Ensure that the safety 
policy states the 
organization’s intentions, 
management principles and 
commitment to continuous 
improvement 
 
“ 
 
 
“ 
 
 
As assigned 
 
 
“ 
 
- develop appropriate 
safety policy amend 
applicable company 
documents 
-communicate policy 
to staff 
Safety policy approved by 
the accountable executive 
 
 
“ 
 
 
“ 
 
As assigned 
 
 
“ 
 
-accountable 
executive to endorse 
safety policy in 
applicable company 
documents 
Ensure the safety policy is 
promoted by the 
accountable executive 
 
 
“ 
 
 
“ 
 
As assigned 
 
 
“ 
 
- establish methods 
for accountable 
executive to promote 
the safety policy-
amend applicable 
documents 
Develop periodic review of 
safety policy 
 
 
“ 
 
 
“ 
 
 
As assigned 
 
 
“ 
 
- develop procedures 
for periodic review 
- amend applicable 
documents 
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